

Congressional Budget Office

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Approaches for Managing the Costs of U.S. Nuclear Forces, 2017 to 2046

Carnegie Endowment for International Peace

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This presentation summarizes information available in Congressional Budget Office, *Approaches for Managing the Costs of U.S. Nuclear Forces, 2017 to 2046* (October 2017), www.cbo.gov/publication/53211

Task and Approach

CBO was asked to

- Estimate the costs of plans to develop, sustain, and field existing and future nuclear forces
- Analyze approaches to manage costs by adjusting modernization plans
- Estimates for the report are based on 2017 budget plans
 - Used the same methodology that CBO used for biannual 10-year cost estimates (with several important exceptions)
 - Projected DoD's and DOE's existing plans out to 2046, including average cost growth experienced historically for similar programs
 - Performed independent estimates of major modernization programs using parametric models based on historical data or actual costs of similar programs

Projected Costs of U.S. Nuclear Forces, 2017 to 2046

Billions of 2017 Dollars

	30-Year Costs
Strategic Nuclear Delivery Systems and Weapons	
Ballistic missile submarines	313
Intercontinental ballistic missiles	149
Bombers	266
Other nuclear activities	44
Subtotal	772
Tactical Nuclear Delivery Systems and Weapons	25
Nuclear Weapons Laboratories and Supporting Activities	261
Command, Control, Communications, and Early-Warning Systems	184
Total Estimated Costs of Nuclear Forces	1,242

Source: Congressional Budget Office, using information from the Department of Defense and the Department of Energy.


Differences Between CBO's 30-year and 10-year Cost Estimates

■ Different time scale

- 30-year time scale to capture full modernization cycle
- Constant dollars instead of nominal dollars
 - Inflation can distort analysis over longer periods
- Different allocation of bomber costs
 - Current study used 100 percent of B-2, B-52, and B-21 costs because some options delayed or reduced the size of the B-21 fleet
 - Current study noted costs (and savings) if one used 25 percent of B-52 and B-21 costs, as in the 10-year estimates

Annual Costs of Nuclear Forces, 2017 to 2046






Source: Congressional Budget Office, using data from the Department of Defense and the Department of Energy.

NC3 = Nuclear command, control, communications, and early-warning systems.



Approximate Modernization Timelines



Source: Congressional Budget Office, using data from the Department of Defense and the Department of Energy.


^{* =} program continues beyond 2046

Options That Would Reduce the Costs of Nuclear Forces

- CBO developed nine options based on three general approaches
 - Delay some modernization programs (one option)
 - Reduce force structure but keep warheads at New START levels (five options)
 - Reduce force structure and the number of warheads (three options)
- For each option, CBO
 - Estimated savings relative to costs of planned forces
 - If implemented for the next generation of systems
 - If implemented for the current generation of systems
 - Assessed the impact on capability relative to that of planned forces
 - Number of warheads in three categories
 - Characteristics under three scenarios (crisis management, limited nuclear strike, large-scale nuclear exchange)

One Option that would Delay Some Modernization Programs

Billions of 2017 Dollars



Source: Congressional Budget Office.

Option 1 would delay development of the new intercontinental ballistic missile, the B-21 bomber, and interoperable warheads.

Five Options that Would Reduce Force Structure but Keep 1,550 Warheads

Billions of 2017 Dollars

	Numbe	r of Platfor	ms in 2046	30-Year Savings Relative to Costs of the 2017 Plan			
Option	SSBNs ICBM:		Nuclear Bombers	Savings in Modernization Programs Only	Total Savings		
Option 2: Forgo Nuclear Cruise Missiles	12	450	120	23	28 (2%)		
Option 3: Forgo Nuclear Bombs	12	450	120	15	27 (2%)		
Option 4: Field a Triad With 10 SSBNs and 300 ICBMs	10	300	120	25	30 (2%)		
Option 5: Field a Dyad Without Bombers	12	450	None	50	71 (6%)		
Option 6: Field a Dyad Without ICBMs	12	None	120	88	120 (10%)		

Source: Congressional Budget Office using information from the Department of Defense and the Department of Energy.



Effects on Capability for Options at 1,550 Warheads

			Capability of Option Relative to Planned Forces							
	Number of Warheads			Crisis Mgmt.	Limit	Limited Nuclear Strike		Large-Scale Nuclear Exchange		
	Deployed	On Alert	Survivable	Ability to Signal Intent	Low-Yield Capability	Trajectory Flexibility	Capability Against Air Defenses	Prompt Response	Aim Points for Adversary	
Option 2: Forgo Nuclear Cruise Missiles										
Option 3: Forgo Nuclear Bombs										
Option 4: Field a Triad With 10 SSBNs and 300 ICBMs									\bigcirc	
Option 5: Field a Dyad Without Bombers					\bigcirc		\bigcirc			
Option 6: Field a Dyad Without ICBMs								\bigcirc		
Equal to or Greater Than Planned Forces		ter Than ⅔ o ned Forces	of $igorplus$	Between 1/3 Planned For			s Than ⅓ of nned Forces	0 1	No Capability	

Source: Congressional Budget Office.

Three Options that Would Reduce Force Structure and Decrease Warheads to 1,000

Billions of 2017 Dollars

	Numbe	er of Platfor	ms in 2046	Costs of the 2017 Plan			
Option			Nuclear Bombers	Savings in Modernization Programs Only	Total Savings		
Option 7: Field a 1,000- Warhead Triad	8	150	120	55	66 (5%)		
Option 8: Field a 1,000- Warhead Dyad Without Bombers	10	300	None	81	107 (9%)		
Option 9: Field a 1,000- Warhead Dyad Without ICBMs	10	None	120	106	139 (11%)		

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
Source: Congressional Budget Office using information from the Department of Defense and the Department of Energy.

Effects on Capability for Options at 1,000 Warheads

				Capability of Option Relative to Planned Forces						
	Number of Warheads			Crisis Mgmt.	Limited Nuclear Strike			Large-Scale Nuclear Exchange		
	Deployed	On Alert	Survivable	Ability to Signal Intent	Low-Yield Capability	Trajectory Flexibility	Capability Against Air Defenses	Prompt Response	Aim Points for Adversary	
Option 7: Field a 1,000-Warhead Triad										
Option 8: Field a 1,000-Warhead Dyad Without Bombers		\bigcirc			\bigcirc					
Option 9: Field a 1,000- Warhead Dyad Without ICBMs										

Source: Congressional Budget Office.

Total Costs of CBO's Force Structure Options



Source: Congressional Budget Office.

Option 1 is not included in this figure. Although that option would have net savings over the 2017–2046 period, they would be realized largely by delaying costs until after 2046.