


Budget Issue  
Paper for  
Fiscal Year 1980

# The Selective Service System: Mobilization Capabilities and Options for Improvement

November  
1978





THE SELECTIVE SERVICE SYSTEM:  
MOBILIZATION CAPABILITIES  
AND OPTIONS FOR IMPROVEMENT

The Congress of the United States  
Congressional Budget Office



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PREFACE

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Since the turn of the century, Selective Service has played a vital role in supplying manpower to the armed forces, especially in times of crisis. Given its mission, Selective Service has often been the subject of intense debate within the Congress. The most recent debate has focused on the appropriate peacetime organization for Selective Service. The armed forces now operate as an all-volunteer force, but with contingency plans requiring a very rapid return to the draft in the event U.S. forces must be fully mobilized. Can Selective Service meet the wartime induction schedule now required by the Department of Defense? If not, can any of the changes to Selective Service recently debated in the Congress ensure that those requirements will be met? This budget issue paper, prepared at the request of the House Armed Services Committee, examines these questions and provides estimates of present wartime induction capability and projections under alternative methods of peacetime operation for Selective Service.

This paper was prepared by Daniel F. Huck of the National Security and International Affairs Division of the Congressional Budget Office, under the supervision of David S.C. Chu. The author gratefully acknowledges the assistance of Alfred B. Fitt, Andrew Hamilton, Bob Hale, and Nancy Swope. Consulting support was provided by Kenneth J. Coffey and Saul H. Gass. Assistance in the use of a computer simulation model to support this study was provided by Penny Johnson and Paul Levy at the Department of Transportation. Patricia H. Johnston and Johanna Zacharias edited the manuscript; Connie Leonard prepared it for publication. In accordance with CBO's mandate to provide objective analysis, the paper offers no recommendations.

Alice M. Rivlin  
Director

November 1978



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FIGURE

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## SUMMARY

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The size and structure of the Selective Service System during peacetime has been a subject of recurring debate since the transition to an all-volunteer force began in the early 1970s. With the end of peacetime conscription, Selective Service was reduced to a caretaker operation, conducting neither registration nor classification. Yet, it is widely agreed that the current standby posture of Selective Service is unsatisfactory. It does not provide adequate assurance that it could meet the wartime induction requirements of the Defense Department's most demanding scenario: a conventional war in Europe between NATO and Warsaw Pact forces.

The House Armed Services Committee has, therefore, asked CBO to address the following questions:

- o What is the current induction delivery capability of Selective Service?
- o What improvements, if any, in meeting Department of Defense (DoD) wartime manpower induction requirements could have been expected under the Administration's proposed \$9.5 million budget for fiscal year 1979?
- o What improvements, if any, would accrue to Selective Service if a budget of \$17 million were provided, as requested by the House Armed Services Committee, to include funds for reinstating peacetime registration and classification?

Answering these questions and evaluating the costs and effects of several alternatives to improve current induction capabilities are the focus of this study.

### CHANGING WARTIME INDUCTION REQUIREMENTS AND A NEW ROLE FOR SELECTIVE SERVICE

At the outset, it is important to note that the wartime role of Selective Service has changed. Should a military crisis develop in Europe similar to the scenario now envisaged by DoD,

Selective Service would have only 30 days to begin delivering the first inductees. Selective Service does not now have and has never had this quick-reaction capability while in standby status. When emerging from standby status in past mobilizations, Selective Service required considerably more than 30 days to start the flow of inductions.

The following table summarizes the revisions to the induction schedule that were made over the past three years. The fiscal year 1976 schedule was prepared at a time when Selective Service had an active field structure (that is, area offices and local boards) in place and planned to continue peacetime registration

INDUCTEE DELIVERY RATES ASSUMED IN SELECTIVE SERVICE SYSTEM BUDGET ESTIMATES: BY FISCAL YEAR

	1976 Actual (\$37.5 Million)	1977 Actual (\$7.1 Million)	1978 Budget (\$6.7 Million)	1979 Request (\$9.5 Million) <u>a/</u>
First Delivery of Inductees	M+30	M+110	M+110	M+30
100,000 Inductees	M+90	M+150	M+150	M+60
300,000 Inductees	NA	M+200	M+200	NA
390,000 Inductees	M+180	NA	NA	NA
480,000 Inductees	NA	M+230	M+230	NA
650,000 Inductees	NA	NA	NA	M+180

NOTE: "M" refers to the first day of mobilization. Thus, M+30 means 30 days after the start of mobilization. "NA" means "not available."

a/ The amount appropriated by the Congress was \$7.1 million, leaving staffing--and presumably induction capability--essentially unchanged from the fiscal year 1978 level.

and classification of 18-year-old males. The schedule for fiscal years 1977 and 1978 reflected Selective Service's own estimate of induction delivery capability under a standby posture, with no field structure in place and no registration and classification underway. The fiscal year 1979 schedule, prepared by DoD in October 1977, mandates a more rigorous induction timetable. This new schedule differs appreciably from Selective Service's own stated capability under a standby posture. Selective Service is now required to deliver 100,000 inductees within two months after mobilization, rather than in five months. Also, the total number of inductions required during the first six months has doubled from the fiscal year 1977-1978 levels.

Although a number of points could be raised about the size and timing of DoD's current wartime induction requirements, CBO assumed these requirements to be valid for purposes of this study and used them as a baseline against which Selective Service capability and various alternatives were measured.

#### CURRENT SELECTIVE SERVICE PLANS TO MEET DoD'S LATEST INDUCTION SCHEDULE

To meet DoD's wartime induction requirements, Selective Service plans to emerge from its standby status upon mobilization and reconstitute the bulk of the organization that existed prior to its phasedown in 1974. A comparison of the structure of Selective Service under its current standby posture and upon mobilization is displayed in the following table.

Unlike past induction operations, Selective Service intends to rely on automatic data processing (ADP) equipment to handle much of its record-keeping activities, to select inductees, and to print induction orders. Also, Selective Service plans to conduct a mass registration of 19- to 21-year-old males upon mobilization, using the states' election apparatus. Once the mass registration is completed, Selective Service will revert to a continuous registration procedure, using its reconstituted area offices as registration locations.

The reconstitution of the field structure is the principal responsibility of the 715 reserve and National Guard officers who would be activated upon mobilization and report to Selective Service. Site location, recruiting, and training of volunteers and paid employees, as well as acquisition of equipment and supplies, are to be accomplished by these officers within 30 days after mobilization.

COMPARISON OF CURRENT STANDBY AND FULLY MOBILIZED STRUCTURE OF SELECTIVE SERVICE

	Standby		Mobilized	
	Facilities	Paid (P) or Volunteer (V) Personnel <u>a/</u>	Facilities	Paid (P) or Volunteer (V) Personnel
National Headquarters	1	67 (P)	1	190 (P)
Regional Headquarters	9	31 (P)	9	200 (P)
State Headquarters	None	None	56	400 (P)
Area Offices <u>b/</u>	None	None	626	2,200 (P)
Local/State Boards	None	None	3,000	15,000 (V)
Registration <u>c/</u>	None	None	50,000	100,000 (V)

a/ Not shown here are 715 reserve officers who would be activated upon mobilization and report to Selective Service to reconstitute the field structure.

b/ Area offices provide administrative support for local boards. Continuous registration would also be conducted through these offices, supplemented by numerous volunteers.

c/ Selective Service now intends to use the states' election apparatus to conduct a mass registration, although no formal plans have been developed.

SELECTIVE SERVICE PROBLEMS IN MEETING DoD'S WARTIME INDUCTION REQUIREMENT

Based upon a review of Selective Service plans and operations, CBO has identified three major problems that would prevent Selective Service from meeting DoD's current wartime induction requirements:

- o No reliable plan for a quick, mass registration has been developed or tested that would provide Selective Service with the initial raw data it needs to begin computerized selection and induction operations.
- o The ADP support now available to Selective Service is neither adequate nor appropriate for the quick-reaction response needed to meet DoD's mobilization induction requirements.
- o The field structure proposed upon mobilization is too complex and cumbersome to be reconstituted quickly without preexisting personnel and logistical commitments in the field and is inconsistent with the automated procedures developed by Selective Service under its Emergency Military Manpower Procurement System (EMMPS).

#### CBO ESTIMATES OF SELECTIVE SERVICE'S CURRENT WARTIME INDUCTION CAPABILITY

Given these problems, CBO's most optimistic estimate is that Selective Service could not begin delivering inductees to DoD training centers until 65 days after mobilization. This time is consumed by the estimated 30 days required to organize and complete a mass registration, the 25 days required to process the data and form a file of induction notices, and the ten-day delay granted registrants prior to reporting for induction. Because of this delay in starting inductions, coupled with insufficient ADP capability, less than 60 percent of DoD's induction requirements would be met by six months after mobilization. This is depicted in the following table, along with a more pessimistic estimate that does not anticipate the first inductee until 95 days after mobilization, resulting in no more than 40 percent of DoD's requirement being met after six months.

#### No Improvement with the Administration's Proposal for Fiscal Year 1979

For fiscal year 1979, the Administration proposed a budget of \$9.5 million, about \$3 million above the fiscal year 1978 appropriation. Almost all of the increase was intended to man a larger peacetime organization and reduce the workload of reserve

DoD INDUCTION REQUIREMENTS, CBO ESTIMATES, AND SELECTIVE SERVICE'S  
STATED CAPABILITY: IN DAYS AFTER MOBILIZATION

	DoD Requirement	CBO Estimates: a/		Selective Service Estimate b/
		Optimistic	Pessimistic	
First Delivery of Inductees	M+30	M+65	M+95	M+110
100,000 Inductees	M+60	M+90	M+120	M+150
480,000 Inductees	NA	NA	NA	M+230
650,000 Inductees	M+180	M+250	M+280	NA

NOTE: "M" refers to the first day of mobilization. Thus, "M+30" means 30 days after the start of mobilization. "NA" means "not available."

a/ Assumes registration completed by M+30 days in the optimistic estimate and by M+60 days in the more pessimistic case.

b/ Estimated by Selective Service at funding levels appropriated for fiscal years 1977-1979.

officers who would be required to reconstitute 626 area offices and 56 state headquarters upon mobilization and act as liaison for the 66 AFEES operated by DoD.

Funds spent in this manner would fail to resolve the critical problems associated with efforts to conduct a quick, post-mobilization mass registration and improve the ADP support available to the organization. For these reasons, CBO estimates that no improvement in induction capability would have resulted had the Congress appropriated these additional funds. 1/

1/ The appropriations bill passed by the Congress for fiscal year 1979 contained \$7.1 million for Selective Service, sufficient to continue current operations with an allowance for wage increases and inflation.

## OPTIONS TO IMPROVE SELECTIVE SERVICE RESPONSIVENESS

Given the problems identified by CBO that would prevent Selective Service from achieving DoD's latest wartime induction requirements, this report presents three options that the Congress may wish to consider to improve Selective Service responsiveness. Each option assumes upgraded ADP support and a field structure consistent with effective performance of Selective Service's wartime mission.

- o Option I: Maintain current standby posture, but revise post-mobilization registration plans; annual cost over current policy is about \$2 million (for improved ADP support).
- o Option II: Reinstate peacetime registration; annual cost over current policy is about \$4 million.
- o Option III: Reinstate peacetime classification (in addition to registration); annual cost over current policy is about \$13 million.

All three options, summarized in the following table, can potentially meet DoD's current induction schedule. The options are arranged in order of increasing peacetime contingency preparation and decreasing risk and uncertainty associated with the timely achievement of DoD's induction goals during mobilization. Obtaining this greater assurance of meeting DoD's requirement, however, generates additional costs--certainly economic and probably social--that must be considered.

The degree to which Option I can be relied on to meet DoD's wartime induction goals depends largely on the effectiveness of the plan chosen to conduct a mass, post-mobilization registration. Selective Service intends to use the states' election apparatus for this purpose, but CBO believes other approaches offer more assurance of a timely, accurate, and comprehensive post-mobilization registration. Two alternatives that would offer such greater assurance are deriving registration data from existing computerized files of the U.S. government or using the facilities of another federal agency with an adequate field structure already in place (such as the Postal Service).

Performing registration in peacetime, as in Option II, would eliminate the risks associated with timely completion of the task during a mobilization. CBO believes it would not be cost

SUMMARY OF SELECTIVE SERVICE CURRENT MOBILIZATION INDUCTION CAPABILITY AND POLICY  
 OPTIONS FOR IMPROVEMENT

	Estimates of Induction Capability <u>a/</u>			Annual Peacetime Cost (In Millions of Dollars)
	First Inductions <u>b/</u>	M+60 Days	M+180 Days	
Base Case (Current Standby Posture-- No Registration or Classification, and Present ADP Capability)	M+65 Days	0	375,000	\$7
Option I <u>c/</u> (Maintain Standby Posture; Revise Post- M-Day Registration)	M+25 Days	100,000	650,000	\$9 <u>d/</u>
Option II <u>c/</u> (Reinstate Peacetime Registration)	M+12 Days	100,000	650,000	\$11 <u>d/</u>
Option III <u>c/</u> (Reinstate Peacetime Registration and Classification)	M+12 Days	100,000	650,000	\$20 <u>e/</u>

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 NOTE: "M" refers to the first day of mobilization. Thus, M+60 means 60 days  
 after the start of mobilization.

a/ DoD requirements for a full mobilization are: first inductee by M+30 days,  
 100,000 by M+60 days, and 650,000 by M+180 days. These cannot be exceeded  
 because of capacity limits at training facilities.

b/ This is the day on which the first inductees arrive at DoD training centers,  
 assuming no post-induction leave is granted by DoD. Arrivals prior to M+30  
 days may be delayed until training facilities are expanded to handle the  
 induction flow.

SUMMARY TABLE (Continued)

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Comments

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Assumes (somewhat optimistically) that mass registration can be completed by M+30 days. ADP equipment too slow to handle a large volume of registrant processing while simultaneously updating transactions from the field.

Assumes post-mobilization registration using existing computerized data files (primarily IRS and Social Security) or facilities of another federal agency with an adequate field structure already in place. Postal Service or another agency handles continuous registration during mobilization. Planned field structure sized to fit registrant needs and compatible with upgraded ADP support.

If successful, avoids problems associated with conducting a quick mass registration soon after mobilization. Costs not significant as long as Selective Service does not reconstitute a field structure in peacetime to conduct registration and does not institute paid media advertising to remind youth to register. All registration schemes pose uncertainty about the extent of participation. Updated registration data on at least two year-of-birth groups must be maintained to avoid mass registration during mobilization.

Like Option II, avoids problems associated with conducting a quick mass registration soon after mobilization. Peacetime classification relatively expensive and of marginal benefit, given adequate ADP support. Peacetime examination expensive and unnecessary. Classification requires peacetime field structure, assumed to include 400 area offices with appeal boards and 10 regions with no state headquarters. Radical change in field structure would require amendment to Military Selective Service Act. Fifty percent reduction in Selective Service reserve officer force. Reconstitution of field structure and registration/classification of two year-of-birth groups would take at least one year.

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c/ Each option is assumed to include upgraded ADP support and a field structure better suited to registrant needs and more compatible with upgraded ADP support. A fully capable ADP system will take at least a year of development and testing.

d/ Cost includes \$2 million annual expense for upgraded ADP support.

e/ Does not include examination during peacetime, estimated at \$16 million annually for each year-of-birth group. Also, the 50 percent reduction in the reserve officer force generates a savings to Selective Service of about \$1.5 million annually, but this would not constitute a net reduction in the federal budget if these personnel were transferred back to DoD.

effective for Selective Service to conduct a face-to-face, continuous registration during peacetime unless registrants were also classified (as in Option II). Other methods should be considered, such as relying on a self-administered, mail-in registration or the peacetime implementation of registration approaches suggested in Option I.

Option III goes one step further than Option II, requiring Selective Service to classify registrants during peacetime. Adding this second stage would make a face-to-face continuous registration administered by Selective Service more cost effective than any of the other peacetime registration alternatives. Peacetime classification would reduce the burden on Selective Service of processing this data during mobilization. Also, since this task requires a field structure, it would ensure that area offices and local boards would be available immediately upon mobilization. The ADP technology exists, however, to process rapidly the data generated by DoD's wartime induction requirements, even if classification was conducted after a mobilization, as in Options I and II. Moreover, immediate reconstitution of local boards would no longer be required, since induction notices would be issued from Selective Service headquarters.

#### Upgraded ADP Support

All three options include an upgraded ADP capability. The technology exists to replace the current ADP system with equipment and programs that will provide the large-scale, high-speed processing needed by Selective Service. CBO estimates the peacetime cost of providing this capability to be \$2 million annually (less, if time-sharing were permitted). This improvement is essential under Option I to avoid long delays in processing and preparing induction orders for the first year-of-birth group registered after mobilization. In both Options I and II, the upgraded ADP support would enable Selective Service to cope with the large volume of classification transactions (especially school postponement requests) transmitted from the field offices. To a certain extent, an improved ADP system would also lessen the need for and benefits of peacetime classification proposed under Option III. In all three options, however, a substantially upgraded ADP system is essential, should Selective Service be expected to continue with sizable induction calls beyond the initial six-month mobilization period.

## Streamlined and Compatible Field Structure

If Selective Service is to fulfill its post-mobilization responsibilities in the most efficient manner possible, it must implement a modern, streamlined field organization. At a minimum, this would entail substantially fewer reconstituted area offices and local boards than Selective Service now contemplates. The revised configuration should be tailored to suit registrant needs and be compatible with the ADP support envisioned for Selective Service in each of these options. Some additional consolidation of local boards and area offices is possible without amending the Military Selective Service Act. But any radical change, such as the elimination of a state headquarters and a shift to a regional organization, would require an amendment to the act.

CBO estimates that Selective Service's current annual budget would have to be increased by about \$13 million to reconstitute a field structure under a regional configuration without state headquarters. This would fund the lease of 400 area offices, the hiring of 650 clerical and supervisory personnel, and the cost of various administrative activities. In contrast, implementing Selective Service's planned field structure would increase the current budget by \$35 million annually.

## CHANGES NEEDED IN THE FISCAL YEAR 1980 BUDGET

Finally, regardless of the approach the Congress may choose for improving the responsiveness of Selective Service, it cannot be accomplished in a brief span of time. To provide even minimal assurance that Selective Service can meet DoD's current wartime induction schedule will require at least a year and possibly two years of development and testing of equipment and procedures. If such development and testing is funded in the fiscal year 1980 and 1981 appropriations for Selective Service, a capable system could be in place at the start of fiscal year 1982.



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CHAPTER I. THE NEED TO REEXAMINE THE SELECTIVE SERVICE SYSTEM

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THE CONTROVERSY OVER SELECTIVE SERVICE'S STANDBY POSTURE

The size and structure of the Selective Service System during peacetime has been a subject of recurring debate since the transition to an all-volunteer force began in the early 1970s. With the elimination of peacetime conscription, Selective Service was placed in standby status and its registration and classification functions were suspended. The current organization, with an annual budget of about \$7 million, is staffed by some 100 full-time employees whose purpose is to develop plans to reactivate inductions and train a cadre of 715 reserve officers to implement those plans in the event inductions must be resumed.

Selective Service was placed in standby status on the premise that it could be reactivated to meet Department of Defense (DoD) induction requirements in the event of a military emergency. 1/ Yet there appears to be wide agreement that the current standby posture of Selective Service does not provide adequate assurance that it could meet the wartime induction schedule now projected by DoD for its most demanding non-nuclear military scenario: a sudden, intense war in Europe. How to improve Selective Service capability and at what cost have been the center of the current controversy and are the focus of this report. 2/

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1/ In 1971, the Congress amended the Military Selective Service Act to authorize an active standby organization staffed by personnel (including reserve officers) capable of immediate reactivation of the system. Actual phasedown to standby status was started in 1974 with the termination of the field office structure. Registration of 18-year-old males was suspended in 1975, and nominal classification of those previously registered ended in 1976.

2/ In addition to this report requested by the House Committee on Armed Services, a number of other studies have recently been completed or are underway on various aspects of Selective Service. For example, see President's Reorganization Project,

Prior to its conversion to standby status in 1975, Selective Service maintained an elaborate field structure composed of national and state headquarters and 3,000 to 4,000 local boards manned by volunteers. This structure was supported by nearly 1,000 area offices staffed by clerical and administrative personnel. 3/ The conventional wisdom behind this expansive, labor-intensive organization was that the onerous task of inducting young men into military service would be more acceptable to the public if the selection process was carried out locally. The experience of the Civil War--in which federal enrolling officers hunted down potential conscripts in house-to-house canvasses, prompting riots and armed resistance--was the catalyst for conscription reform that vested the power to induct in local boards. 4/ If a military emergency requiring mobilization were to occur today, Selective Service plans call for a mass registration and reactivation of the state and area office structure, as well as the enlistment of thousands of volunteers to man local boards representing every county in the nation.

The debate over Selective Service capability is symptomatic of a more general concern about the nation's mobilization capabilities in the era of the all-volunteer force. Specifically, it is argued that the cost of recruiting and retaining manpower in a competitive labor market has resulted in a smaller active-duty force, one that places too much reliance on both the reserves and Selective Service as sources of rapid expansion in the

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Office of Management and Budget, Selective Service System Functions--Requirements and Organizational Location (October 1978). Also, the General Accounting Office and the Office of the Secretary of Defense are preparing reports on various aspects of Selective Service and its authorizing legislation, the Military Selective Service Act.

3/ The budget for an operation of this size approached \$100 million in fiscal year 1972. See The Selective Service System, Hearings before the Subcommittee on Investigations, House Committee on Armed Services, 94:2 (January-February 1976), p. 26.

4/ For a historical perspective on the origins of Selective Service, see Gary L. Wamsley, Selective Service and a Changing America (Columbus, Ohio: Charles E. Merrill Publishing Co., 1969), pp. 13-49.

event of a mobilization. An analysis of these broader issues, however, exceeds the scope of this report.

A SHIFT TO A MORE DEMANDING WARTIME INDUCTION SCHEDULE

When Selective Service stated that it could meet the fiscal year 1976 induction schedule shown in Table 1, it still had an extensive field structure in place. With registration and classification suspended in 1975, the field structure was dismantled and the slower, less productive induction schedule for fiscal years 1977-1978 was adopted as a realistic base for planning purposes.

TABLE 1. INDUCTEE DELIVERY RATES ASSUMED IN SELECTIVE SERVICE SYSTEM BUDGET ESTIMATES: BY FISCAL YEAR

	1976 Actual (\$37.5 Million)	1977 Actual (\$7.1 Million)	1978 Budget (\$6.7 Million)	1979 Request (\$9.5 Million) <u>a/</u>
First Delivery of Inductees	M+30	M+110	M+110	M+30
100,000 Inductees	M+90	M+150	M+150	M+60
300,000 Inductees	NA	M+200	M+200	NA
390,000 Inductees	M+180	NA	NA	NA
480,000 Inductees	NA	M+230	M+230	NA
650,000 Inductees	NA	NA	NA	M+180

NOTES: "M" refers to the first day of mobilization. Thus, M+30 means 30 days after the start of mobilization. "NA" means "not available."

a/ The amount appropriated by the Congress was \$7.1 million, leaving staffing--and presumably induction capability--essentially unchanged from the fiscal year 1978 level.

A primary factor contributing to the concern over the Selective Service System's standby capability is the recent shift by the Department of Defense to a much more demanding wartime induction schedule. In October 1977, DoD restated its induction requirements, mandating delivery of the first inductees within 30 days, 100,000 inductees within 60 days, and a total of 650,000 inductees within six months after mobilization. Under its standby status, however, Selective Service has claimed that it could only reconstitute its field structure and deliver the first inductees within four months after mobilization, providing a total of just 480,000 inductees in about eight months.

The new and more rigorous wartime induction schedule Selective Service must now plan to meet results from the Administration's desire to accelerate and enlarge the system's traditional back-up manpower supply role in view of the following factors:

- o The Administration's plan to develop a larger and more rapid reinforcement capability for U.S. conventional forces supporting NATO.
- o Concern over the adequacy of U.S. trained manpower to meet and sustain a full mobilization in the event of a NATO/Warsaw Pact conflict, in part because of the reduced size of certain reserve forces. 5/
- o A reduction in recruit training time which results in expanded capacity of DoD training centers during mobilization, and thus potentially allows induction to play a larger role in meeting DoD's manpower needs.

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5/ A distinction must be made between "full mobilization" and "total" and "partial" mobilizations. Under a full mobilization, all existing units--both active and reserve--would be activated and brought up to wartime manning levels. A partial mobilization would require only selected units--both active and reserve--to be activated and brought to wartime manning levels. Total mobilization exceeds the requirements of full mobilization in that new units are formed, such as additional divisions, that did not exist before. Selective Service would be less likely to perform a support role in a partial mobilization than it would under a full or total mobilization.

## Rapid Reinforcement for NATO

The Administration is concerned about improvements in Warsaw Pact capability to mount a conventional attack on Western Europe with little warning. To counter such a possibility, the Administration plans to improve U.S. capability to reinforce NATO forces rapidly upon mobilization. At present, the Administration estimates that it can expand the ground forces now in NATO from five divisions to roughly seven division equivalents within ten days to two weeks after a decision to mobilize. By fiscal year 1983, the Administration plans to be capable of doubling the size of U.S. ground forces in Europe from five to approximately ten division equivalents within ten days after a decision to mobilize. 6/

An accelerated mobilization timetable for NATO has secondary and tertiary effects on the entire mobilization pipeline, including Selective Service. For example, should intense combat erupt soon after mobilization, more casualties in a shorter period of time would occur than earlier scenarios envisioned. This in turn would result in a more urgent replacement need for both manpower and equipment in order to sustain military force levels in the theater of battle. While inductees could not be expected to contribute in the very early months of the war, a more responsive draft might help stabilize the military situation more quickly.

At no time in the past was Selective Service required to operate under conditions in which a large-scale conflict occurred soon after mobilization. While millions registered for the draft and were eventually inducted in both World War I and World War II, Selective Service had several months to prepare itself for such massive requirements. Even during the Korean War, when Selective Service went from no inductions in fiscal year 1950 to almost 600,000 in fiscal year 1951, an operating organization was already in place. Following the outbreak of the Korean War, Selective Service continued inductions for the next 23 years until the transition to an all-volunteer system in 1973. As a result, the Vietnam War was not marked by any rapid surge in inductions. Inductions during the peak Vietnam period of 1966

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6/ Department of Defense, Annual Report, Fiscal Year 1979, p. 7.

through 1970 ranged between 200,000 and 350,000 annually, whereas during the previous five years, they had ranged between 60,000 and 150,000 annually.

#### Adequate Manpower to Meet and Sustain a Full Mobilization

The Administration and others are also concerned that the accelerated mobilization timetable for NATO might create a shortage of aggregate manpower needed to sustain a full mobilization. Table 2 illustrates possible supplies of available manpower if DoD were required to build and sustain active-duty forces at close to four million over the first six months of a mobilization. The table shows that DoD might still experience a significant 250,000 shortage in manpower even with Selective Service meeting its new induction timetable.

Attempting to reduce this six-month deficit further with an even more responsive Selective Service System would prove fruitless unless the capacity of the training facilities was expanded. Also, DoD expects that most of the trained manpower deficit would occur during the first three months of a mobilization for NATO. Because it takes about four months to induct and train manpower, Selective Service could not be expected to reduce or eliminate these shortfalls during the early months of a mobilization. As an alternative to an even more responsive Selective Service and the necessary expansion in training facilities, DoD is exploring ways to increase its supply of trained manpower available upon mobilization. This includes incentives to increase unit manning levels in the Selected Reserve and changes in policy that will affect the size of the Individual Ready Reserve (IRR). 7/

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7/ The Selected Reserve are paid reserve personnel who are assigned to organized National Guard and reserve units. They usually train one weekend a month and attend training camp two weeks out of each year. The IRR is made up of unpaid reserve personnel who are not assigned to organized reserve units but are intended to serve as fillers and replacements for casualties. Most IRR personnel have completed an active-duty tour but, for a period of time equal to the remainder of all but their last year of a six-year military service obligation, remain subject to recall. Standby reserves are typically those in their last year of a six-year military service obligation.

TABLE 2. COMPARISON OF MILITARY MANPOWER REQUIREMENTS AND SUPPLY UNDER A FULL MOBILIZATION (NATO/WARSAW PACT CONFLICT): IN THOUSANDS

	Military Manpower
Active-Duty Trained Requirement <u>a/</u>	-3,850
Trained Manpower Assets upon M-Day	
Active duty, immediately available	1,900
Selected Reserve <u>b/</u>	750
Individual Ready Reserve (IRR) <u>b/</u>	250
Standby Reserve <u>b/</u>	<u>100</u>
Subtotal Trained upon M-Day	3,000
Additional Trained Assets by M+6 Months	
Active duty, not immediately available <u>c/</u>	100
Personnel in training on M-Day	100
Delayed Enlistment Pool (DEP)	80
Volunteers for draft (M-Day to M+2 Months) <u>d/</u>	70
Inductees <u>e/</u>	<u>250</u>
Additional Trained by M+6 Months	600
Trained Shortfall by M+6 Months <u>f/</u>	-250

SOURCES: Department of Defense, Official Guard and Reserve Manpower (July 1978); Honorable John P. White, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Manpower, Reserve Affairs and Logistics (speech before the Conference on Selective Service System Reserve Forces Personnel, Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama, April 24, 1978; processed).

NOTE: "M" refers to the first day of mobilization. Thus, "M+6 months" means six months after mobilization begins.

a/ Average strength assuming a freeze on all discharges and retirements plus cumulative net casualty replacements over M+6 months. These requirements are approximations, since DoD contends there is considerable uncertainty about these estimates.

b/ Assumes 95 percent availability rate for Selected Reserve, 70 percent for IRR, and 50 percent for Standby Reserve.

c/ Primarily students attending professional schools, those on leave, and patients, all assumed to be deployable assets.

d/ Assumes that volunteer rate (nonprior service) is the same as during peacetime for both active and reserve forces, approximately 35,000 monthly. A major war in Europe might, however, precipitate a surge in volunteers that would go well beyond the current peacetime volunteer rate.

e/ Assumes new induction delivery schedule of 100,000 by M+60 days and 650,000 by M+180 days. Given three months for training, this schedule should produce 250,000 trained inductees by M+6 months.

f/ This could be partially offset by a call-up of retired military personnel.

## Expanded Capacity in DoD Training Facilities

The 650,000-man induction objective established for Selective Service might not be sufficient to eliminate DoD's total manpower mobilization deficit, but it would fill the training facilities to capacity. An amendment to the Military Selective Service Act passed in 1975 permits new inductees to complete training and be deployed overseas with a minimum of three months of service rather than four. Barring other changes, this increases by about 25 percent the number of inductees who could be trained over a given period of time.

## Caveats in Order

Even though this study is not intended to provide an in-depth analysis of the plausibility of these wartime manpower requirements and supplies, a number of caveats are in order:

- o First, setting manpower requirements and estimating personnel availability is by no means an exact science. Estimates of casualties inflicted during wartime are subject to considerable variation, as are the anticipated availability rates for reserve personnel. Both of these factors impinge on requirements for replacements from Selective Service.
- o Second, assumptions about how much mobilization time DoD would have before a conflict begins are also subject to widespread disagreement among defense planners. The sooner a conflict begins after a decision to mobilize, the more responsive Selective Service would have to be if it were to make any contribution during the critical first six months of a conflict. If several months' mobilization time were available, there would be less concern about the existing supply of trained manpower, since Selective Service would have more time to deliver new inductees to the training facilities.
- o Third, in its mobilization planning, DoD has assumed that, once conscription resumes, the training facilities could accept a daily average of 4,000 inductees. The possibility exists, however, that this rate of inductions could not be utilized effectively by the training facilities. More than two-thirds of these inductees would be delivered to Army training centers that might lack

sufficient mobilization assets in training equipment and manpower. More generally, even if Selective Service delivery requirements were met, utilizing these replacements effectively might be limited by DoD's capability to train, deploy, and sustain them during wartime.

While recognizing these qualifications, this report assumes that the present induction requirements are valid and are therefore the primary objective against which Selective Service performance should be evaluated.

#### CURRENT PROPOSALS FOR IMPROVING THE STANDBY CAPABILITY OF SELECTIVE SERVICE

In response to DoD's much more demanding induction delivery schedule, the Administration requested an increase in the Selective Service operating budget from \$6.7 million in fiscal year 1978 to \$9.5 million in fiscal year 1979. 8/ These increased funds were intended primarily to pay for an additional 40 civilians and 200 reserve officers to speed up the reconstitution of the field structure upon mobilization.

Differences of opinion have arisen, however, over whether or not this level of funding would be adequate to meet DoD's stepped-up induction requirements. Congressional testimony by Selective Service and Defense Department officials indicated cautious optimism that the Administration's fiscal year 1979 funding request of \$9.5 million would be adequate to provide Selective Service with enough capability to meet DoD's wartime induction delivery schedule under a full mobilization. 9/

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8/ The amount actually appropriated was \$7.1 million, sufficient to continue current policy with an allowance for wage increases and inflation.

9/ For example, see Military Posture and H.R. 10929 (Department of Defense Authorization for Appropriations for Fiscal Year 1979), Hearings before the House Committee on Armed Services, 95:2 (February/March 1978), Part 5, p. 216; Selective Service System (Department of Housing and Urban Development--Independent Agencies Appropriations for Fiscal Year 1979), Hearings before the Subcommittee on HUD-Independent Agencies, House Committee on Appropriations, 95:2 (February 1978), Part 3, p. 66.

Proponents of an even larger budget for Selective Service argue that peacetime registration is essential to meeting DoD's more demanding induction delivery requirements. 10/ These proponents have suggested a total Selective Service budget of between \$15 million and \$20 million. The House Armed Services Committee included language in its report on the fiscal year 1979 defense authorization bill urging a \$17 million budget to fund the reinstatement of peacetime registration and classification. 11/ The Senate Armed Services Committee has also expressed similar concern about the level of Selective Service funding, but it has not gone as far as the House committee in calling for reinstatement of registration and classification. 12/ Opponents of peacetime registration and classification, including the Administration, argue that Selective Service can develop the capability to react quickly without reconstituting the field structure of area offices and local boards.

#### ISSUES TO BE ADDRESSED IN THIS REPORT

In view of the more rigorous DoD induction requirements and the controversy over how best to organize and fund Selective Service to meet them, the House Armed Services Committee requested CBO to answer the following questions in this report:

- o What would be the induction delivery capability of Selective Service if mobilization occurred today?
- o What improvements, if any, in meeting DoD's wartime manpower induction requirements could have been expected under the Administration's proposed \$9.5 million budget for fiscal year 1979?
- o What improvements, if any, would accrue to Selective Service if a budget of \$17 million were provided, as

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10/ The obligation of 18-year-old males to register for the draft was eliminated by an executive order in 1974.

11/ Department of Defense Appropriation Authorization Act, 1979, H. Rept. 95-1118, 95:2 (May 6, 1978), p. 34.

12/ DoD Authorizations for Appropriations for Fiscal Year 1979, Hearings before the Senate Committee on Armed Services, 95:2 (February-March 1978), Part 3, pp. 2002-2004.

recommended by the House Armed Services Committee,  
to include funds for reinstating peacetime registration  
and classification?

The remaining chapters of this report attempt to answer  
these questions and evaluate the costs and effects of several  
alternative approaches to improving current induction capa-  
bilities.



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CHAPTER II. SELECTIVE SERVICE PLANS TO RESUME INDUCTIONS UPON  
MOBILIZATION

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Under the Military Selective Service Act, <sup>1/</sup> the number of steps that a Selective Service registrant is required or entitled to take before induction are considerable and time-consuming. As a result, a massive amount of data on potential inductees would have to be processed by Selective Service in a relatively short period of time to meet DoD's more demanding schedule. This chapter discusses how Selective Service plans to meet DoD's wartime induction schedule and still conform to the statutory requirements of the Military Selective Service Act.

MAJOR PROVISIONS OF THE MILITARY SELECTIVE SERVICE ACT

The Military Selective Service Act requires a number of induction-processing functions to be performed and, in some instances, prescribes the organizational framework for carrying them out. Meeting the statutory requirements of the Act affects not only the size and structure of the organization Selective Service plans to reactivate, but also the number of registrants it must process to meet DoD's induction requirement. The relevant portions are grouped below according to six major functions, together with Selective Service plans for implementation:

- o Registration. This is the process of gathering pertinent information on potential inductees. Selective Service currently plans a mass registration of all 19- to 21-year-old males, using the states' election apparatus. While there have been a few instances of massive single-day registrations, such as in World War I and in 1940, the registration function has generally been conducted on a continuous basis throughout the country, at various sites manned by both paid and volunteer registrars.
- o Selection. The current plan is to select registrants for induction from a single year-of-birth group in numerical

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<sup>1/</sup> Public Law 90-40, as amended.

sequence by randomly assigning a number from 1 to 365 to each birthdate. When each sequence number is called, all those with the birthdate corresponding to that number will receive induction notices. Actual induction, however, will depend on the results of the classification and examination procedures. While this function was performed manually in the past, Selective Service now intends to use a central computer to process the registration data, assign random sequence numbers, and issue registration cards.

- o Classification. This function has in the past been the primary responsibility of 3,000 to 4,000 local boards representing every county in the nation. Selective Service interprets the Military Selective Service Act to authorize up to 18 classifications. Of these, thirteen are purely administrative in nature and do not require decisions at the local level. The remaining five classifications deal with conscientious objectors, clergymen, and hardship cases which are judgmental in nature and require local board decisions. Amendments to the act have eliminated occupational and educational deferments (but not temporary administrative postponements), thereby removing a substantial degree of autonomy from the local boards.
- o Induction Notification. Once an individual has completed the four steps described above and exhausted his appeal rights, he may be inducted into the Armed Forces. In the past, induction notification was carried out by the local boards. Selective Service now plans to centralize the operation at its national headquarters, relying upon computer support to prepare the induction notices. According to Selective Service, this may require an amendment to the Military Selective Service Act before inductions can be resumed.
- o Examination. Prior to World War II, physical examinations were performed by Selective Service physicians. This function is now carried out by DoD at 66 Armed Forces Entrance Examining Stations (AFEES). Should it become necessary to reinstate inductions, DoD would continue to conduct the examinations, although Selective Service would assign a portion of its reserve officer cadre force to AFEES to act in a liaison role.

- o Assignment. Once inducted, an individual can be assigned to any of the four military services. This function is typically performed by DoD personnel at the AFES, based upon service needs and capacity of the training facilities. The director of the Selective Service is charged, however, with the responsibility of assigning alternate civilian work to those classified as conscientious objectors.

These statutory provisions and other considerations affect both the number and timing of inductions. These, in turn, dictate how Selective Service would have to respond to meet DoD's more demanding induction schedule. For example, to produce the 650,000 inductions required by DoD within six months after mobilization, at least two year-of-birth groups would have to be registered and classified. This reflects CBO's estimate that less than one in seven males between the ages of 19 and 21 could be inducted immediately.

The basis for this estimate is demonstrated in Table 3, which illustrates the disposition of 20-year-old males--the first group Selective Service would register under a full mobilization. The first column ("initial") is in effect a snapshot showing the maximum number of inductions that could be expected from this age group at the beginning of a mobilization. After all postponements lapsed and applications for deferments were adjudicated, the final disposition--shown in column two ("final")--would be about one induction for every three males. CBO estimates of the availability of 19- and 20-year-old males yield similar results.

#### SELECTIVE SERVICE PLANS TO RECONSTITUTE UPON MOBILIZATION

Upon mobilization, Selective Service would be charged with carrying out most of the statutory requirements mandated by the Military Selective Service Act--that is, registration, selection, classification, and the preparation of notices for induction or assignment to alternate service. In order to conform to these statutory requirements and meet DoD's induction delivery schedule under a full mobilization, Selective Service intends to reconstitute the bulk of the organization that existed just prior to its phasedown, beginning in 1974. At that time, the field structure consisted of 56 state and territorial headquarters (staffed by 560 paid personnel), 626 area offices (1,600 paid

TABLE 3. DISPOSITION OF 20-YEAR-OLD MALES DURING MOBILIZATION:  
IN THOUSANDS

	<u>Disposition</u>	
	Initial	Final
Total 20-Year-Old Male Population (1978)	2,000	2,000
Less those:		
With current or prior military service	-250	-250
Institutionalized (hospital, prison, etc.)	<u>-50</u>	<u>-50</u>
Subtotal Those Available to Register	1,700	1,700
Less those:		
Failing to register on time or at all	-250	-100
Registered inaccurately	<u>-50</u>	<u>-30</u>
Subtotal Those Registered Who Can Be Selected for Induction Processing	1,400	1,570
Less those classified as:		
Violators	-60	-20
Postponed for school	-475	0
Postponed/delayed for other reasons	-145	0
Seeking or granted a deferment	<u>-170</u>	<u>-50</u>
Subtotal Those Available to Be Examined	550	1,500
Less those:		
Failing examination	-275	-750
Total Available to Be Inducted	275	750

SOURCES: CBO estimates based on DoD personnel information, Current Population Survey data, and Selective Service historical statistics.

personnel), offices at each AFEES (200 paid personnel), and 3,000 local and state appeal boards (manned by some 15,000 volunteers). A comparison of the structure during peacetime and after mobilization is shown in Table 4.

TABLE 4. COMPARISON OF CURRENT STANDBY AND FULLY MOBILIZED STRUCTURE OF SELECTIVE SERVICE

	Standby		Mobilized	
	Facilities	Paid (P) or Volunteer (V) Personnel <u>a/</u>	Facilities	Paid (P) or Volunteer (V) Personnel
National Headquarters	1	67 (P)	1	190 (P)
Regional Headquarters	9	31 (P)	9	200 (P)
State Headquarters	None	None	56	400 (P)
Area Offices <u>b/</u>	None	None	626	2,200 (P)
Local/State Boards	None	None	3,000	15,000 (V)
Registration <u>c/</u>	None	None	50,000	100,000 (V)

a/ Not shown are 715 reserve officers assigned to Selective Service to be used as the cadre force to reconstitute the field structure upon mobilization.

b/ Area offices provide administrative support for local boards. Continuous registration would also be conducted through these offices, supplemented by numerous volunteers.

c/ Selective Service now intends to use the state election apparatus to conduct a mass registration, although no formal plans have been developed.

But unlike past induction operations, Selective Service intends to rely on automatic data-processing equipment to handle many of the record-keeping activities, select inductees, and prepare induction orders. A mass registration of 19- to 21-year-old males would be conducted upon mobilization using the state election apparatus, although no formal plans have been developed. Once the mass registration was completed, Selective Service would revert to a continuous registration procedure, using its area offices as registration sites.

The reconstitution of the field structure and coordination of the mass registration would be the principal responsibility of 715 reserve and National Guard officers who would be activated upon mobilization and report to Selective Service. These officers would be expected to locate office space, recruit and train volunteers and paid employees, and procure equipment and supplies within 30 days after mobilization.

#### Reconstituting State Headquarters

The Military Selective Service Act requires the President to form state Selective Service headquarters in each of the 50 states, the District of Columbia, and U.S. territorial possessions. Current Selective Service plans call for the reconstitution of these state headquarters upon resumption of inductions. The existence of state Selective Service headquarters dates back to the close of the Civil War, when a study of induction methods recommended that each state be assigned an induction quota. This tradition of state involvement in Selective Service activity has continued to the present, but Selective Service now prescribes a method of national random selection that would eliminate the need for state induction quotas.

The Military Selective Service Act also requires the state headquarters to nominate and impanel local draft boards and state appeal boards. In practice, however, these appointments have been recommended by reserve and National Guard officers, with the routine approval of state officials.

The transition to more standardized induction procedures, the introduction of automatic data-processing equipment, and the reduction in the types of deferments have eliminated much of the need for state involvement in the induction process. The state headquarters can, however, perform a valuable reconstitution

service in locating office space for local boards. In fact, the majority of area offices in the past were located in federal, state, and local government office buildings.

### Reconstituting Area Offices and Draft Boards

As indicated earlier, Selective Service is proposing in its reconstitution plan to form approximately 3,000 local and state appeal boards, manned by about 15,000 volunteers, and to reactivate 626 area offices staffed with approximately 1,600 paid personnel.

The proposed field structure is based on tradition and statute rather than on projected workload. For example, the Military Selective Service Act requires each of the 3,100 counties to be represented by at least one local board having at least three members. An amendment to that act in 1970 authorized the formation of intercounty boards as a means of consolidating local operations. This step led to a reduction in local and state appeal boards from approximately 4,000 to 3,000 and area offices from over 900 to 626. It appears that further consolidation was under active consideration in 1976 after all registration/classification activities had ceased. A number of studies have recommended that these area offices be further reduced to between 300 and 500. 2/

In the past, local boards issued induction orders and maintained registrant files. Filing alone was a monumental task: in fiscal year 1970, Selective Service maintained files on 37 million registrants (although a substantial number of these did not have active files).

In the future, with adequate automatic data-processing capability, only exception processing would be handled at the local level. Induction orders would be issued by the national headquarters. Local board members would decide four kinds of judgmental cases: hardship, conscientious objector, religious occupations, and extended postponements. Files would be required only for registrants falling in these four categories.

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2/ For example, see National Advisory Commission on Selective Service, In Pursuit of Equity: Who Serves When Not All Serve? (U.S. Government Printing Office, 1967), p. 35.

## SELECTIVE SERVICE EFFORTS TO USE AUTOMATIC DATA PROCESSING

In the past, Selective Service has fulfilled its statutory responsibilities of registration, selection, classification, and induction notification with manual procedures. Various commissions and study groups that have examined Selective Service operations have recommended increased use of automation. <sup>3/</sup> Since 1973, Selective Service has been attempting to automate much of the clerical work that was performed manually in the past by volunteers and paid employees. The shift toward more automation has been made possible by greater standardization of Selective Service policies and procedures, a significant reduction in the types of judgmental classification decisions made by local boards, and technological progress in the field of automatic data processing (ADP).

The development in 1973 of a Registrant Information Bank (RIB) was the first step toward an ADP-supported operation. The RIB, however, was essentially a passive system that maintained historical records of registrants on magnetic tape. It was not an integral component of the decisionmaking process that took place within the organization. The RIB gradually evolved into what is now called the Emergency Military Manpower Procurement System (EMMPS), which may eventually become the centerpiece of Selective Service operations. The EMMPS performs three functions:

- o Registrant Selection. Under this function, the EMMPS would use registrant data already converted into machine-readable form to assign a randomly generated induction sequence number based upon a registrant's birthdate.
- o Induction Notification. Under this function, the EMMPS would prepare a magnetic tape file and/or print induction notices on preformatted mailers according to the random sequence number assigned to each registrant.
- o File Maintenance. EMMPS is intended to perform a major record-keeping function and update registrant files with new data from the field. Status reports would be transmitted from the national headquarters to the field, thus eliminating the need for local offices to compile files for each registrant.

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<sup>3/</sup> Ibid.

The concept for EMPS appears to conform to the statutory provisions of the Selective Service Act in that it incorporates random selection procedures and standardizes the administrative actions following the issuance of induction orders. It also permits exception processing by local boards in cases where a judgmental classification decision is required. Selective Service maintains, however, that the act vests sole authority in local boards to issue induction orders and that an amendment would be required to permit the director of Selective Service to issue orders through automated methods.



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CHAPTER III. PROBLEMS IN MOVING FROM A STANDBY TO AN ACTIVE  
POSTURE TO MEET DoD'S WARTIME INDUCTION NEEDS

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CBO has reviewed Selective Service's current plans and operations and believes that the system cannot meet DoD's wartime induction schedule for the following reasons:

- o No reliable plan for a quick, mass registration has been developed or tested that would provide Selective Service with the initial raw data it needs to begin computerized selection and induction operations.
- o The ADP support now available to Selective Service is neither adequate nor appropriate for the quick-reaction response needed to meet DoD's mobilization induction requirements.
- o The field structure proposed upon mobilization is too complex and cumbersome to be reconstituted quickly without preexisting personnel and logistical commitments in the field and is inconsistent with the automated procedures developed by Selective Service under its Emergency Military Manpower Procurement System (EMMPS).

PROBLEMS IN CONDUCTING A QUICK POST-MOBILIZATION REGISTRATION

Selective Service has developed a registration plan for each state that describes in detail how to organize and conduct a face-to-face mass registration, followed by a continuous registration. For the most part, these 50 state plans are based on historical records of how registrations were conducted in the past. According to these plans, the Guard and Reserve officers assigned to Selective Service would be responsible for coordinating the effort to locate some 50,000 registration sites and recruit 100,000 volunteer registrars to conduct a mass registration of 19- to 21-year-old males (approximately six million in number). These plans do not respond to DoD's more demanding induction schedule; rather, they con-

form to Selective Service's own stated capability to begin a mass registration on M+60 days, with the first inductees to be delivered by M+110 days.

To meet DoD's new induction requirements, Selective Service intends to use the existing voter election apparatus in each state as an alternative to the mass registration plan described in the state documents. Selective Service believes this approach would allow a mass registration to be completed by M+15 days rather than by M+60 days, as required by the state plans. The use of state election apparatus is an appealing concept: it represents a tremendous latent capability for conducting the kind of large-scale public registration that was used at the beginning of World War I and just prior to World War II. But in practice, the state election apparatus may lack the quick-reaction capability needed to produce a comprehensive and accurate registration list within two weeks after mobilization. To have even a modest chance of success, considerable advance planning and coordination with local election jurisdictions would be required. There are as yet no plans to cope with three major problems:

Inappropriate Number and Location of Polling Sites. Nearly 300,000 polling places are currently used for elections, far exceeding the 50,000 sites envisioned by Selective Service registration plans. Just to reduce the number of registration places to a manageable level would require site selection standards tailored to the particular demographic characteristics of each area. With enough lead time, this would not be a difficult task, but an incomplete and error-ridden registration could result if the task were attempted in haste.

Lack of Coordination at the Federal/State/Local Levels. There is no chain of command for election purposes between the federal government and the states, nor are there necessarily any close ties between the states and the estimated 6,500 local election jurisdictions. Any coordinated and productive nationwide use of the election apparatus within a few days after mobilization would have to be arranged well in advance.

Lack of an Adequate Data-Conversion Plan. Regardless of the method chosen to conduct a face-to-face registration, Selective Service would have to convert the data from manual to machine-readable form before the EMMPS computer could prepare induction orders. CBO estimates that it would take 50,000 labor-

hours of effort to convert six million registration cards into a form that could be read by a computer. Selective Service has not yet developed a plan to carry out this task. 1/

#### INADEQUATE AUTOMATIC DATA-PROCESSING SUPPORT

When emerging from standby status in past mobilizations, Selective Service required considerably more than 30 days to start the flow of inductions. In order to develop the quick-reaction capability required by DoD's new induction schedule, Selective Service intends to rely heavily on ADP support.

The hardware for EMMPS is a central processor unit purchased in 1971, linked to 13 tape track units, four disk pack units, and an OCR optical scanner as a data input device. Unfortunately, the EMMPS hardware and software are neither adequate nor appropriate for operating under the crisis conditions of a full mobilization envisaged by DoD in its fiscal year 1979 planning guidance. Some of the problems associated with EMMPS are:

Slow Computer Processing of Registrant Data. In order to meet the delivery requirement of 100,000 inductions within 60 days after a mobilization, Selective Service would have to process an entire year-of-birth group within about 10 days. That translates into a daily processing rate of between 150,000 and 200,000 registrants. Based on Selective Service test runs, the current computer configuration is capable of processing only 70,000 registrant records per day. At that rate, Selective Service would fall 20 days behind schedule in preparing the first batch of induction orders for delivery.

Inefficient Processing Procedures and Programs. In addition to the problem of slow processing capabilities, the EMMPS design is primarily a tape-oriented system. The hardware/software combination selected does not permit random access to data files

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1/ The format of the Selective Service registration card itself is critical to efficient conversion into machine-readable form. For this reason, the card needs to be examined from a systems engineering standpoint to determine the optimum design that would minimize the time required to convert the data from manual to machine-readable form, keeping transcription errors within tolerable limits.

for updating purposes. Copies of all registrant records and reports generated by this system would also be maintained on tape. Selective Service estimates that, at the daily processing rate of 200,000 records that would be required to meet DoD's schedule, the system would generate between 15,000 and 20,000 tapes within a span of 30 days. Selective Service has neither a tape library management system to handle such a vast number of tapes nor adequate space in which to store them. By today's data-processing standards, this is an archaic system that is ill-suited to high-volume data processing operations, even in a noncrisis situation.

No Backup Computer System or Facilities. Selective Service does not have a backup system to rely on in the event of an equipment malfunction. More than a backup central processor unit would be required, however; an alternative site must be found with adequate facilities to accommodate the large staff and tremendous volume of tapes that would be generated by the system.

Incompatibility Between EMMPS Design and Reconstitution Plans. There appears to be some incompatibility between the design concept of EMMPS and the organization of the field structure that Selective Service would reconstitute upon mobilization. (This is discussed in more detail in the next section.) The large field structure places a considerable reporting burden on EMMPS. For example, Selective Service has estimated that it would print approximately 220,000 pages of information a day for distribution to all 56 state headquarters, 66 AFEES stations, and 626 area offices across the United States. Selective Service currently has less than one-tenth of the line-printing capacity required to produce this huge volume of reports, and it has yet to resolve the logistical problem of distributing the material to the field offices.

No Plan to Expand Computer Support. Finally, the Computer Service Center, which is responsible for the operation of the EMMPS, does not have a training program and has not identified personnel to be utilized to meet the expanded staffing requirements upon mobilization. <sup>2/</sup> Since EMMPS is critical to meeting DoD's induction schedule, reliance on inexperienced or untrained operators could have disastrous consequences for the entire effort.

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<sup>2/</sup> Selective Service estimates the computer staff would have to be expanded from 5 to 42 people upon mobilization.

## PROBLEMS WITH SELECTIVE SERVICE PLANS TO RECONSTITUTE ITS FIELD STRUCTURE

In addition to its state registration plans, Selective Service has prepared a field operations reconstitution plan for each state. These plans call for the reactivation of 3,000 local and state appeal boards, manned by about 15,000 volunteers, and 626 area offices, staffed with approximately 1,600 paid personnel. This would restore Selective Service operations to approximately their size just prior to the conversion to a standby posture in 1974. In spite of its efforts to streamline operations and develop a field structure compatible with adequate ADP support, Selective Service faces a number of problems that it has yet to resolve:

Lack of Conformity of Plans to New Induction Schedule. To date, Selective Service has not revised its plans to meet DoD's more demanding induction schedule, requiring delivery of the first inductees one month after mobilization. Each of the state reconstitution plans is still designed around Selective Service's stated induction capability for fiscal years 1977 and 1978, under which delivery of the first inductees was not required until four months after mobilization.

Outdated Information. In addition to the lack of conformity between the reconstitution plan and DoD's induction schedule, the documents themselves are not so much plans as they are historical records of how, by whom, and where Selective Service field operations were conducted in the past. For example, extensive lists of the names and addresses of past local board members are contained in the documents, but none of these individuals has been contacted to determine his interest and availability to serve in the event of a mobilization. Based upon normal mobility rates for this group, as many as one-third to one-half may have changed addresses since the lists were compiled four years ago.

No Established Field Commitments. Selective Service and the reserve officers who would have to reconstitute the system have no preexisting logistical and personnel commitments in the field. Commitments for specific office sites and equipment to support the area offices have not been secured by Selective Service.

Uneven Distribution of Reserve Officers. In some instances, a reserve officer's home is a considerable distance from the

area in which a field office would be located, and he is unfamiliar with the resources that may be available in that location. In some cases, one reserve officer would be responsible for establishing more than one area office and/or recruiting volunteers for several local boards. An extreme example can be cited in Brooklyn, New York, where the plans identify only one reserve officer to set up 24 local boards. This would require the recruitment of from 75 to 125 volunteer board members and the hiring of full-time administrative and support staff, to say nothing of the necessary logistical support. According to Selective Service, these tasks would have to be accomplished by M+15 days in order to meet the fiscal year 1979 induction delivery schedule established by DoD.

Inadequate Training of Reserve Officers. Selective Service has invested considerable time and resources in developing and conducting a training program for its reserve officers, the most intensive part of which takes place during their annual two-week active-duty tour. The training consists primarily of paper-and-pencil exercises. While the training program makes the officers aware of their responsibilities for locating office sites, hiring and training personnel, and operating the system once inductions begin, it does not necessarily make them proficient in performing these tasks. This would require that officers be actively engaged in recruiting and training volunteers and locating space for area offices, functions which are not now being performed.

Unrealistic Personnel Requirements. As far as can be determined, Selective Service based its requirements for paid staff in the area offices and state headquarters on the number of active files held in each office in 1974, with a minimum of one full-time employee assigned to each office. If this is a valid measure of workload and if the number of active files could be substantially reduced with appropriate ADP support, then the staffing requirements should be modified accordingly. Assuming that ADP improvements were made, most administrative correspondence (such as postponement requests) could be handled directly between the Computer Service Center and the registrant. Clerical personnel would be needed only to handle judgmental classification decisions of local boards. Efforts to reduce this personnel requirement through a more sensible staffing plan would reduce the burden on reserve officers.

Inconsistency Between Number of Local Boards and Projected Workload. As stated earlier, both the number and distribution of the 3,000 local boards Selective Service plans to reconstitute

are dictated more by tradition and statute than by workload. They do not reflect the elimination of educational and occupational deferments and the centralization of the induction notification process. With properly designed ADP support, the local boards would be engaged in exception processing only--primarily judgmental deferments for conscientious objectors and hardship cases. If historical data can be used as a guide, between 10 and 15 percent of all registrants could be expected to seek such judgmental deferments. Furthermore, the bulk of past judgmental classification requests were handled by a relatively small proportion of all local boards. This would suggest that Selective Service's plans to reconstitute all 3,000 local boards within two weeks after mobilization are neither prudent nor essential to an effective and equitable response capability. Again, this effort would place an excessive and unnecessary burden on Selective Service reserve officers during the crucial first month of a mobilization.

### CONCLUSIONS

In summary, Selective Service faces serious problems in the three critical areas of registration, ADP support, and reconstitution of its field structure. Unless steps are taken to correct these problems, Selective Service will not be able to meet DoD's induction schedule with any reasonable degree of assurance. Neither the registration plan nor the field structure reconstitution plan conforms to DoD's new induction schedule. A paper-and-pencil mass registration of six million youth to be completed with two weeks' notice is a complex undertaking requiring considerable advance planning; reliance on the state election apparatus to respond rapidly, based on present preparations, is risky. Even if the state election apparatus proved responsive, the ADP hardware and software is wholly inadequate to meet the high-volume processing needs of the quick-reaction organization Selective Service is supposed to become.



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CHAPTER IV. ESTIMATES OF CURRENT CAPABILITY AND THE ADMINISTRATION'S FISCAL YEAR 1979 PROPOSAL FOR IMPROVEMENT

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This chapter responds to two questions raised by the House Armed Services Committee. First, what is the current capability of Selective Service to meet DoD's wartime induction schedule? Second, what changes in capability--if any--might be expected if the proposals contained in the Administration's budget request for fiscal year 1979 were implemented? CBO estimates of current capability will be used as a baseline against which the costs and effects of the policy options described in the next chapter will be measured.

The previous chapter pointed out certain serious problems in Selective Service plans and capabilities that would prevent it from meeting DoD's current induction delivery schedule under a full mobilization. These problems centered on the reliability of the registration plan, the slow processing capability of the EMMPS computer system, and a cumbersome field structure that could not be reconstituted as quickly as intended by Selective Service.

As a result of these problems, CBO has concluded that Selective Service does not have the capability at present to follow a timely and uniform schedule of inductions. DoD training centers would not have sufficient capacity to accept inductees at a rate much higher than stated in the present schedule. Thus, the shortfall in inductions that occurred during the transition from standby to active status could not be overcome simply by accelerating DoD's induction schedule later in the mobilization. In assessing Selective Service capability, therefore, it is important to examine not only the number of induction notices it can prepare, but also the timing and speed with which it can begin sending them.

ASSUMPTIONS UNDERLYING CBO ESTIMATES

To estimate how close Selective Service could come to achieving DoD's wartime induction schedule, CBO made the following assumptions:

Registration Organized Within 30 Days. It was assumed that Selective Service could organize and conduct a registration within 30 days after mobilization, successfully registering about 85 percent of all 19- to-21-year-old males. In CBO's judgment, this is a somewhat optimistic estimate of the time that would be required to complete a mass registration. A longer delay of 60 days to complete the registration is a possible--but much more pessimistic--assumption. In choosing the more optimistic estimate, CBO has assumed that if given enough priority attention by Selective Service, the task would have at least a modest chance of completion by M+30 days.

Satisfactory Conversion Rate of Raw Data into ADP Form. It was assumed that Selective Service could convert 65,000 registrations per day from manual data into machine-readable form. This is the current estimated capacity of the EMMPS computer, with a 7 percent allowance for equipment downtime beyond normal maintenance. CBO also judges this assumption to be somewhat optimistic.

Order-of-Call Procedures Observed. It was assumed that no induction orders would be produced until all available registrants for a given year-of-birth group had been processed. This is in accordance with the "order-of-call" procedures prescribed by the Military Selective Service Act. If the delays in starting the induction process became intolerable, the President could simply order publication of a set of random sequence numbers and, through all available public media, direct males in the specified age group to appear for examination on prescribed dates. The formal induction notices could be issued after the fact.

Rapid Induction Notification by Mailgram. Induction orders would be sent by mailgram procedures now being worked out by Selective Service in cooperation with Western Union and the Postal Service. Western Union can produce as many as 300,000 induction orders per day from magnetic tapes supplied by Selective Service, with a 95 percent probability of next-day delivery to the registrant's address.

Ten-Day Delay Between Notification and Reporting. Upon receiving their induction notices, registrants would be given ten days to report for AFEES processing. Past procedures have granted 30 days. Because Selective Service plans provide only

a ten-day period between receipt of notification and appearance for examination/induction, DoD might grant an additional delay before arrival at the training center. No such post-induction leave was assumed in these estimates. Should post-induction leave time be provided, however, the amount would likely depend upon the severity of the military emergency and the available space in the training centers at that time.

Quick AFEES Mobilization. It was assumed that the Armed Forces Entrance Examining Stations (AFEES) can mobilize quickly enough to keep pace with the number of registrants Selective Service is capable of scheduling. The current mobilization plans of the Military Enlistment Processing Command (MEPCOM), which is responsible for AFEES, call for the first registrant to be delivered to AFEES by M+110 days. MEPCOM representatives have stated that this registrant acceptance date will be moved forward as Selective Service demonstrates a quicker delivery capability.

Fifty Percent of Examined Registrants Rejected. CBO assumed that fifty percent of registrants processed through AFEES (including reexaminees) would be rejected for physical and/or mental reasons. The average rejection rate for the period 1950 through 1971 was 41 percent. Results during the Vietnam era showed rejection rates approaching 50 percent, and it is this latter figure that is used in this study. Use of the lower rejection rate would not improve Selective Service's six-month induction capability.

School Postponements for One-Third of Registrants. In accordance with the Military Selective Service Act, full-time students will not be inducted until they have completed the semester. For those in their final year of school, induction will be postponed until graduation. Based upon Current Population Survey data, roughly one-third of males age 19 to 21 are in school full time. While the length of the postponement will depend upon both the time of year in which a mobilization begins and whether or not the students are in their final year of school, CBO assumed that the expected postponement time will be 90 days. Coupled with delays CBO expects Selective Service to experience in starting the induction process, this postponement will effectively exclude three-quarters of all full-time male students from being examined for induction during the first six months of a mobilization.

Local Board Decisions for Fewer than 15 Percent of Registrants. CBO assumed that fewer than 15 percent of registered youth will seek a classification (such as conscientious objector) requiring a local board decision. This assumption is based on the limited historical statistics that are available on claims for and results of judgmental classifications. These data also show that fewer than one in three requests for such classifications were actually granted by the boards. Obviously, the nature of the crisis that precipitated a full mobilization would materially affect attitudes toward conscription and the number of appeals received by Selective Service. Less favorable attitudes would likely reduce the induction yield from a fixed number of registrants called; the converse would be true if attitudes were more favorable.

Printing Requirements Met. The Computer Service Center could cope with the voluminous printing requirements needed to supply the field structure with up-to-date information. CBO has assumed that Selective Service could resolve the problems noted in Chapter III by locating sufficient printing capacity at other computer sites.

Women Not Included in the Estimates. Current law does not authorize the registration or induction of females, and the Selective Service workload estimates used in this study take only males into account. If females were included, the number of registrants could potentially double, and a corresponding increase in the Selective Service processing workload could be expected.

#### INDUCTION RESULTS UNDER CURRENT FUNDING AND POLICY

Based on these assumptions, CBO estimates that Selective Service could not provide the first inductees to DoD until at least 65 days after mobilization (M+65 days). 1/ Moreover,

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
1/ This delay results from the time required to complete a registration (30 days), process the data and prepare induction notices (25 days), and provide time to report for induction (10 days).

less than 60 percent of DoD's six-month requirement could be met within six months after mobilization. Even these results may be overstated in view of the somewhat optimistic judgment by CBO that a mass registration could be completed within 30 days after mobilization. Figure 1 displays results for this case and a more pessimistic scenario with identical assumptions, except that registration is not completed until 60 days (rather than 30 days) after mobilization. In this more pessimistic case, the first inductees would not arrive at DoD training centers until M+95 days, and only about 40 percent of DoD's requirement would be met by M+180 days.

Figure 1.

### COMPARISON OF DEFENSE DEPARTMENT REQUIREMENTS AGAINST CBO ESTIMATES OF SELECTIVE SERVICE CAPABILITY

Inductees Arriving at All Training Centers  
(in Thousands)



NOTE: The slight kinks in the CBO curves result from a fall-off in production as the Selective Service diverts its computer to processing registrant data to prepare induction orders for the next year-of-birth group.

<sup>a</sup>Based on Training Center capacity.

The base case used for comparison purposes in the next chapter is CBO's somewhat more optimistic assessment, with inductions beginning at M+65 days.

COMPARISON OF CBO ESTIMATES WITH SELECTIVE SERVICE'S STATED CAPABILITY

CBO's estimates of Selective Service's capability fall considerably short of DoD requirements. Yet these estimates exceed Selective Service's own stated capability at its current annual funding level of about \$7 million. 2/ Table 5 provides a comparison of DoD requirements, CBO estimates, and Selective Service's stated capability.

TABLE 5. DoD INDUCTION REQUIREMENTS, CBO ESTIMATES, AND SELECTIVE SERVICE'S STATED CAPABILITY: IN DAYS AFTER MOBILIZATION

	DoD Requirement	CBO Estimates: <u>a/</u>		Selective Service Estimate <u>b/</u>
		Optimistic	Pessimistic	
First Delivery of Inductees	M+30	M+65	M+95	M+110
100,000 Inductees	M+60	M+90	M+120	M+150
480,000 Inductees	NA	NA	NA	M+230
650,000 Inductees	M+180	M+250	M+280	NA

a/ Assumes registration completed by M+30 days in the optimistic estimate and by M+60 days in the more pessimistic case.

b/ Estimated by Selective Service at funding levels appropriated for fiscal years 1977-1979.

2/ The Congress appropriated \$7.1 million for fiscal year 1979, an amount sufficient to continue current operations with allowances for wage increases and inflation. Therefore, CBO assumed that Selective Service's stated capability would remain essentially unchanged from fiscal year 1978, when \$6.7 million was appropriated.

The major difference between CBO estimates and Selective Service stated capability lies in assumptions about the time required to complete a mass registration as well as the induction arrival rate at DoD training centers. Under optimistic assumptions, CBO estimates that a mass registration could be completed by M+30 days, with registrants given a ten-day delay before reporting for induction. Selective Service plans, on the other hand, assume a mass registration would not be completed until M+60 days, with registrants granted a thirty-day delay. This estimate corresponds to the more pessimistic CBO case. A 4,000-man average daily arrival rate at DoD training centers is assumed in the CBO estimates for the entire mobilization period. Selective Service assumes a 2,500-man arrival rate during the first 40 days after inductions begin, increasing to 4,000 for the remainder of the mobilization period.

#### COMPARISON OF CBO ESTIMATES WITH THE ADMINISTRATION'S PROPOSAL FOR FISCAL YEAR 1979

For fiscal year 1979, the Administration proposed a budget of \$9.5 million for Selective Service, an increase of about \$3 million over the fiscal year 1978 appropriation. <sup>3/</sup> The increase was intended primarily to provide more personnel to man a larger peacetime organization, thus reducing the workload of the reserve officers who would be required to reconstitute the field structure within two weeks after mobilization and act as liaison for the 66 AFES.

In the previous chapter, CBO questioned the need to expend more funds to reconstitute the entire field structure as planned by Selective Service within two weeks after mobilization. But more important, the Administration's proposal fails to address the problem of inadequate ADP support and makes no provision to develop a reliable plan for registration. Thus, CBO estimates that little improvement in induction capability would have resulted from adoption of the Administration's fiscal year 1979 proposal.

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<sup>3/</sup> The amount actually appropriated, however, for fiscal year 1979 was \$7.1 million, just enough to continue Selective Service operations at their current level.



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## CHAPTER V. OPTIONS TO IMPROVE SELECTIVE SERVICE RESPONSIVENESS

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There are at least three options the Congress may wish to consider for improving the responsiveness of Selective Service to meet DoD's latest wartime induction requirement:

- o Option I: Maintain current standby posture, but revise post-mobilization registration plans and upgrade ADP support.
- o Option II: Reinstate peacetime registration and upgrade ADP support.
- o Option III: Reinstate peacetime classification (in addition to registration) and upgrade ADP support.

These options, arranged in order of progressively greater peacetime contingency preparations, provide three alternative approaches to meeting DoD's current induction requirements. Additional peacetime preparations would reduce some of the risk and uncertainty associated with the timely achievement of DoD's induction goals during mobilization. Obtaining this greater assurance of meeting DoD's requirement would, however, generate additional costs--certainly economic and probably social--that must be considered. Adoption of Options II and III would lead to successively larger budgets and a more active peacetime role for Selective Service, with a greater degree of intrusion on the public. All three options assume improved ADP support, as discussed at the end of this chapter.

Each of these options is compared in Table 6 to the baseline estimates developed in the previous chapter. The baseline case uses CBO's more optimistic estimate of Selective Service's current wartime induction capability.

### OPTION I: MAINTAIN CURRENT STANDBY POSTURE, BUT REVISE POST-MOBILIZATION REGISTRATION PLANS AND UPGRADE ADP SUPPORT

For this option to succeed, Selective Service must develop a credible post-mobilization mass registration plan. Without

TABLE 6. SUMMARY OF SELECTIVE SERVICE CURRENT MOBILIZATION INDUCTION CAPABILITY AND POLICY OPTIONS FOR IMPROVEMENT

	Estimates of Induction Capability <u>a/</u>			Annual Peacetime Cost (In Millions of Dollars)
	First Inductions <u>b/</u>	M+60 Days	M+180 Days	
Base Case (Current Standby Posture-- No Registration or Classification, and Present ADP Capability)	M+65 Days	0	375,000	\$7
Option I <u>c/</u> (Maintain Standby Posture; Revise Post- M-Day Registration)	M+25 Days	100,000	650,000	\$9 <u>d/</u>
Option II <u>c/</u> (Reinstate Peacetime Registration)	M+12 Days	100,000	650,000	\$11 <u>d/</u>
Option III <u>c/</u> (Reinstate Peacetime Registration and Classification)	M+12 Days	100,000	650,000	\$20 <u>e/</u>

NOTE: "M" refers to the first day of mobilization. Thus, M+60 means 60 days after the start of mobilization.

a/ DoD requirements for a full mobilization are: first inductee by M+30 days, 100,000 by M+60 days, and 650,000 by M+180 days. These cannot be exceeded because of capacity limits at training facilities.

b/ This is the day on which the first inductees arrive at DoD training centers, assuming no post-induction leave is granted by DoD. Arrivals prior to M+30 days may be delayed until training facilities are expanded to handle the induction flow.

TABLE 6 (Continued)

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Comments

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Assumes (somewhat optimistically) that mass registration can be completed by M+30 days. ADP equipment too slow to handle a large volume of registrant processing while simultaneously updating transactions from the field.

Assumes post-mobilization registration using existing computerized data files (primarily IRS and Social Security) or facilities of another federal agency with an adequate field structure already in place. Postal Service or another agency handles continuous registration during mobilization. Planned field structure sized to fit registrant needs and compatible with upgraded ADP support.

If successful, avoids problems associated with conducting a quick mass registration soon after mobilization. Costs not significant as long as Selective Service does not reconstitute a field structure in peacetime to conduct registration and does not institute paid media advertising to remind youth to register. All registration schemes pose uncertainty about the extent of participation. Updated registration data on at least two year-of-birth groups must be maintained to avoid mass registration during mobilization.

Like Option II, avoids problems associated with conducting a quick mass registration soon after mobilization. Peacetime classification relatively expensive and of marginal benefit, given adequate ADP support. Peacetime examination expensive and unnecessary. Classification requires peacetime field structure, assumed to include 400 area offices with appeal boards and 10 regions with no state headquarters. Radical change in field structure would require amendment to Military Selective Service Act. Fifty percent reduction in Selective Service reserve officer force. Reconstitution of field structure and registration/classification of two year-of-birth groups would take at least one year.

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c/ Each option is assumed to include upgraded ADP support and a field structure better suited to registrant needs and more compatible with upgraded ADP support. A fully capable ADP system will take at least a year of development and testing.

d/ Cost includes \$2 million annual expense for upgraded ADP support.

e/ Does not include examination during peacetime, estimated at \$16 million annually for each year-of-birth group. Also, the 50 percent reduction in the reserve officer force generates a savings to Selective Service of about \$1.5 million annually, but this would not constitute a net reduction in the federal budget if these personnel were transferred back to DoD.

such a plan, Selective Service cannot offer any reasonable assurance of meeting DoD's wartime induction requirement while still maintaining a low-profile, standby posture during peacetime. CBO estimates the additional annual cost of implementing this option to be \$2 million. These funds would be used to upgrade the ADP support. CBO assumes that revision of the registration plans would not involve additional expenditures.

Because of DoD's latest induction schedule, a mass registration (including encoding of data from manual to machine-readable form) must be completed within two weeks after a decision to mobilize, rather than the two months allowed for in Selective Service plans. To accomplish this, Selective Service intends to use the states' election apparatus. Yet CBO believes this intended approach harbors too much uncertainty about how quickly 6,500 state election jurisdictions could be activated to complete a mass, face-to-face registration.

There are two possible alternatives to Selective Service's intended use of the states' election apparatus. One approach would be to compile a list of registrants from existing computerized data files of the U.S. government. A second approach would be to arrange to use the field offices of another federal agency--such as the United States Postal Service (USPS)--to conduct a face-to-face mass registration.

#### Use Existing Computerized Lists to Compile Registration Data

Rather than attempting to organize and conduct a face-to-face mass registration, Selective Service could rely on existing computerized lists to form a registration data base. For example, it appears technically feasible to merge Social Security and IRS taxpayer files to produce a current address list for up to 85 percent of all 20-year-old males. <sup>1/</sup> The Social Security Administration and Internal Revenue Service already have a major tape exchange program in effect, and they estimate it would take about three to five days to merge the files to obtain a registrant list with the necessary personal data, such as birthdate and sex, from the Social Security Administration and current addresses from IRS.

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<sup>1/</sup> This would be the first age group Selective Service intends to induct upon mobilization.

Before adopting such an approach, however, a number of factors should be considered:

- o Current law (26 U.S. Code 6103) would have to be amended to permit IRS to furnish taxpayer information to Selective Service during a mobilization.
- o Given the high mobility rate of inductable males, 2/ some addresses in IRS files might not be current, especially if several months had passed since tax returns were last filed. For example, if a mobilization occurred in the month of January, Selective Service would have to rely on the IRS for address data that were nearly one year old. This problem would make it more difficult to locate and induct a given year-of-birth group soon after a mobilization.
- o Data obtained from Social Security and IRS files could exclude at least 15 percent of those obligated to register. This estimate was based on Bureau of Labor Statistics data showing that about 85 percent of the 19- to 20-year-old population work at some time during the year. 3/ CBO presumed that most of these would appear on IRS taxpayer files. Employment (and therefore IRS coverage), however, varies when broken down by such factors as race, education, and region of the country. For example, considerably less than a complete registration could be expected among disadvantaged youth because of their poorer work history. Instead of speculating on the degree of coverage, however, the utility of the files under mobilization conditions could be tested in peacetime by IRS without releasing data on individuals.

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2/ Census data on mobility show that over a 12-month period, March 1975 to March 1976, almost 30 percent of 20-year-old males changed addresses. This high mobility rate (the national average was 17 percent) is partially attributable to full-time residence at post-secondary schools and to enlistment in the military. See Geographic Mobility: March 1975 to March 1976, Current Population Survey Reports, Series P-20, No. 305 (January 1977).

3/ Information provided to CBO by Bureau of Labor Statistics.

- o Because of the potential for incomplete coverage, especially among those with a limited work history, this method could be supplemented with other data files and by implementing a continuous face-to-face registration during mobilization. <sup>4/</sup> One procedure might be to send out registration cards through the mailgram system to all those identified on the computerized files. Those not receiving such a card, but falling within the year-of-birth group(s) liable for induction, would be instructed to report to a federal office site (such as a post office) to fill out a registration card. Such a procedure could substantially limit the workload of Selective Service and speed the accomplishment of a mass registration.

#### Rely on Other Federal Agencies to Conduct a Face-to-Face Mass Registration

Rather than planning to organize its own mass registration or using the states' election apparatus, Selective Service could rely on another federal agency with an active field structure already in place to conduct the registration. Examples of such agencies include the USPS, the Military Recruiting Commands, the Agricultural Stabilization and Conservation Service (ASCS) of the Department of Agriculture, and the United States Employment Service (USES). The USPS operates some 40,000 post offices across the nation, with an intricate distribution and collection system more than adequate to handle a rapid mass registration. The Military Recruiting Commands operate about 3,000 office sites across the nation and are accustomed to dealing with youths and processing applications. The ASCS operates 2,800 offices covering every county in the nation and might be especially useful in

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<sup>4/</sup> For example, the Department of Transportation estimates that 95 percent of 20-year-old males have drivers' licenses. Moreover, almost all states have computerized license files. Lack of current addresses and the absence of other pertinent data such as sex and social security numbers in a few of these state files poses a problem. As a result, these files could not be relied upon as a primary source for a registrant data base. Should the data formats be standardized and the states implement a vigorous program to update address information, these files could provide more comprehensive coverage than IRS taxpayer files.

conducting a registration in the less accessible rural areas. USES, which operates about 2,500 local offices across the country and specializes in taking applicant data for employment, might be especially helpful in urban areas of the country.

#### Problem of Coverage Under Each Approach

None of these alternative approaches to registration can guarantee complete and accurate coverage of inductable youths. A list derived from computerized files might substantially under-represent certain segments of the target population. The completeness of a face-to-face registration is also at risk since it depends upon youth voluntarily submitting to the registration. Obviously, the extent of such participation is dependent upon attitudes toward the mobilization. 5/

#### OPTION II: REINSTITUTE PEACETIME REGISTRATION AND UPGRADE ADP SUPPORT

An option that includes peacetime registration could be more controversial and would be more expensive than Option I. It could, however, eliminate the uncertainty associated with plans for conducting a quick, post-mobilization, mass registration. Provided Selective Service does not reestablish a field structure to conduct peacetime registration, CBO estimates the additional annual cost of this option to be \$4 million (including \$2 million for upgraded ADP support and \$2 million for registration). A number of approaches to peacetime registration can be considered. Four possibilities are:

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5/ For example, in October 1940, a mass registration of 14 million males was accomplished with close to 100 percent participation from those required to register. Selective Service attributes the high degree of participation to strong public support for mobilization efforts just prior to U.S. intervention in World War II. There is, of course, no guarantee that any future mobilization would take place under a similar set of circumstances. For a review of registration just prior to and during World War II, see Selective Service System, Registration and Selective Service, Special Monograph No. 4 (1946).

- o Derive a registration data base from existing computerized files.
- o Rely on a continuous, self-administered, mail-in registration.
- o Reinstate continuous face-to-face registration.
- o Conduct a mass, face-to-face registration once or twice a year.

#### Registration Data Base Derived from Computerized Files

This alternative would require no direct contact between Selective Service and the public. Selective Service could continue its present standby posture and maintain registrant files in the manner described under Option I for close to 85 percent of 19- to 21-year-old males liable for induction. Like Option I, this action would require that the Congress exempt Selective Service from the prohibition against use of IRS taxpayer files (26 U.S. Code 6103). Alternative uses of taxpayer files during peacetime might discourage the public from submitting accurate and complete information vital to the IRS in fulfilling its revenue collection responsibilities. For this reason, the IRS would likely resist any attempt to amend current law to permit Selective Service access to its records during peacetime.

Assuming Selective Service acquired registrant data during peacetime and had adequate ADP support, it could be prepared to start induction notification shortly after mobilization day. This would be 10 days sooner than if the data files were turned over to Selective Service upon mobilization. The time saved by this approach, however, might not produce trained inductees any sooner because of the time it would take to expand DoD's training facilities. This would depend upon both the number of volunteers awaiting training and the time of the year inductions began. The summer months are peak operating times for training new recruits, while excess capacity exists in early spring.

#### Continuous Self-Administered, Mail-In Registration

In theory, this approach could provide a greater degree of coverage than one derived from existing computerized files. Total compliance could not be assured, however, and problems

in converting the data from manual into machine-readable form might result in a registrant data base no more comprehensive than one derived from existing computerized data files. 6/ Some form of self-administered mail-in registration may be necessary to supplement other peacetime or post-mobilization registration schemes. But further improvements would be required before a self-administered system could be considered reliable as the sole method of registration.

#### Continuous Face-to-Face Registration

This has been the traditional method used to register young men for possible induction. Accessibility to applicants, not workload, would be the critical factor in determining the size of the field structure. Thus, it would not be cost effective for Selective Service to reconstitute a field structure solely to conduct a registration. Using the facilities of another federal agency with an adequate field structure already in place would be a more cost-effective approach. The same agencies mentioned in Option I to support a post-mobilization registration could be candidates for this task during peacetime. While most agencies might balk at accepting such an additional task, the military recruiting commands might find the registration task a valuable marketing opportunity, putting them in contact with prospective enlistees. With about 2,900 recruiting sites across the nation, accessibility would be quite adequate.

#### Additional Factors to Consider

While a successful peacetime registration would eliminate the risks and uncertainty associated with conducting a registration during mobilization, there are other factors to consider:

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6/ In 1977, Selective Service tested the effectiveness of optically scanning hand-printed registration forms, self-administered by approximately 10,000 military recruits. The results showed the equipment to be very reliable, but the participants made too many errors that were either uncorrectable (for example, incorrect address, birthday, etc. in about 7 percent of the cases) or correctable but too numerous to correct in an efficient and timely manner. (About 90 percent of the test registration cards contained errors of this type.)

- o Any manual approach to registration must cope with the problem of transcription and encoding errors in developing a machine-readable data base. This problem can be especially acute in a self-administered registration.
- o The degree of participation that can be anticipated from the population required to register is also highly uncertain. In a survey of its most recent peacetime registration, Selective Service found that nonparticipation was relatively higher in the urban (10 to 20 percent) areas than in the rural (1 to 5 percent) areas of the country. In addition, late registration appeared to be a widespread problem. 7/
- o Since more than three years have passed since the last registration, future registrations might need to be supplemented with paid media advertising to encourage and remind youths of their responsibility to register. While estimates of the cost of a national media campaign were not included in this option, it could easily amount to several million dollars annually.
- o Any statutory obligation to register in peacetime poses difficult and costly enforcement problems. 8/ In lieu of

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7/ Results of these surveys are summarized in Selective Service System, Contingency Planning Study Group, Selective Service in Fiscal Year 1975 (April 1973), pp. 88-96. While the survey designs did not appear to be very scientific, the evidence tentatively supported the hypothesis that declining participation rates by the population obligated to register accompanied periods of relative peace.

8/ The Military Selective Service Act, as amended, requires that males aged 18 to 26 register "at such time or times ... as shall be determined by proclamation of the President...." The Administration interprets this to mean that the President has the freedom to choose when a registration shall be conducted and thus could decide not to conduct a registration during periods of relative peace. If the Congress deemed it necessary to reinstate peacetime registration, it might choose to amend the Act with language eliminating the President's apparent discretion in the timing of registrations.

this, a voluntary program linked to some incentive system to encourage participation might be attempted. For example, application for drivers' licenses might include a requirement to register.

- o Regardless of the registration approach employed during peacetime, Selective Service must maintain an updated data base on a minimum of two year-of-birth groups. An up-to-date registration of a single year-of-birth group during peacetime would not be sufficient to avoid mass registration during the first three months of a mobilization, given DoD's current wartime induction requirement.
- o Finally, unless a mass registration for a minimum of two--and possibly three--year-of-birth groups were conducted, reliance on continuous registration would result in only a gradual build-up of registrant data. Without an initial mass registration, it could take a year or more to develop a reasonably complete registration data base.

#### OPTION III: REINSTATE PEACETIME REGISTRATION AND CLASSIFICATION AND UPGRADE ADP SUPPORT

This option would allow Selective Service to perform all its statutory functions during peacetime except induction and assignment to alternative service. <sup>9/</sup> This option goes one step further than Option II in that it calls for Selective Service to classify registrants into various available, postponed, and deferred groups.

The discussion of Option II noted that it would not be cost effective for Selective Service to operate a peacetime face-to-face registration, should the Congress recommend that the statutory function be reinstated. Should the Congress adopt the approach suggested by Option III, however, Selective Service peacetime activity would increase markedly and a field operation to handle both registration and classification would be required. The most probable course of action for Selective

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<sup>9/</sup> Examination is a statutory function included in the Military Selective Service Act, but performed by DoD. Examination is treated separately as part of this option.

Service would be to register and classify two year-of-birth groups, such as 19- and 20-year-old males. This population should be sufficient to supply DoD with its six-month, full mobilization induction requirement.

The estimated cost of establishing a field structure capable of handling peacetime registration and classification would be about \$20 million annually, or \$13 million above the current budget of \$7 million. 10/ This would allow for the lease of 400 area offices and the hiring of 650 clerical and supervisory personnel as well as travel and administrative expenses. It would not include the cost of mental and medical examinations, estimated at \$16 million annually for a single year-of-birth group. Peacetime examination appears to be both more costly and less advantageous for a rapid mobilization capability than just peacetime classification. AFEES should be able to accept a large number of registrants soon after mobilization (probably sooner and in greater numbers than the training facilities could accommodate), although performing this work in peacetime would require double shifts to handle both volunteers and registrants. Even if classified males were given preinduction physicals, it would be necessary to provide a physical inspection upon induction at the AFEES. 11/

Introducing an improved ADP system would to some extent lessen the need for and the benefit of conducting a substantial amount of classification in peacetime. If classification were reserved as a post-mobilization activity, as in Options I and II, the volume and pace of classification activity would be sizable

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10/ If the field structure were reconstituted in peacetime, fewer reserve officers now assigned to Selective Service would have to be activated upon mobilization. A 50 percent reduction in the 715 reserve officer cadre force would reduce Selective Service costs by about \$1.5 million annually. This would not result in a net savings to the federal budget, however, if these individuals were transferred back to DoD. The savings to Selective Service would, however, just about offset the estimated \$2 million annual cost of upgrading the ADP support.

11/ Historically, about 20 percent of males who receive and pass a preinduction physical fail the physical inspection upon induction.

but would not exceed the capabilities of a modern, large-scale data processing system. Also, since draft-eligible males constitute a very mobile population, with frequent changes in address and school status, it would be necessary to track their activity continuously throughout the period of induction liability. Failure to do so would diminish the benefits gained from peacetime classification.

While the demands of peacetime classification would ensure that an operational field organization would be in existence upon mobilization, the need is less immediate given the processing procedures Selective Service plans to implement. Since the central computer would issue induction notices, local boards need not be reestablished following a mass registration to start the induction process. Local boards would be necessary to handle judgmental deferment cases, but it is unlikely that their reconstitution would need to be completed until two or three months after mobilization. The large volume of administrative actions, such as school postponements, could be handled without an area office structure, given automated procedures to verify school enrollment. 12/

In summary, Option III offers little improvement over Option II in meeting DoD's wartime induction requirements. A capable ADP system should be able to cope with the large volume of classification processing even if conducted during mobilization. To a great extent, an improved ADP system is a cost-effective substitute for peacetime classification.

#### STREAMLINED AND COMPATIBLE FIELD STRUCTURE FOR EACH OPTION

If Selective Service is to fulfill its post-mobilization responsibilities in the most efficient manner possible, it must implement a modern, streamlined field organization. At a minimum,

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12/ Once mobilization begins, however, there is likely to be a substantial volume of inquiries from potential inductees. Reserve officers now assigned to Selective Service could be made available at the AFEES to man toll-free telephone banks and train others to respond to such inquiries. Rapid and earlier reconstitution of a field structure to handle such inquiries appears to be unwarranted since this responsibility could be more effectively handled at the AFEES.

this would entail reconstituting substantially fewer area offices and local boards than Selective Service now contemplates. The revised configuration should be tailored to suit registrant needs and be compatible with the ADP support envisioned in each of the three options. Some consolidation of local boards and area offices would be possible without amending the Military Selective Service Act. But any radical change, such as the elimination of state headquarters and a shift to a regional organization, would require an amendment to the act.

A more streamlined field structure would also cost substantially less than the one included in present Selective Service plans. In Option III for example, CBO estimates that the current Selective Service budget would have to be increased by about \$13 million annually to reconstitute a peacetime field structure under a regional configuration not including state headquarters. In contrast, implementing Selective Service's planned field structure would increase the current budget of \$7 million by \$35 million annually, for an annual total of \$42 million.

#### UPGRADED ADP SUPPORT REQUIRED FOR EACH OPTION

Regardless of the option chosen, each should include improved ADP support. Without such support, Selective Service would not be able to cope with the information demands generated by DoD's large induction requirement and still provide equitable treatment to registrants. A return to an entirely manual system, while feasible, would jeopardize the rapid-response capability needed to meet DoD's induction requirement.

The technology exists to replace the current ADP system with equipment and programs that will provide the large-scale, high-speed processing capability needed by Selective Service. Conversion to a newer-generation central processor unit and greater use of random access, rather than tape-oriented, data processing methods could potentially reduce the time required to prepare an induction file for a registered, single year-of-birth group from 25 to 5 days.

Rather than shifting to a larger central processor unit, another alternative would be to redistribute the processing task to outside contractors and lease or buy several mini-computers with adequate computing capacity. This also would require changes in the software (that is, the programs) and hardware (that is, both the type of computer and a shift from primarily tape to

disc-oriented operations). This configuration has the advantage of providing a more reliable backup capability and a greatly enlarged capacity to handle peak loads, especially those occurring during the initial period of mobilization. In addition, the mini-computer system could probably handle a larger number of remote site terminals for continuous feedback of information to and from the computer and the field structure than could a single central processor unit.

These alternative computer configurations would require both time to install and additional funding. If Selective Service were to procure its own equipment, an additional \$2 million would be required annually to upgrade the ADP support. This peacetime cost could be reduced by time-sharing arrangements with other government users. Conversion of the EMMPS to a more capable computer configuration could take 12 to 18 months.

#### CHANGES NEEDED IN THE FISCAL YEAR 1980 BUDGET

Finally, regardless of the approach the Congress may choose for improving the responsiveness of Selective Service, it cannot be accomplished in a brief span of time. To provide even minimal assurance that Selective Service can meet DoD's current wartime induction schedule will require at least a year and possibly two years of development and testing of equipment and procedures. If such development and testing is funded in the fiscal year 1980 and 1981 appropriations for Selective Service, a capable system could be in place at the start of fiscal year 1982.





