Notes

Unless otherwise indicated, all years referred to in describing the budgetary effects of the President’s budget proposals are federal fiscal years, which run from October 1 to September 30 and are designated by the calendar year in which they end. All years referred to in describing the economic effects of the proposals are calendar years.

The analysis in this report is based on the economic projections published by the Congressional Budget Office in January 2016. The estimates of the budgetary effects of the President’s budget proposals are relative to CBO’s March 2016 baseline projections.

Numbers in the text and tables may not add up to totals because of rounding.
# Contents

**Summary**
- How Would the President’s Proposals Affect the Economy? 1
- How Would the President’s Proposals Affect Budget Deficits? 2

**How the Individual Proposals in the President’s Budget Would Affect the Economy**
- Increasing the Size of the U.S. Population 3
- Reducing Federal Deficits 4
- Raising Marginal Tax Rates on Labor Income 5
- Raising Marginal Tax Rates on Capital Income 6
- Increasing Investment by the Federal Government 7

**The Overall Economic Effects of the President’s Proposals and Their Feedback Into the Budget**
- Effects Through 2021 8
- Effects After 2021 10

**Appendix A: How Changes in Government Policies Can Affect the Economy** 11

**Appendix B: Ranges of Estimates of the Effects of the President’s Budget Proposals on GNP, 2022 Through 2026** 15

**About This Document** 18

**Tables**
1. Projected Marginal Federal Tax Rates 5
2. Estimated Budgetary Effects of the President’s Proposals 9
3. Estimated Effects of the President’s Proposals on Real GNP 10
   B-1. Estimated Effects of the President’s Proposals on GNP From 2022 to 2026 Under Two Models 16

**Figures**
1. Deficits Projected Under CBO’s Baseline and Under the President’s Proposals 2
2. How the President’s Proposals Would Affect Population and Output 4
A Macroeconomic Analysis of the President’s 2017 Budget

Summary
Each year, after the President releases the Administration’s budget request, the Congressional Budget Office analyzes the proposals in that request. Using its own economic projections and estimating procedures, CBO projects what the federal budget would look like over the next 10 years if the President’s proposals were adopted. CBO provides that information in two reports. In general, the first report examines the proposals’ direct effects on the budget; the second, which takes more time to prepare, shows the effects that the proposals would have on the economy and how those macroeconomic effects would, in turn, feed back into the budget.

CBO’s first report typically does not incorporate any of that macroeconomic feedback. This year, however, a proposal related to immigration would affect the economy more directly than Presidential proposals usually would, chiefly by increasing the size of the labor force, and that increase would result in significantly higher receipts from income and payroll taxes. Therefore, the budgetary projections in this year’s version of the first report, which was published in March, included some feedback resulting from the immigration proposal.1

This second report describes the effects of the President’s budget request as a whole on the economy, including the effects of the immigration proposal that were incorporated into the first report. It then describes how the resulting macroeconomic feedback, combined with the proposals’ direct effects on the budget, would affect the federal government’s budget deficits.

How Would the President’s Proposals Affect the Economy?
Under the President’s proposals, the nation’s real (inflation-adjusted) gross national product (GNP) would be 0.2 percent higher, on average, during the 2017–2021 period, and 1.8 percent higher during the 2022–2026 period, than it would be under current law, CBO estimates.2 Most of that increase would be due to the immigration proposal’s expansion of the labor supply.

Because some factors that influence CBO’s projections are uncertain, CBO also makes projections using ranges of estimates of those factors. When using those ranges, the agency projects that the increase in GNP would probably be between zero and 0.5 percent over the 2017–2021 period and between 1.0 percent and 2.5 percent over the 2022–2026 period. Those ranges reflect uncertainty about three key factors that influence CBO’s projections: the effect of changes in overall demand on output, the effect of marginal tax rates on the supply of labor, and the effect of increased immigration on total factor productivity (the efficiency with which labor and capital are used to produce goods and services). However,

1. For this year’s version of the first report, see Congressional Budget Office, An Analysis of the President’s 2017 Budget (March 2016), www.cbo.gov/publication/51383. For other CBO analyses that include macroeconomic feedback from immigration proposals, see Congressional Budget Office, A Macroeconomic Analysis of the President’s 2016 Budget (August 2015), www.cbo.gov/publication/50734, and cost estimate for S. 744, the Border Security, Economic Opportunity, and Immigration Modernization Act (June 18, 2013), www.cbo.gov/publication/44225.

2. For this analysis, CBO focused on effects on GNP—the total market value of goods and services produced in a given period by the labor and capital supplied by a country’s residents, regardless of where the labor and capital are located—instead of the more commonly cited gross domestic product (GDP). In contrast to GDP, GNP excludes foreigners’ earnings on domestic investments and includes domestic residents’ foreign earnings. In a large, open economy like that of the United States, changes in GNP are therefore a better measure of changes in domestic residents’ income than are changes in GDP.
many other factors that influence CBO’s projections are also uncertain, and actual outcomes could lie outside the ranges of probable outcomes estimated by CBO.

Unlike total GNP, per capita GNP would be lower under the President’s proposals than under current law, primarily because of the immigration-related increase in the size of the population. According to CBO’s analysis, the President’s proposals would reduce per capita GNP by about 0.6 percent over the 2017–2021 period, on average, and by about 0.7 percent over the 2022–2026 period.

3. The estimated reduction in per capita GNP does not necessarily imply that current U.S. residents would be worse off under the President’s proposals than under current law. That lower per capita GNP would be for all U.S. residents under the proposals, including not only people who would be residents under current law but also the additional people who would come to the country under the immigration proposal. And as CBO explained in its analysis of S. 744—immigration legislation passed by the Senate in 2013 to which the President’s immigration proposal is similar—those additional people would have lower income, on average, than other residents, which would pull down average income and thus pull down per capita GNP. CBO has not analyzed the effects of the President’s immigration proposal on the income of people who would be U.S. residents under current law. See Congressional Budget Office, The Economic Impact of S. 744, the Border Security, Economic Opportunity, and Immigration Modernization Act (June 2013), www.cbo.gov/publication/44346.

How Would the President’s Proposals Affect Budget Deficits?

Deficits under the President’s proposals would rise from 2.3 percent of gross domestic product (GDP) in 2017 to 3.4 percent in 2026, CBO estimates (see Figure 1). By contrast, in CBO’s baseline—which is a projection of the path that federal deficits would take if current laws generally remained unchanged—deficits rise from 2.8 percent of GDP to 4.9 percent over the same period. CBO estimates that over the course of the 2017–2026 period, deficits under the President’s proposals would be a total of $2.4 trillion, or about 1 percent of GDP, smaller than they are in the baseline. That estimated difference incorporates the proposals’ direct effects on the budget and also their macroeconomic feedback into the budget.

The projected budgetary effects of the President’s proposals over 10 years vary by less than $35 billion from what CBO estimated in its first report, and they are almost identical to what was estimated in that report when measured as a percentage of GDP. The main reason is that the largest feedback effects were already incorporated into that earlier report. Another reason is that the additional feedback effects analyzed in this second report would largely offset one another. The smaller deficits resulting from the President’s proposals would raise output in the long run; that higher output would generate more tax revenue. But the workers added to the labor force under the President’s immigration proposal would increase the ratio of labor to
capital, raising the rate of return on capital and therefore raising interest rates throughout the economy; those higher interest rates would raise federal borrowing rates and thus federal interest payments. (Even though that feedback effect on interest payments would result from the immigration proposal, it was not incorporated into CBO’s first report.)

How the Individual Proposals in the President’s Budget Would Affect the Economy
If enacted, the policies proposed in the President’s 2017 budget would affect the economy in five main ways.\(^4\) They would:

- Increase the size of the U.S. population, thereby expanding the labor force and boosting total factor productivity;
- Reduce federal budget deficits, thereby reducing overall demand for goods and services in the short term and increasing national saving and private investment in the long term;
- Raise marginal tax rates on labor income, on average, thereby discouraging work;
- Raise marginal tax rates on capital income, on average, thereby discouraging saving; and
- Increase federal investment, thereby increasing productivity.

The population increase would account for most of the impact of the President’s proposals on the economy. For more information about how changes in government policies can affect the economy in general, see Appendix A.

Increasing the Size of the U.S. Population
The President has proposed altering laws related to immigration, taking an approach similar to the one that the Senate took when it passed immigration legislation in 2013.\(^5\) The President’s proposal would have a number of effects on the economy, including increases in population, employment, and economic output.

CBO estimates that by 2026, the immigration proposal would make the total number of people residing in the United States 11 million (or about 3 percent) higher than projected under current law (see Figure 2). That increase in the population would expand the labor force and employment, boosting output. At first, as employment increased, less capital would be available per worker, and workers’ average output would therefore be lower for a time. In addition, the new workers would be less skilled, on average, than the labor force under current law. Through the end of the 10-year period covered by this analysis, those factors would make average wages lower than they would be under current law—although that reduction does not necessarily imply that average wages would be lower for people who would be residents under current law. CBO has not analyzed the effects of the President’s immigration proposal on the income of those people.

Over time, the increases in the labor force and in employment would boost output in another way: They would raise capital investment, primarily because the return that people earned on a given amount of investment would be higher under the immigration proposal than it would be under current law. The increased rate of return on capital investment would occur because the larger labor force would make the existing stock of capital scarcer in relation to the supply of labor, which would make each unit of capital—a single computer, for example—more productive. The increase in the rate of return on investment would moderate over time, however, as the stock of capital grew. The greater rate of return on investment would also mean that the federal government, which competes with the private sector for investors’ money, would have to pay higher interest rates to sell its debt securities than it would under current law.

\(^4\) CBO has not estimated the economic effects of all of the President’s proposals. For example, a proposal to give states grants that would expand access to child care for low- and middle-income families could, in principle, lead to increased labor force participation among affected parents. But the Administration has not provided enough detail to allow CBO to estimate the proposal’s effects. In addition, CBO is in the process of estimating the economic effects of the Trans-Pacific Partnership, a trade agreement not yet approved by the Congress, so it has not included those effects in this analysis.

The President’s immigration proposal would also boost output by leading to higher total factor productivity, CBO anticipates. That would happen because some immigrants—highly skilled immigrants in particular—would contribute to the development of technological advancements. The increase in total factor productivity would tend to push up wages and interest rates as well. The agency’s central estimate is that immigration would boost total factor productivity by rising amounts each year; in 2026, the increase would amount to 0.7 percent. Because the effect of immigration on total factor productivity is particularly uncertain, CBO calculated a range for that effect, estimating that it would probably be between zero and an increase of 1.4 percent in 2026.

Reducing Federal Deficits
The President’s proposals would reduce federal budget deficits, mainly by raising tax revenues. That deficit reduction would reduce output in the short term but boost it in the long term.

The short-term reduction in output would occur primarily because the President’s tax proposals would reduce people’s disposable income and thus their demand for goods and services. The proposals include limiting certain individual income tax deductions for higher-income taxpayers, imposing a minimum tax on certain foreign income, imposing a tax on oil, and increasing taxes on capital gains and dividends. The resulting decrease in demand would be partly offset by increases in demand stemming from other proposals, such as increasing the limits on discretionary spending established by the Budget Control Act of 2011 and subsequent amendments, a change that would directly raise overall demand by boosting the government’s purchases of goods and services.

The net change in overall demand would depend on the proposals’ effects on government and household spending. Increases or decreases in federal purchases alter government spending dollar for dollar. Taxpayers and recipients of government transfers, by contrast, tend to adjust their spending by less than one dollar for each one-dollar change in their income. Furthermore, the adjustment in spending tends to be smaller for high-income households, which would be disproportionately affected by the President’s tax proposals, than for low-income households.

6. CBO’s central estimates are the effects predicted when key inputs to an analysis are at the midpoints of their ranges.
Table 1.
Projected Marginal Federal Tax Rates

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Effective Marginal Tax Rate on Labor Income</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rate Under Current Law (Percent)</td>
<td>29.7</td>
<td>30.1</td>
<td>30.2</td>
<td>30.4</td>
<td>30.6</td>
<td>30.7</td>
<td>30.6</td>
<td>30.7</td>
<td>30.9</td>
<td>31.0</td>
<td>31.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rate Under the President's Proposals (Percent)</td>
<td>30.1</td>
<td>30.9</td>
<td>30.9</td>
<td>31.2</td>
<td>31.4</td>
<td>31.5</td>
<td>31.4</td>
<td>31.6</td>
<td>31.8</td>
<td>32.0</td>
<td>31.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Difference</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percentage points</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>0.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>2.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Effective Marginal Tax Rate on Capital Income</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rate Under Current Law (Percent)</td>
<td>14.4</td>
<td>14.4</td>
<td>14.9</td>
<td>15.4</td>
<td>17.1</td>
<td>17.1</td>
<td>17.1</td>
<td>17.2</td>
<td>17.4</td>
<td>17.5</td>
<td>17.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rate Under the President's Proposals (Percent)</td>
<td>15.3</td>
<td>17.4</td>
<td>18.1</td>
<td>18.8</td>
<td>20.4</td>
<td>20.6</td>
<td>20.6</td>
<td>20.7</td>
<td>20.9</td>
<td>21.0</td>
<td>20.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Difference</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percentage points</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>3.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent</td>
<td>6.5</td>
<td>20.9</td>
<td>21.0</td>
<td>21.8</td>
<td>19.5</td>
<td>19.9</td>
<td>20.7</td>
<td>20.4</td>
<td>20.1</td>
<td>20.0</td>
<td>19.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Congressional Budget Office.

The effective marginal tax rate on income from labor is the share of an additional dollar of such income that is paid in federal individual income taxes and payroll taxes, averaged among taxpayers with weights proportional to their labor income.

The effective marginal tax rate on income from capital is the share of the return on an additional investment made in a particular year that will be paid in taxes over the life of that investment. Rates are calculated for different assets and industries and then averaged over all assets and industries with the shares of total asset values used as weights.

households. Nevertheless, in the case of the President’s proposals, the effect of the revenue increases is estimated to outweigh that of the spending increases, leading to a reduction in overall demand.

The long-term boost in output would occur because the decrease in deficits under the President’s proposals would represent an increase in public saving and thus in national saving. Greater national saving would increase domestic investment and the nation’s capital stock—and therefore output and income.

Raising Marginal Tax Rates on Labor Income
CBO estimates that the President’s proposed changes to the taxation of labor income would make the effective tax rate on an additional dollar of a taxpayer’s earnings higher throughout the 2017–2026 period than it would be under current law. In CBO’s baseline, that rate—called the effective marginal tax rate on labor income—is projected to rise from 30.1 percent in 2017 to 31.0 percent in 2026, as people’s income grows faster than inflation (see Table 1). The President’s proposals would increase the effective marginal tax rate on labor income by amounts ranging from 0.7 percentage points to 0.9 percentage points each year between 2017 and 2026, CBO estimates, boosting the rate in 2026 to 31.8 percent. That would cause the supply of labor, and thus economic output, to be smaller than they would be otherwise.

Most of that increase in marginal rates stems from a proposal to limit people’s tax savings from certain income exclusions and itemized deductions. Specifically, the proposal would allow taxpayers to reduce their income tax liability by no more than 28 percent of those exclusions and deductions. Also contributing to the estimated increase in marginal rates is the President’s proposal for a new minimum tax on high-income taxpayers. That proposal would replace the existing schedule of marginal rates.

7. The total amount of saving in the economy, called national saving, is the sum of public saving and private saving. Public saving consists of all surpluses of state and local governments and the federal government, plus government investment in fixed assets, minus all deficits; private saving consists of saving by households and businesses.

8. For details about how changes in tax and spending policies affect the labor supply, see Congressional Budget Office, How the Supply of Labor Responds to Changes in Fiscal Policy (October 2012), www.cbo.gov/publication/43674.
rates with a flat 30 percent marginal rate for people subject to the new minimum tax, which would increase marginal rates for some taxpayers and decrease them for others. On net, CBO estimates, the proposal would increase the marginal tax rate on labor income.

A proposal to tax domestically produced and imported petroleum products at a rate equivalent to $10.25 per barrel of crude oil would further reduce the labor supply. CBO and the staff of the Joint Committee on Taxation estimate that the proposal would increase revenues by $273 billion, accounting for about one-tenth of the total revenue increases proposed by the President. Although the proposal would not technically change taxes on labor income, much of the new tax would probably be passed on to consumers in the form of higher prices, especially for goods and services that use petroleum intensively. Those higher prices would reduce the consumers’ purchasing power, much as an increase in marginal tax rates would. In CBO’s estimates, for the sake of simplicity, the full amount of the tax is passed on to consumers, but other approaches would not significantly alter the proposal’s estimated effects.

Some of the smaller tax proposals, such as a credit for married couples with two earners, an expansion of the earned income tax credit for childless adults, and expansions of the child and child care tax credits, would have a mixed effect on marginal tax rates, decreasing them for some workers but increasing them for others. In CBO’s estimation, the net effect of those proposals would probably be small.

Raising Marginal Tax Rates on Capital Income

The President’s budget contains some policy proposals that would raise the tax rate on an additional dollar of a taxpayer’s income from capital—such as stock dividends, realized capital gains, and owners’ profits from businesses. Other proposals of the President’s would lower that rate. Taken together, CBO estimates, the proposals would increase the effective marginal tax rate on capital income, averaged over all types of investment, by 3.0 percentage points in 2017 and by slightly larger amounts thereafter, ranging from 3.1 percentage points to 3.5 percentage points (see Table 1). In CBO’s estimation, those increases would make private saving—and thus investment and output, eventually—lower than they would be otherwise.

The proposal that would produce the largest increase in the marginal tax rate on capital income would increase the maximum tax rate on dividends and capital gains to 28 percent. Another proposal would cap at 28 percent the extent to which itemized deductions and certain exclusions from income could reduce a taxpayer’s income tax liability. (That is the same proposal as the one described above in relation to labor income.) Most of the increase in effective tax rates from that proposal would result from reducing the tax benefits to some people of deducting mortgage interest and property taxes. Other proposals that would increase the marginal tax rate on capital income, beginning in 2017, include imposing a new minimum tax on high-income taxpayers; making S corporation income subject to either the net investment income tax or the self-employment tax; restricting the ability of multinational corporations to treat equity as debt; limiting the ability of domestic entities to relocate abroad; taxing carried interest at the higher rates used for ordinary income rather than at the lower rate used for capital gains; and reinstating taxes that once helped finance the Superfund program. A proposal to assess a fee on the liabilities of various financial institutions would also raise the marginal tax rate on capital income.

A few of the President’s proposals would make the marginal tax rate on capital income lower than it would be under current law. The proposal with the largest such effect would simplify and expand the tax credit that companies receive when they increase spending on research and experimentation. Another proposal would modify and extend the tax credit for producing renewable electricity. A third would expand small businesses’ ability to immediately deduct capital purchases from their taxes and to use simplified accounting methods.


10. S corporations are certain privately held corporations that are not subject to the corporate income tax; instead, their profits are passed through to their owners and taxed at the individual level. Carried interest is a type of compensation typically received by a general partner in a private equity or hedge fund; it usually consists of a share of the profits from the assets under management. The Superfund program cleans up abandoned hazardous waste sites.
Economic activity is affected not only by the average of the effective marginal rates at which capital investments are taxed but also by how uniformly such investments are taxed. If some capital investments receive more favorable tax treatment than others do, additional resources will be directed to the former even if the latter would be more productive. The proposal of the President’s that would most significantly affect the uniformity of capital taxation is the increase in taxes on capital gains and dividends, which would affect only certain types of capital income. In particular, that proposal would increase tax rates on income in the corporate sector, which already faces higher effective marginal tax rates than other types of capital income do. Mostly because of that proposal, CBO estimates that the President’s proposals as a whole would make capital taxation slightly less uniform, reducing output slightly in comparison with what it would otherwise.

CBO did not include the President’s proposal to increase estate and gift taxes in its calculation of the effective tax rate on capital income, because those taxes and income taxes may affect incentives to save differently. Instead, CBO analyzed the effect of the estate and gift tax proposals separately, estimating that each increase of a dollar in estate and gift taxes would raise national saving by about 5 cents. That increase would be the net effect of an increase in public saving, owing to higher revenues; a decrease in saving by potential donors of bequests and gifts, owing to the proposed higher tax rate on each dollar of bequests; and an increase in saving by potential and actual recipients of bequests and gifts, owing to their expectation of having less money than they would have had otherwise.

CBO’s calculation of the effective tax rate on capital income also did not account for some proposals of the President’s to change the taxation of foreign earnings. One proposal would impose a onetime tax on certain foreign earnings—but the tax would apply only to earnings that were the result of past investment decisions, so CBO estimates that the proposal would have little effect on people’s incentives to save and invest in the future. Another proposal, which would impose a minimum tax on certain foreign earnings, would have effects on domestic investment that are difficult to analyze. The proposal would increase the amount of tax paid on foreign investment, making such investment less attractive and thus probably stimulating domestic investment. However, some foreign earnings represent a return on domestic investment; by subjecting those earnings to a higher effective tax rate, the proposal would discourage domestic investment. CBO cannot determine which of those two offsetting incentives would be stronger.

**Increasing Investment by the Federal Government**

The President’s proposals would increase federal investment—that is, purchases of goods and services that are expected to increase private-sector productivity in the future—by boosting spending on surface transportation, education and job-training programs, and research and development (R&D). To that end, the President has proposed increasing the existing limits on discretionary spending for 2017 through 2021 and setting limits for the 2022–2026 period that would be higher than the amounts projected in CBO’s baseline. CBO estimates that during the 2017–2026 period, federal investment would be $514 billion greater under the President’s proposals than it is in the baseline.

Such an increase would eventually boost potential output (which is the economy’s maximum sustainable level of production) by raising productivity—by amounts that would differ by the type of investment. However, the increase in investment would probably reduce potential output slightly over the 10-year period, in CBO’s assessment: The small increases in productivity occurring during that period would be more than offset by the fact that the increase in investment would temporarily encourage people to leave the labor force and enter school (an effect that would be particularly strong for a proposed increase in investment in higher education). After completing school, however, the people who had left the labor force would rejoin it and be more productive than they would have been otherwise.

The proposed increases in investment would have a limited effect on productivity over the next decade partly because certain types of investment take a while to begin boosting output. For instance, CBO expects that the proposed increases in spending for early childhood education would boost the eventual earnings of people who are currently children in preschool, but not until after 2026.


Similarly, there would be lags between spending money on transportation and R&D and seeing potential output rise—a shorter lag in the former case, a longer one in the latter. All told, CBO estimates that only $234 billion, less than half of the total increase in federal investment, would begin to have an effect on potential output between 2017 and 2026. Most of the boost to the economy’s potential output resulting from that $234 billion increase in investment—as well as all of the other $280 billion—would occur well after 2026.

The Overall Economic Effects of the President’s Proposals and Their Feedback Into the Budget

If the policy changes proposed in the President’s budget were implemented, economic output would be lower in 2017 and 2018, but higher—by increasing amounts—in later years, CBO estimates. The proposed changes to immigration laws would raise total GNP throughout the period; the President’s other proposals, taken together, would reduce total GNP through most of the period, but by smaller amounts. Unlike total GNP, per capita GNP would be lower between 2017 and 2026 under the President’s budget than it would be under current law. CBO also estimates that the President’s proposals would boost interest rates.

Those economic effects would feed back into the budget and make deficits smaller, on balance, than they would otherwise be. The largest instance of such feedback would be the income and payroll taxes paid by the additional people who would be working in the United States under the immigration proposal. The impact of those taxes on deficits was included in CBO’s March estimates of the budgetary effects of the President’s proposals. The other feedback effects of the President’s proposals would be small and essentially offsetting.

With all macroeconomic feedback included, CBO estimates that over the 2017–2026 period, implementing the President’s proposals would make outlays $0.5 trillion higher, and revenues $2.9 trillion higher, than the agency projects under current law (see Table 2). Therefore, CBO estimates, the President’s proposals would reduce the cumulative deficit for the 10-year period by roughly $2.4 trillion—by $0.9 trillion over the 2017–2021 period and by $1.5 trillion over the 2022–2026 period.

Those estimates include the effects on federal interest payments of the proposals’ changes both to interest rates and to the amount of federal debt. (The report that CBO issued in March, by contrast, did not incorporate the effects of the proposals on interest rates.) In analyses whose scope is the budget as whole, CBO generally includes the effects on interest payments of changes to the amount of federal debt—though it does not include such effects in cost estimates for specific pieces of legislation, to be consistent with long-standing procedures used by the Congress for budget enforcement purposes.

Effects Through 2021

CBO estimates that over the course of the 2017–2021 period, the President’s proposals would make real GNP higher than it would have been under CBO’s baseline by an average of 0.2 percent; real GNP would be reduced in the first two years and then increased by growing amounts over time (see Table 3 and Figure 2 on page 4). During that period, the President’s proposals would boost economic output mainly by expanding the workforce each year through changes to immigration laws. A larger supply of workers would cause the capital stock, and therefore output, to be greater than projected in CBO’s baseline.

The President’s proposals other than the one related to immigration would combine to decrease real GNP slightly from 2017 through 2021. Those proposals would reduce overall demand, on balance: Both revenues and spending would be higher than under current law, but the higher revenues would reduce demand more than the higher spending would boost it. The proposals to increase marginal tax rates on labor and capital income would likewise dampen output, though more modestly, by reducing incentives to work and save. However, by reducing deficits, the proposals would raise private investment, which would boost output somewhat.

When estimating the macroeconomic effects of the President’s budget, CBO also generated ranges of possible outcomes, using likely ranges for key variables. The agency estimates that the increase in real GNP from 2017
Table 2.
Estimated Budgetary Effects of the President’s Proposals

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Effects on Outlays</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>-18</td>
<td>298</td>
<td>401</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Effects on Revenues</td>
<td>164</td>
<td>226</td>
<td>264</td>
<td>275</td>
<td>296</td>
<td>294</td>
<td>289</td>
<td>305</td>
<td>330</td>
<td>353</td>
<td>1,224</td>
<td>2,795</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Effects on the Deficit</td>
<td>116</td>
<td>165</td>
<td>192</td>
<td>213</td>
<td>240</td>
<td>252</td>
<td>254</td>
<td>281</td>
<td>309</td>
<td>372</td>
<td>926</td>
<td>2,394</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Effects of Additional Macroeconomic Feedback

| Effects on Outlays  | -1   | -1   | -1   | 2    | 6    | 11   | 17   | 24   | 31   | 40   | 5   | 128      |
| Effects on Revenues | -15  | -18  | -17  | -12  | -2   | 10   | 20   | 31   | 42   | 58   | -64     | 96       |
| Effects on the Deficit | -14  | -17  | -16  | -14  | -8   | -1   | 3    | 7    | 11   | 19   | -69     | -32      |

Effects With All Macroeconomic Feedback

| Effects on Outlays  | 47   | 59   | 71   | 63   | 62   | 53   | 52   | 48   | 53   | 21   | 303      | 529      |
| Effects on Revenues | 149  | 207  | 247  | 262  | 294  | 303  | 309  | 336  | 372  | 411  | 1,160    | 2,891    |
| Effects on the Deficit | 102  | 148  | 176  | 199  | 232  | 251  | 257  | 288  | 319  | 390  | 857      | 2,362    |

Memorandum:
Projected Deficit Under CBO’s March 2016 Baseline

| Projected Deficit Under CBO’s March 2016 Baseline (Percentage of GDP) | -2.8 | -2.7 | -3.4 | -3.7 | -3.9 | -4.4 | -4.4 | -4.3 | -4.6 | -4.9 | -3.3 | -4.0 |
| Projected Deficit Under the President’s Proposals With All Macroeconomic Feedback (Percentage of GDP) | -2.3 | -2.0 | -2.6 | -2.8 | -2.9 | -3.4 | -3.2 | -3.4 | -3.4 | -2.5 | -3.0 |

Source: Congressional Budget Office.

GDP = gross domestic product.

a. These are the estimates provided in CBO’s March 2016 analysis of the budgetary effects of the President’s proposals. See Congressional Budget Office, An Analysis of the President’s 2017 Budget (March 2016), www.cbo.gov/publication/51383.
b. Positive numbers indicate a decrease in the deficit; negative numbers indicate an increase in the deficit.
c. These comprise all feedback effects not included in CBO’s March 2016 analysis.
d. Each value in this group is the sum of the corresponding two values in the previous two groups.

through 2021 would range from zero to 0.5 percent. That range primarily reflects uncertainty about the effect of changes in fiscal policies on the overall demand for goods and services. There is also uncertainty about other effects of the President’s proposals on the economy, including the number and earnings of additional immigrants. However, that uncertainty is not reflected in CBO’s ranges (either for this period or for later years), so those ranges probably underestimate the total uncertainty surrounding the projected economic effects of the proposals.

Although the President’s proposals would boost total GNP, they would have the opposite effect on per capita GNP. Specifically, real per capita GNP would be an average of 0.6 percent lower between 2017 and 2021 under the President’s budget than under current law, CBO estimates (see Figure 2 on page 4). That reduction would occur mainly because the number of new workers stemming from the proposals’ changes to immigration laws would increase more rapidly than the additional amount of capital available to workers, and because the new workers would be less skilled and have lower wages, on average, than the labor force under current law.

The President’s proposals would reduce interest rates in the short term, primarily because they would lower economic activity in 2017 and 2018, but increase them in the long term, primarily because the immigration proposal would increase the rate of return on capital. Over the 2017–2021 period, interest rates would be about 0.1 percentage point higher, on average, than they would be under current law.
Table 3.

Estimated Effects of the President’s Proposals on Real GNP

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>2017–2021</th>
<th>2022–2026</th>
<th>2017–2026</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Central Estimate</strong></td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>1.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Range</strong></td>
<td>* to 0.5</td>
<td>1.0 to 2.5</td>
<td>0.5 to 1.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Congressional Budget Office.

Real GNP excludes the effects of inflation.

CBO’s central estimates are the effects predicted when key inputs to an analysis are at the midpoints of their ranges.

GNP = gross national product; * = between zero and 0.05 percent.

The macroeconomic changes caused by the President’s policies would feed back into the budget and, on net, increase the extent to which the policies reduced the deficit from 2017 through 2021. The feedback effects may be grouped into two categories:

- The first category consists of feedback effects that were included in CBO’s March estimates of the effects of the President’s budget. The largest such effect over the 2017–2021 period stems from the increase in the workforce under the immigration proposal, which would increase receipts from income and payroll taxes. This category also includes some smaller effects on revenues from the immigration proposal.
- The second category consists of feedback effects that were not included in the March estimates. They include the effects on the budget of changes in total factor productivity, the income from capital, and wage differences among workers with different skills. They also include a reduction in the labor supply and private saving stemming from the higher marginal income tax rates proposed by the President, which would reduce revenues and increase deficits. And they include the budgetary effects of changes in interest rates, which would raise the cost of interest on the government’s debt. On net, the feedback effects not included in March would, over the 2017–2021 period, make projected deficits $69 billion larger than CBO estimated in March (see Table 2).

**Effects After 2021**

In the second half of the 10-year projection period, the President’s proposals would have economic effects of the same types that they would have toward the end of the first half, and for the same reasons that were described above. Those effects would be larger, however, during the 2022–2026 period. In addition, during that period, the additional immigration under the President’s proposals would begin to have an appreciably positive effect on total factor productivity, CBO estimates.

If the President’s proposals were enacted, real GNP would be 1.8 percent higher, on average, from 2022 through 2026 than under current law, according to CBO’s central estimate; that increase could range from 1.0 percent to 2.5 percent, according to CBO’s likely ranges for key variables. That span primarily reflects uncertainty about the effect of increased immigration on total factor productivity, but it also reflects uncertainty about the effect of deficits on the capital stock owned by U.S. residents, the effect of marginal tax rates on the supply of labor, and the role of households’ expectations about future policies. (See Appendix B for more information about CBO’s ranges of estimates for the 2022–2026 period.) Interest rates would be about 0.3 percentage points higher, on average, from 2022 through 2026 than they would be under current law.

Those developments, taken together, would reduce projected deficits during the 2022–2026 period. The largest feedback effect would again be taxes paid on the wages earned by additional workers under the immigration proposal. And CBO estimates that the other economic effects of the President’s proposals—those not included in the agency’s March analysis—would, from 2022 through 2026, make projected deficits $37 billion smaller than the agency projected in March. (Over the entire 2017–2026 period, those other economic effects would make projected deficits $32 billion larger than CBO estimated in March.)
Appendix A: How Changes in Government Policies Can Affect the Economy

Changes in the federal government’s tax and spending policies, such as those proposed by the President in the Administration’s budget request, can affect the economy in both the short term and the long term. In the short term, changes in fiscal policies affect the amount of economic output primarily by changing the overall demand for goods and services by consumers, businesses, and governments. In the long term, changes in fiscal policies affect output by altering potential output, which is the economy’s maximum sustainable level of production. They do so by changing people’s incentives to work, save, and invest and by changing productivity.

The Congressional Budget Office employs different methods for estimating those short-term and long-term effects, and the agency gradually shifts from short-term analysis to long-term analysis as it projects the effects of a proposed policy change over time.1 For one year, starting when the change would take effect, CBO’s estimates of the change’s effects on output reflect only the short-term analysis. For the next three years, the estimates place increasing weight on the long-term analysis. For the remaining years of the projection period, the estimates are based entirely on the policy change’s long-term effects on potential output.2

Changes in fiscal policies are not the only way that the federal government can affect the economy. For the analysis underlying this report, CBO also considered how extensive changes to immigration laws would alter the economy’s actual output and potential output, in both the short term and the long term, mainly by changing the size of the population and the supply of labor (that is, the number of hours of labor that workers provide).

Tax and Spending Policies in the Short Term
Changes in fiscal policies affect the economy in the short term largely by influencing the overall demand for goods and services. For example, cuts in taxes and increases in government transfer payments boost demand by raising the amount of money that people have available to spend; increases in the government’s own purchases of goods and services also add to demand. Such increases in demand encourage businesses to boost production and hire more workers than they would have otherwise. Conversely, increases in taxes and cuts in government spending reduce demand and have the opposite effects on businesses.

The effect that a proposed change in fiscal policy would have on overall demand depends on several factors: the particular policy being considered; the state of the economy when the change would occur; and the way the Federal Reserve, which sets monetary policy, would react to the change. The third factor is closely related to the second,


2. CBO published an earlier report analyzing the President’s budget request in March. To be consistent with that report, CBO assumed for the analysis underlying this report that the President’s proposals would be enacted at the beginning of the third quarter of calendar year 2016. Therefore, CBO’s estimates for the third quarter of calendar year 2016 through the second quarter of 2017 are based only on the short-term economic effects of the President’s proposals, which are largely changes in demand; estimates for the following three one-year periods are weighted averages of the short-term effects on demand and the long-term effects on potential output in which the weights on the short-term effects fall from 0.75 to 0.50 to 0.25; and estimates for the third quarter of 2020 and beyond are based entirely on effects on potential output.
because the Federal Reserve’s reaction would depend heavily on the state of the economy. For example, when output is well below its potential level and inflation is low (as has been the case in recent years), the Federal Reserve may keep short-term interest rates near zero to encourage investment and consumer spending and thus raise output. At such times, tax cuts and increases in government spending generate a larger boost in demand than at times when the Federal Reserve reacts by increasing interest rates—because the higher rates depress output, offsetting to some extent the effects of the fiscal changes.

Fiscal policies that increase demand in the short term are likely to reduce output in the long term, all things being equal. In general, such policies directly increase deficits by some combination of raising spending and reducing revenues. (Although the boost to demand tends to increase output and taxable income—and thus revenues—in the short term, those changes are generally not big enough to offset the direct increase in deficits.) As a result, such policies tend to raise the total amount of government borrowing—which, in the long term, causes the nation’s saving and capital stock to be smaller than they would be otherwise. That effect, which is described in more detail below, reduces output.

Some researchers have reached a different conclusion. They maintain that policies that raise demand in the short term—especially during a deep recession or slow recovery, when labor is underused—can have positive economic effects in the long term as well because an increase in demand for labor can prevent workers’ skills from eroding and preserve their attachment to the labor force. That effect could increase long-term potential output by enough to outweigh the negative economic and budgetary effects of greater federal borrowing. Because of uncertainty about the ways in which a short-term increase in demand could raise potential output in the long term, CBO does not incorporate such effects into its analyses, although the agency continues to investigate the issue.

Changes in fiscal policies can affect output in the short term not only by influencing overall demand but also by influencing the supply of labor. CBO incorporates such effects into its analyses, but their size depends on the state of the economy. For instance, when unemployment is high and actual output is much lower than potential output, a policy that leads some workers to leave the labor force (say, a policy that makes disability insurance payments larger) may enable unemployed people to fill those workers’ former jobs, resulting in no effect on output. However, when unemployment is low and actual output is close to its potential level, the same policy might reduce the total number of people who are employed and thus reduce output.

Tax and Spending Policies in the Long Term

The key determinant of economic output over the long term is the nation’s potential to produce goods and services. That potential output, in turn, depends on three factors:

- The size and quality of the labor force;
- The stock of productive capital (such as factories, vehicles, and computers); and
- Total factor productivity—that is, the efficiency with which that labor and capital produce goods and services.

The government’s fiscal policies change those factors in three principal ways: by affecting the total amount of saving in the economy, by altering individuals’ and businesses’ incentives to work and save, and by changing the amount of public investment.

National Saving

The total amount of saving in the economy, called national saving, is the sum of public saving and private saving. Public saving consists of all surpluses of state and local governments and the federal government, plus government investment in fixed assets, minus all deficits; private saving consists of saving by households and businesses. National saving, along with net borrowing from abroad, finances the nation’s investment in its capital.


Incentives to Work and Save
Tax and spending policies can also affect the economy’s potential output by altering incentives. Changes in tax rates, for example, alter people’s willingness to work and save, affecting the supplies of labor and capital in the long term. Similarly, government policies that change consumer prices, such as excise taxes, can affect work incentives by changing the purchasing power of workers’ earnings. And changes in government spending on transfer payments, such as unemployment insurance and Social Security benefits, can increase or decrease people’s willingness to work and save, again affecting the size of the labor force and the capital stock.

In CBO’s assessment, an increase in the effective marginal tax rate on labor income—that is, the rate that would apply to an additional dollar of an employee’s earnings—causes the supply of labor to be smaller than it would be otherwise. That is the result of two countervailing pressures created by the higher tax rate: a substitution effect and an income effect. The increase in the marginal tax rate reduces the after-tax income from an additional hour of work, making work less valuable in relation to other uses of a person’s time; by itself, that substitution effect would reduce the number of hours that people work. At the same time, however, the reduction in after-tax income from a given amount of work requires people to work more hours to maintain the same standard of living; by itself, that income effect would increase the number of hours that people work. After reviewing the empirical evidence, CBO has concluded that the substitution effect outweighs the income effect, meaning that an increase in the marginal tax rate on labor income decreases the total supply of labor that workers provide. CBO uses a range of estimates of how much the size of the labor supply changes when the marginal tax rate on labor income changes.

Similarly, an increase in the marginal tax rate on income from capital—such as stock dividends, realized capital gains, and owners’ profits from businesses—has countervailing effects on saving. Higher tax rates on capital income reduce the returns that people earn on their savings (which tends to discourage saving) but also increase the amount of savings that people need to achieve a given future income (which encourages saving). In CBO’s assessment, an increase in the marginal tax rate on capital income makes private saving smaller, on balance, than it would be otherwise; the result, other things being equal, is a smaller capital stock.

Public Investment
The federal government pays for many goods and services that are expected to increase potential output some years in the future. Those purchases are called public investment. Spending on education can help develop workers’ skills, improving the quality of the labor force; spending on research and development (R&D) can prompt innovation, raising total factor productivity; and spending on physical capital, such as roads and airports, can facilitate commerce, likewise raising productivity. The federal

5. Private saving also increases for two other reasons. One is that some people anticipate that policymakers will raise taxes or cut spending in the future to cover the cost of paying interest on the additional accumulated debt, so those people increase their own saving to prepare for paying higher taxes or receiving less in benefits. The other is that the policies that give rise to deficits (such as tax cuts or increases in government transfer payments) put more money in private hands, and some of that money is saved.


7. Although increased net borrowing from abroad mitigates the effect of rising deficits on the capital stock, it also means that more profits and interest payments will flow overseas. Part of the income resulting from the larger capital stock will consequently not accrue to U.S. residents.

8. For details about how changes in tax and spending policies affect the supply of labor, see Congressional Budget Office, How the Supply of Labor Responds to Changes in Fiscal Policy (October 2012), www.cbo.gov/publication/43674.

government can boost potential output by making investments that the private sector would not have made on its own or would have made in smaller amounts than their broad public benefits might justify.

Considerable uncertainty exists, however, about the size of the increase in potential output that results from each additional dollar of federal investment. Some past federal investments have generated much higher returns than others, and returns have varied significantly by historical period. For example, in a study of transportation and water infrastructure, CBO concluded that average returns are lower than they once were because returns derived from additional spending on a mature infrastructure network are typically smaller than those derived from the investments that established that network in the first place. Moreover, federal investment can discourage investment by private entities or state and local governments by raising the price of investment goods and by allowing those governments to redirect their own funds to other purposes. If that happened, the net effect of federal investment on output would be smaller. To account for those and other types of uncertainty, CBO’s analyses incorporate a range of estimates of the effect of federal investment on output.11

CBO estimates that returns on federal investment accrue more slowly than returns on private investment do, because many federal investments differ in nature from private ones. From 1988 to 2008, for example, 33 percent of nondefense federal investment was for education and 23 percent was for R&D, whereas most private-sector investment was for physical capital. In the agency’s assessment, education and R&D take much longer to boost private-sector output than investment in physical capital does. Investment in the education of young children, which does not affect productivity until the students reach working age, takes a particularly long time to boost output, as does investment in basic research. Such investments often do not affect output within the 10-year period usually covered by CBO’s analysis.

Federal investment, like private-sector investment, usually depreciates over time and eventually disappears completely. However, some types of investment depreciate more slowly than others do; for instance, educating workers can increase the productivity of the economy throughout those workers’ careers. Furthermore, depreciation may occur gradually, as in the case of an aging bridge or building, or suddenly, as in the case of a person who leaves the labor force.

Immigration Policies
Changes in immigration policies can alter the size and quality of the nation’s labor supply, which are major determinants of both actual and potential output. If a change in immigration policies led to an increase in the labor supply (and everything else stayed the same), the amount of employment and output in the economy would rise. The increase in the labor supply would also tend to make average wages slightly lower than they would have been otherwise over the following decade, mostly because the amount of capital available to workers would not increase as rapidly as the number of workers. If the new workers were less skilled and had lower wages, on average, than the labor force that existed before the change in immigration policies took place, that would also tend to reduce average wages.

In addition, the rate of return on capital would tend to be higher under such a change in immigration policies than it had been before. At least in the first several years, growth in the workforce would render the existing stock of capital scarce (compared with the supply of labor) and more productive (because the existing capital would be used more intensively). As a result, the rate of return on capital would increase over time and spur additional investment, which in turn would expand the stock of capital and further increase output.

CBO estimates that an increase in immigration—particularly an increase in the immigration of highly skilled workers—would also raise total factor productivity, because some of the immigrants would contribute to the development of technological advancements, such as inventions and improvements in production processes.12


11. For more discussion about the effect of federal investment on output, see Congressional Budget Office, The Macroeconomic and Budgetary Effects of Federal Investment (forthcoming).

12. Although the determinants of total factor productivity are poorly understood, a substantial body of research suggests a link between it and increases in the number of highly skilled immigrants; a smaller body of research quantifies the effects of immigration on output in general. For more discussion, see Congressional Budget Office, The Economic Impact of S. 744, the Border Security, Economic Opportunity, and Immigration Modernization Act (June 2013), www.cbo.gov/publication/44346.
Appendix B: Ranges of Estimates of the Effects of the President’s Budget Proposals on GNP, 2022 Through 2026

Over calendar years 2022 through 2026, the President’s budget proposals for fiscal year 2017 would make gross national product (GNP) about 1.8 percent larger, on average, than it would be under current law, according to the Congressional Budget Office’s central estimate. That estimate is subject to considerable uncertainty, so CBO has also calculated estimates using two economic models and various estimates of particularly uncertain factors. The full span of estimates suggests that the President’s budget proposals would increase GNP by between 0.7 percent and 2.8 percent over the 2022–2026 period, on average. However, in CBO’s view, a more probable range is 1.0 percent to 2.5 percent, and that is the range reported in the main body of this report.

CBO’s Approach to Estimating Ranges

The two economic models that CBO used were a Solow-type growth model and a life-cycle growth model. The models differ in a number of respects, but perhaps the most important is the way they incorporate people’s expectations:

- The Solow-type model incorporates the assumption that people’s decisions about working and saving are determined not by their expectations of particular future developments but by their general expectations of future fiscal policy—and that those general expectations, in turn, are determined in the same way that they have been in the past.

- The life-cycle model, by contrast, incorporates an assumption that people’s decisions about working and saving reflect their expectations of particular future economic conditions, and it does not account for the ways in which expectations have historically been formulated. As a result, the life-cycle model requires the user to specify future fiscal policies. In addition, those policies must put federal debt on a sustainable path over the long run—because forward-looking households, according to the model, would not hold government bonds if they expected that debt as a percentage of the economy would rise without limit. Different assumptions about those future policies have little effect on CBO’s estimates, however. CBO has found that people’s current choices to work and save are only modestly different under various assumptions about what they believe will happen to the government’s tax and spending policies sufficiently far into the future.

Because of the uncertainty surrounding the effects of the President’s immigration proposals, CBO produced the analysis underlying this report by using both the Solow-type model and the life-cycle model with two different estimates—derived from the agency’s study of the economics literature—of the effect that those proposals would have on total factor productivity (the efficiency with which labor and capital are used to produce goods and services). Those two estimates were a “weak effect” estimate that the proposals would not change productivity and a “strong effect” estimate that they would increase productivity by 1.4 percent in 2026. CBO’s analysis indicates that the uncertainty surrounding the effects of the immigration proposal accounts for most of the variation in estimates of how the President’s budget would affect GNP from 2022 to 2026.
Table B-1.

Estimated Effects of the President’s Proposals on GNP From 2022 to 2026 Under Two Models

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source: Congressional Budget Office.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CBO’s Solow-type growth model is an enhanced version of a model developed by Robert Solow. CBO’s life-cycle growth model is an overlapping-generations general-equilibrium model that is based on a standard model of the economy in which people are forward-looking in their behavior.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GNP = gross national product.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

CBO also used the Solow-type model with two different estimates (again, weak and strong) of the effect that deficits have on private investment—which in turn influences interest rates—and two different estimates (also weak and strong) of how changes in marginal tax rates on labor income affect the supply of labor. In the case in which immigration had a weak effect on total factor productivity, the result was four possible outcomes for the 2022–2026 period, with the estimated reduction in real (inflation-adjusted) output over that period ranging from 0.9 percent to 1.5 percent (see Table B-1). In the case in which immigration had a strong effect on total factor productivity, the result was, again, four possible outcomes, with the estimated reduction in real output over the period ranging from 2.0 percent to 2.8 percent.

With the life-cycle model, CBO used two different ways that people may believe that the federal government will stabilize its debt: by reducing spending (making equal cuts in transfer payments and in purchases of goods and services) or by raising revenues (collecting equal amounts from higher effective marginal tax rates and from other sources). The choice of policies that will stabilize federal debt has only a modest effect on the outcomes of the 10-year estimates. CBO also used two different assumptions about how interest rates are determined: within the domestic economy or within the world economy. In the case in which immigration had a weak effect on total factor productivity, applying the model therefore resulted in four possible outcomes for the 2022–2026 period, with estimated reductions in real output ranging from 0.7 percent to 0.8 percent. In the case in which immigration had a strong effect on total factor productivity, applying the model resulted again in four possible outcomes, with estimated reductions in real output ranging from 1.8 percent to 2.2 percent.

**CBO’s Approach to Reporting Ranges**

In CBO’s view, the full span of estimates reported in Table B-1 overstates the extent of uncertainty about the economic effects of the President’s budget proposals. For example, if labor supply responses to marginal tax rates are at the high end of the likely range of the estimates found in the economics literature, if the effect of deficits

2. In both approaches, the policies that would stabilize federal debt are phased in over a 10-year period, starting in the sixth year after the end of the 10-year estimation period—in the current analysis, 2032.
on private investment is at the low end, and if the effect on productivity from large increases in immigration is also at the low end, the Solow-type model estimates that the President’s proposals would boost GNP by only 0.9 percent, on average, over the 2022–2026 period. If all of those parameters are at the other ends of their likely ranges in the economics literature, the boost to GNP would be 2.8 percent. However, the likelihood that all three parameters would simultaneously be at the ends of their likely ranges is smaller than the likelihood that any individual parameter would be at the end of its likely range.

CBO therefore focused on uncertainty about the two parameters in the Solow-type model that had the largest budgetary effects. Specifically, the agency examined cases in which two parameters were equal to the ends of their likely ranges and the other parameter was equal to its central estimate, identified the cases that resulted in the most favorable and least favorable budgetary outcomes, and used those cases to construct the reported range of likely results for GNP.

When choosing parameters for the Solow-type model, CBO aimed for the results to cover about two-thirds of the range of likely economic effects if the budgetary effects estimated in CBO’s first report on the President’s budget proposals, published this past March, were realized. That is, this analysis does not account for uncertainty in those earlier estimates or the factors that underlie them, such as the number and earnings of additional immigrants. In the agency’s assessment, it is easier to interpret a range of results from the Solow-type model as covering a certain percentage of the range of likely results than it is to do the same for a combination of results from the Solow-type and life-cycle models. CBO therefore used only the estimates produced by the Solow-type model in constructing such a range.

---

About This Document

This report is the second of two analyses, both conducted at the request of the Senate Committee on Appropriations, that the Congressional Budget Office has done of the President’s budget request for fiscal year 2017, which was released on February 9, 2016. The first report—An Analysis of the President’s 2017 Budget, published in March—used CBO’s economic projections and estimating techniques, rather than the Administration’s, to project how the proposals in the President’s budget would affect federal revenues and outlays. This second analysis, also using CBO’s economic projections and estimating techniques, projects how the proposals in the President’s budget would affect the U.S. economy and how those economic effects would, in turn, affect the federal budget (along with the direct budgetary effects shown in the first report). In keeping with CBO’s mandate to provide objective, impartial analysis, this report makes no recommendations.

Charles Whalen wrote the report with assistance from Paul Burnham, Sheila Campbell, William Carrington, Ed Harris, Joseph Kile, Lucille Msall, Nathan Musick, and Chad Shirley and with guidance from Jeffrey Werling, Kim Kowalewski, and Benjamin Page (formerly of CBO). The underlying economic and tax modeling was performed by Paul Burnham, Eva de Francisco, Devrim Demirel, Ed Harris, Jonathan Huntley, Felix Reichling, and the staff of the Joint Committee on Taxation (JCT). Shiqi Zheng, formerly of CBO, provided research assistance. The estimated budgetary effects described in the report were the work of many analysts at CBO and JCT.

Wendy Edelberg, Jeffrey Kling, and Robert Sunshine reviewed the report, Benjamin Plotinsky edited it, and Jeanine Rees prepared it for publication. An electronic version is available on CBO’s website (www.cbo.gov/publication/51625).

Keith Hall
Director

June 2016