As ordered reported by the House Committee on Foreign Affairs on April 22, 2026
By Fiscal Year, Millions of Dollars | 2026 | 2026-2031 | 2026-2036 | ||||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Direct Spending (Outlays) | 0 | 54 | 144 | ||||||||
Revenues | 0 | 0 | 0 | ||||||||
Increase or Decrease (-) in the Deficit | 0 | 54 | 144 | ||||||||
Spending Subject to Appropriation (Outlays) | 0 | 3 | 8 | ||||||||
Increases net direct spending in any of the four consecutive 10-year periods beginning in 2037? | < $2.5 billion | Statutory pay-as-you-go procedures apply? | Yes | ||||||||
Mandate Effects | |||||||||||
Increases on-budget deficits in any of the four consecutive 10-year periods beginning in 2037? | < $5 billion | Contains intergovernmental mandate? | No | ||||||||
Contains private-sector mandate? | Yes, Under Threshold | ||||||||||
The bill would
| |||||||||||
Estimated budgetary effects would mainly stem from
| |||||||||||
Areas of significant uncertainty include
| |||||||||||
On This Page
Bill Summary
The Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) is responsible for investigating and prosecuting export control violations. Under current law, the bureau operates a portal to collect information about potential violations, but is not authorized to remunerate whistleblowers. H.R. 6322 would require payments to certain whistleblowers; those payments would not be subject to the appropriation of funds.
Estimated Federal Cost
Table 1. Estimated Budgetary Effects of H.R. 6322 | |||||||||||||
By Fiscal Year, Millions of Dollars | |||||||||||||
2026 | 2027 | 2028 | 2029 | 2030 | 2031 | 2032 | 2033 | 2034 | 2035 | 2036 | 2026-2031 | 2026-2036 | |
Increases in Direct Spending | |||||||||||||
Estimated Budget Authority | 0 | 0 | 0 | 18 | 18 | 18 | 18 | 18 | 18 | 18 | 18 | 54 | 144 |
Estimated Outlays | 0 | 0 | 0 | 18 | 18 | 18 | 18 | 18 | 18 | 18 | 18 | 54 | 144 |
Increases in Spending Subject to Appropriation | |||||||||||||
Estimated Authorization | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 3 | 8 |
Estimated Outlays | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 3 | 8 |
Memorandum: | |||||||||||||
Increase in Revenues from Whistleblower Programa | 0 | 0 | 0 | 45 | 45 | 45 | 45 | 45 | 45 | 45 | 45 | 135 | 360 |
a. The Conference Report for the Balanced Budget Act of 1997 (Public Law 105-33) established a series of scorekeeping rules that guide what budget effects are attributed to proposed legislation. Rule 14 states that “no increase in receipts or decrease in direct spending will be scored as a result of a provision of a law that provides direct spending for administrative or program management activities.” Thus, any estimated additional penalties that may be collected under the proposed expansion to the whistleblower program cannot be attributed to this bill for Congressional scorekeeping purposes. | |||||||||||||
Basis of Estimate
For this estimate, CBO assumes that the bill will be enacted in fiscal year 2027. The estimate is based on data about criminal and civil enforcements from the BIS and on similar whistleblower incentive programs at the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN), the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), and the Commodities Futures Trading Commission (CFTC).
Direct Spending
Under H.R. 6322, whistleblowers would be rewarded if their actions lead to a successful criminal prosecution or civil enforcement of export control violations by BIS if the penalty exceeds $1 million. Using information about similar whistleblower programs at FinCEN, SEC, and CFTC, CBO expects that payments under the bill would begin two years after enactment.
In recent years, BIS has had an average of three successful enforcement actions annually with financial collections greater than $1 million. The penalties above that threshold averaged $45 million. Using information from FinCEN, SEC, and CFTC, CBO expects that one BIS enforcement action each year under current law will result from information provided by a whistleblower who would be eligible to receive an award under H.R. 6322. CBO anticipates that whistleblower awards would average 20 percent of penalty amounts. Thus, awards for BIS enforcement actions under current law would lead to additional payments under the bill, increasing direct spending by $72 million over the 2026‑2036 period.
In addition, using information from other federal agencies, CBO estimates that BIS would bring one additional enforcement action each year as a result of the incentives provided to whistleblowers in the bill. CBO estimates that whistleblower awards from those additional enforcement actions would increase direct spending by $72 million over the 2026‑2036 period.
In total, CBO estimates that implementing H.R. 6322 would increase direct spending by $144 million over the 2026‑2036 period.
Revenues
CBO estimates that enacting H.R. 6322 would result in one additional civil enforcement action each year, on average. Using information from BIS, CBO estimates the bureau would collect an additional $45 million annually beginning in 2029.
The Conference Report for the Balanced Budget Act of 1997 (Public Law 105-33) established a series of scorekeeping rules that guide what budget effects are attributed to proposed legislation. Rule 14 states that “no increase in receipts or decrease in direct spending will be scored as a result of a provision of a law that provides direct spending for administrative or program management activities.” Thus, any estimated additional penalties that may be collected under the proposed expansion to the whistleblower incentive program cannot be attributed to this bill for Congressional scorekeeping purposes.
Spending Subject to Appropriation
CBO expects that investigating and enforcing additional export control violations under the whistleblower incentives of H.R. 6322 would increase the workload of BIS by the equivalent of three full-time employees, or about 1 percent of the bureau’s current workforce for enforcement of export controls. Using information from BIS, CBO estimates that annual salary and benefits for each employee would average about $250,000. In total, CBO estimates that implementing H.R. 6322 would cost $8 million over the 2026-2036 period; such spending would be subject to the availability of appropriated funds.
Uncertainty
Pay-As-You-Go Considerations
Table 2. CBO’s Estimate of the Statutory Pay-As-You-Go Effects of H.R.6322, the Stop Stealing our Chips Act, as Ordered Reported by the House Committee on Foreign Affairs on April 22, 2026 | |||||||||||||
By Fiscal Year, Millions of Dollars | |||||||||||||
2026 | 2027 | 2028 | 2029 | 2030 | 2031 | 2032 | 2033 | 2034 | 2035 | 2036 | 2026-2031 | 2026-2036 | |
Net Increase in the Deficit | |||||||||||||
Pay-As-You-Go Effect | 0 | 0 | 0 | 18 | 18 | 18 | 18 | 18 | 18 | 18 | 18 | 54 | 144 |
Increase in Long-Term Net Direct Spending and Deficits
CBO estimates that enacting H.R. 6322 would not increase on‑budget deficits by more than $5 billion in any of the four consecutive 10-year periods beginning in 2037.
Mandates
The bill would not impose intergovernmental mandates as defined in UMRA.
Estimate Prepared By
Mandates: Brandon Lever
Estimate Reviewed By
David Newman
Chief, Defense, International Affairs, and Veterans’ Affairs Cost Estimates Unit
Kathleen FitzGerald
Chief, Public and Private Mandates Unit
Christina Hawley Anthony
Deputy Director of Budget Analysis
Estimate Approved By

Phillip L. Swagel
Director, Congressional Budget Office