Summary

Small unmanned aircraft systems (sUASs)—often called drones—pose a growing threat to the United States; in recent years, sUASs of unknown origin have flown over military installations and other important sites. Additionally, sUASs have been used to collect intelligence and attack people, vehicles, and critical fixed locations in the Middle East and Ukraine. Those developments have heightened interest in procuring and implementing systems to counter sUASs.

In this report, the Congressional Budget Office outlines the evolution of sUASs, describes the methods currently available to counter them, and estimates the costs of procuring one or more of those methods to protect military installations. In CBO’s assessment, a layered system that combined methods would provide the most comprehensive defense.

This analysis does not examine the legal and operational issues concerning an installation commander’s authority to engage UASs in the United States, nor does it assess the systems and tactics that could be used to defend mobile military forces.

Methods to Counter Small UASs

Currently, several methods exist to detect and defeat sUASs. Each method can only perform one of the functions; that is, it is generally necessary to have at least one system to detect sUASs and another system to defeat them.

Detecting Small UASs

Detecting sUASs is difficult because of their size and the fact that they can hover and fly in unpredictable ways. Several types of systems are currently available:

• Radars direct electromagnetic energy away from a facility and measure any energy reflected back from sUASs or other objects.
• Radio frequency (RF) signal detection sensors detect the radio frequency of the radiation emitted by an sUAS when it communicates with operators controlling it remotely. Some of those sensors may be handheld.
• Other detection systems, such cameras and acoustic sensors, use different methods to detect sUASs and are less practical for widespread use.

Defeating Small UASs

Several types of systems to defeat sUASs that have been detected currently exist:

• Kinetic interceptors are either one-way missiles that hit sUASs or unmanned aircraft that collide with sUASs to bring them down.
• RF signal detection systems interfere with an sUAS’s communication link to its operator.

Other defeat systems, such as nets, entanglements, protective structures, and antiaircraft artillery, are currently available but require the sUAS to be very close to the defeat systems, thus putting the installation under threat. Two other defeat systems are being developed, but they have yet to be widely deployed: Lasers use highly focused energy to physically destroy an sUAS’s airframe; high-power microwave systems destroy an sUAS’s internal electronics.

Cost to Defend Military Installations From Small UASs

CBO analyzed the evolving threat posed by sUASs and the characteristics of the detection and defeat systems that would be needed to protect military facilities from those threats. The Department of Defense’s (DoD’s) current plans call for a layered set of systems. To conduct its analysis, CBO considered a benchmark scenario that consists of a 5 mile by 5 mile military installation. CBO assessed five options for protecting against sUASs, each of which includes one or more systems.

In CBO’s assessment, a counter-sUAS (C-sUAS) system consisting of 4 radars, 12 RF signal detection and defeat systems, 4 kinetic interceptor systems with multiple interceptors, and 16 handheld RF signal defeat systems would provide a comprehensive defense. A command-and- control system would be required to integrate those components into a coordinated layered defense. Each system would have to be purchased and would incur annual costs to repair and upgrade throughout its service life (about four to five years). Those systems would have to be replaced at the end of their service life, particularly if the threat posed by sUASs continued to evolve.

CBO estimates that it would cost $74 million to purchase and install such a layered defense system at the installation in the benchmark scenario. Annual support and repair would cost $5 million per system. (Those operating costs would be higher if the services added personnel to operate or maintain the system.) Those costs scale linearly. Protecting 100 installations, for example, would cost roughly 100 times more: about $7.4 billion to purchase and $500 million a year to support.

Chapter 1: The Evolving Threat Posed by Small Unmanned Aircraft Systems

Small unmanned aircraft systems weighing less than 100 pounds have become a serious threat to personnel, military installations, and civil infrastructure over the past 25 years. In response, the U.S. military is acquiring systems to protect facilities, troops, and vehicles at home and abroad. That process is complicated by the rapid evolution of sUAS technology.

The Evolution of Small UASs

Small electric UASs, commonly referred to as drones, were first developed by universities and small companies in the early 2000s. Their development flourished in China, predominantly as toys and as visual inspection tools for construction and agriculture.1

The development of smartphone technology with higher bandwidth communication capabilities, batteries with higher energy density, and better cameras and microelectronics has provided new technologies and expanded possible uses for sUASs. Those technologies and uses have evolved rapidly since Russia invaded Ukraine in early 2022. Since the start of that war, sUASs have had grenades and other explosive devices attached to them, which are then flown to targets. (Before that conflict, sUASs were deployed almost exclusively for intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance missions.) More recently, both combatants have developed one-way sUASs equipped with munitions that use first-person view and live video feeds (so that the operator can fly them into targets) with the capability to destroy armored vehicles and bunkers and kill soldiers. Additionally, Ukraine and Russia can now control some sUASs without using detectable radio frequency signals; those new methods include programming waypoints for an sUAS to follow autonomously and connecting an operator to an sUAS by thin fiber-optic cables that trail the aircraft.

Categories of Small UASs

The Department of Defense (DoD) separates UASs into five groups; Groups 1 to 3 are regarded as sUASs.2 (For renderings of aircraft in those groups, see Figure 1-1.) This report focuses on systems designed to counter Group 1 sUASs, Group 2 sUASs, and smaller UASs in Group 3. Those aircraft are less than 10 feet long and weigh less than 600 pounds and are inexpensive (less than $250,000). Because battery and electric motor technology has advanced and radios and cameras have become smaller, some overlap in capabilities now exists among the groups. (For more details about the technical specifications of aircraft in each group, see Table 1-1.)

Current Counter-sUAS Systems

The Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) has established policies to address the growing threat posed by sUASs. In December 2024, OSD produced a report about its strategy to counter UASs. The full strategy is classified, but the unclassified fact sheet outlines a strategy that focuses on protecting U.S. interests and developing rapidly scalable solutions to meet the military’s need.3 The counter-sUAS system options examined in Chapter 3 are broadly consistent with that goal.

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1. 1. For more details about definitions and regulations of sUASs, see Unmanned Aircraft Systems, 49 U.S.C. § 44801 et seq.

2. 2. DoD delineates the groups by type of propulsion and payload capacity.

3. 3. Department of Defense, “Fact Sheet: Department of Defense Strategy for Countering Unmanned Systems” (December 5, 2024), https://tinyurl.com/3t3thmmt.

Chapter 2: Methods to Counter Small Unmanned Aircraft Systems

Small unmanned aircraft systems are quiet, fly slowly at low altitudes, follow unpredictable flight patterns, and can be mistaken for birds or swaying trees. They can hover in place and then quickly move to a new spot where they may hover again. Those characteristics make sUASs difficult to detect, track, and defeat. Therefore, a variety of detection and defeat systems is necessary for a complete defense.

Detecting Small UASs

Each of the current methods to detect sUASs exploits different characteristics of sUASs; therefore, using several types improves the likelihood of detecting them. (For an overview of each system, see Table 2-1.)

Radar

Radars transmit radio frequency energy and capture the returning signal. They can detect sUASs within their line of sight, conservatively up to about 6 miles away. The strength of the returning signal depends on the target’s distance, its shape and size, and the radar’s frequency.

Radars are used for many military missions, but those that detect sUASs differ in important ways from radar systems that detect and track rockets, artillery, and large aircraft. First, counter-sUAS radar systems are tuned to detect small objects that reflect small amounts of radar energy. They typically operate in the S-band (2 to 4 gigahertz, or GHz) or the X-band (8 to 12 GHz). By contrast, radars designed to counter rockets or artillery use the Ku-band (12 to 18 GHz) to allow high-precision tracking of the fast-moving targets. Second, the algorithms used to track sUASs are specifically designed to track sUASs’ unpredictable flight patterns. (Rockets and mortars move in regular, predictable paths, which allows tracking algorithms to rapidly guide mechanisms to defeat the threat.)

Radio Frequency Signal Detection

Most sUASs are connected to their operator by a radio connection; for commercially available sUASs, the link is detectable. An RF signal detection system automatically scans for that link, assesses its properties, and determines whether it is an sUAS or some other radio signal. RF signal detection systems can detect sUASs up to about 2.5 miles away.

Objects, such as trees or buildings, that block the direct line of sight to an sUAS reduce the performance of the system but do not render it ineffective. However, ambient radio signals—such as those from radio stations, some radars, and other transmitters—make the detection of the specific signal to and from the sUAS more difficult to extract from the noise, resulting in shorter detection ranges and reduced warning times.

Recent developments in Ukraine and the Middle East have shown that there are alternatives to direct RF control of sUASs that allow the operator to control the sUAS without relying on a radio connection (instead using fiber-optic cables or a fully autonomous navigation system). Those alternatives make sUASs more difficult for current systems to detect and influence. Continued research and development is needed to counter those adaptive threats.

Cameras

Two types of digital cameras (using semiconductor chips for their imagers) can detect and identify sUASs: visible light cameras and infrared (IR) cameras. They are often fielded together in a grouping of multiple cameras. Anything that interferes with the direct line of sight—such as objects like trees or buildings and obscurants like rain, fog, or smoke—reduces a camera’s performance.

Visible Light Cameras. As the name implies, a visible light camera requires an external light source to illuminate the target. That light source could be the sun, navigation lights from an sUAS, ambient light from the surrounding buildings, or a dedicated spotlight. In well-lit conditions, visible light cameras can detect sUASs up to about 2 miles away.

Recent developments in automatic target recognition have permitted autonomous monitoring of the images from the cameras.

Infrared Light Cameras. An IR camera detects energy in wavelengths shorter than visible light, in the range of 0.9 to 14 micrometers (µm). IR cameras are grouped into two categories: short-wave infrared (SWIR) cameras and mid-wave infrared (MWIR) and long-wave infrared (LWIR) cameras.

SWIR cameras (which detect energy in wavelengths from 1 to 3 µm) detect sUASs the same way visible cameras do. That is, a light source in the shortwave IR range has to be active. The light source can be city lights or even moonlight. By contrast, MWIR and LWIR sensors do not require an external light source; the energy comes from the target itself and is generated by its temperature. For those longer wavelength cameras to work, however, the temperature difference between the sUAS and the background environment must be large enough to allow discrimination. MWIR and LWIR cameras can detect sUASs up to about 1.3 miles away.

Acoustic Sensors

An acoustic detection system uses an array of acoustic sensors to detect the noise that an aircraft makes. Those sensors can be tuned to the frequency range of the noise typically emitted by an sUAS. Acoustic sensors are passive: Once installed, they will continue to surveil an area until they are turned off or moved.

Acoustic sensors are relatively inexpensive and simple, but they can be easily confused by ambient sounds in populated areas and battlefields. To obtain the best performance, the acoustic sensors should be linked. The effort needed to install and train a network to unambiguously identify an sUAS can be significant and has to be redone if the acoustic array is moved.

Defeating Small UASs

The best method to defeat an sUAS depends on several factors: the expected threat from and the intent of the sUAS, the amount of time available to defeat the sUAS, and the location of the installation being defended. (See Table 2-2 for an overview of the systems.)

Nets and Entanglements

Net or entanglement systems have the shortest range; the launching system must be within 300 feet of an sUAS and typically requires the person launching the entanglement to see the target. Nets and entanglements can be launched from shoulder-fired weapons or from unmanned aircraft systems and often use visible light or IR cameras to detect their targets. The systems are relatively inexpensive and do not require extensive training, but because of their short range, a hostile sUAS may be within range of its intended target before a net or entanglement can bring it down. Once entangled, the sUAS falls close to where it became entangled, thus minimizing collateral damage.

Antiaircraft Artillery and Small Arms

The most direct means to defeat an sUAS is through traditional antiaircraft weapons. Those include antiaircraft artillery, shoulder-fired shotguns, and other small arms; they can be turreted systems mounted on the ground or on a vehicle or be handheld systems carried by service members. To maximize the chances of destroying a target, specialized rounds that have a proximity fuze (which allows the rounds to detonate if they get close to but do not hit the sUAS) are currently in development.1

Because sUASs are so small, unguided projectiles must be shot precisely in order to hit them. Any projectile that misses will fall back to Earth, thus potentially endangering civilians, structures, or military personnel. Specialized tracking and aiming systems improve performance, but those improvements increase the systems’ costs and complexity.

Kinetic Interceptors

Kinetic interceptors are specially designed to engage and defeat aircraft; they fall into one of two categories (antiaircraft missiles or antiaircraft unmanned systems). Kinetic interceptors are different from traditional antiaircraft artillery because they are guided to the target by sensors on the ground or on the interceptor.

Antiaircraft missiles. Portable, unguided antiaircraft missiles that can be carried by personnel have been used since the 1970s. Currently, most antiaircraft missiles are sized for engagements with large manned aircraft up to about 9 miles away. The missiles detect and track an aircraft’s thermal signature and detonate their warhead with a proximity fuze. Recent improvements in rocket motors and sensors have allowed missiles to become smaller, cheaper, and more lethal against smaller aircraft, thus enabling them to track and engage sUASs. Like their larger counterparts, missiles used for C-sUAS missions carry a high risk of collateral damage when employed near civilians or military personnel.

Antiaircraft unmanned systems. sUASs can be used to damage other sUASs by loitering near or above a defended area and then flying into incoming hostile sUASs. Small antiaircraft UASs are powered by internal combustion or gas turbine engines, which increases costs and speed. Those engines also allow them to loiter over a defended area or be redirected after being launched to counter other threats. Because they are not equipped with explosive warheads or rocket motors, the risk of collateral damage is smaller than that associated with traditional antiaircraft missiles. However, risk still exists: Debris from the impact or the payload from the hostile sUAS could fall in civilian areas. For that reason, policy considerations may limit the practical range of these systems.2

Radio Frequency Signal Defeat Systems

The same radios used to scan for sUASs can be used to defeat them by transmitting radio signals on the identified frequency to either cancel, drown out, spoof (that is, transmit false signals to), or otherwise interfere with the communication link. Once the RF signal is interfered with, the sUAS will return to its home base, move to another predetermined location, or begin to hover. Any of those outcomes would neutralize the threat to the U.S. military installation by the sUAS. RF signal defeat systems would be ineffective against sUASs that do not rely on a radio communication link.

Protective Structures

Protective structures counter sUASs—that is, prevent them from completing their missions—without actively interacting with them. Unlike the reinforced concrete structures that protect sites from large bombs or explosive devices, structures that protect areas from sUAS attacks are typically lightweight temporary structures, often chain-link meshes or other rigid coverings. The structure are easily assembled and cost less than $400,000.

Protective structures take time and effort to assemble and are vulnerable to bad weather. Their efficacy may diminish as sUASs become more precise and destructive. Swarms of sUASs also can breach the structures with coordinated attacks. Protective structures are not well suited to protecting larger areas such as the populated areas on a military installation, but they could be used to protect relatively small high-value targets such as aircraft hangars or bunkers from any sUAS that penetrated an active defense.

High-Energy Lasers or High-Power Microwave Weapons

High-energy lasers (HELs) and high-power microwave (HPM) weapons direct large amounts of focused energy at vulnerable components of sUASs to physically break or destroy them. The energy pulse from the HEL or HPM moves at the speed of light to the sUAS, and after a dwell time of tens of seconds, the sUAS can be fatally damaged. (Dwell time is the length of time that laser energy is applied to a target.)

HELs and HPM weapons and the safety systems needed to safely deploy and use them are still in development in the United States, although Israel recently said it had an operational system. When developed, HELs and HPM weapons are expected to be expensive to acquire and to need a lot of electrical power (approximately 150 kilowatts, kW, of input power for a 50 kW laser). HEL or HPM energy pulses must be expertly directed because missing the sUAS could direct the energy onto an unintended person or system. That could mean blinding a person, damaging a satellite, or destroying electronics.

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1. 1. A fuze is the component of an explosive device that initiates the detonation. Around the fuze is a cartridge that contains a projectile, the propellant, and an ignition device. The projectile, sometimes called a bullet (especially with regard to small arms), is what strikes the intended target.

2. 2. The potential danger to civilians is one of the considerations taken into account when providing the military with the authority to use C-sUAS systems within the United States. For more details, see 10 U.S.C. § 130i.

Chapter 3: Options to Protect Military Installations From Small Unmanned Aircraft Systems

Every military installation has different needs and constraints when it comes to countering small unmanned aircraft systems. The specifics depend on an installation’s size, location, and geography, as well as the type of military unit stationed there. For example, a base located in or near an urban area would need to account for the risk that falling sUASs and defense system components could land in crowded areas outside the installation. In addition, hilly terrain or heavily wooded areas would influence the effective range of counter-sUAS sensors, shortening intercept times and possibly eliminating certain technologies from consideration. Finally, the type and value of the military unit stationed at an installation would affect the installation’s specific strategy, since an Army base would have different critical areas and strategic values to protect than a port would.

Estimating the costs for each military installation’s C-sUAS strategy or comparing the cost of the sUAS with the cost of the defeat mechanism is beyond the scope of this analysis. Instead, the Congressional Budget Office constructed a benchmark scenario consisting of a representative installation for which it considered several C-sUAS system options. CBO estimates that the cost to purchase enough systems to defend the representative installation would range from $1 million to $74 million, depending on how comprehensive the defense architecture was. Those procurement costs might have to be repeated every four or five years for the systems to remain effective, depending on how rapidly the threat evolves. Operating costs would range from $10,000 to $5 million per year.

CBO’s Benchmark Scenario

CBO first reviewed lists of critical installations and determined that the most important areas of most bases—where command staff, family housing and barracks, and important equipment and infrastructure are located—would fit within a 5 mile by 5 mile area, which is equal to 16,000 acres (see Figure 3-1). Many installations would fit entirely within that area.

CBO then assessed how many of various types of C-sUAS systems would be needed to defend an installation of that size and estimated their costs. (When determining the number and types of C-sUAS systems that would be needed, the agency assumed ideal conditions for each system considered.)

Finally, the agency extended that estimate for multiple installations. Because each site is a stand-alone property and independent, CBO assumed that the costs for multiple sites would scale linearly; that is, it would cost 100 times more to protect 100 installations.

Counter-sUAS Systems That CBO Considered

No single system would provide full protection from the complex challenges posed by sUASs, but a layered set of different systems could be used to offset individual systems’ limitations and maximize protection.

CBO considered the following four systems: radio frequency signal detection and defeat systems, handheld C-sUAS defeat devices, radar, and kinetic interceptors. CBO chose systems that the Department of Defense is currently buying. Each system’s effectiveness is limited to a certain range, and the range that most can protect is shaped like a dome. Therefore, systems must overlap each other at ground level to minimize coverage gaps at altitudes at which sUASs would typically fly (see Figure 3-2). Detection ranges must be longer than defeat ranges so that commanders have time to assess and act against any threats.

RF Signal Systems

Radio frequency signal detection and defeat systems are connected. When signals from sUASs are detected, the RF signal defeat system can engage either through broadband omnidirectional RF noise projection or with individual UAS RF channel attack. In the broadband engagement, the RF defeat system transmits large amounts of RF energy in the same frequency range that the sUASs’ radios use in order to overwhelm the control signal with noise. If individual RF defeat is used, the radio signal detection system will discriminate among multiple radio signals from multiple sUASs and engage a particular sUAS. The RF signal defeat system must remain linked to that sUAS until it is incapacitated. During that time, the defeat system cannot engage other sUASs that are not using that same radio frequency.

Therefore, determining exactly where to place RF signal systems requires complex site analysis and surveys to measure ambient radio signal levels and to model the detection system’s performance in various locations. Under ideal conditions, RF systems are placed evenly around the perimeter of the installation.

RF signal systems can detect sUASs up to about 2.5 miles away (see Figure 3-3). Once placed, an RF detection system’s performance must be monitored for changes in the ambient electromagnetic environment and adjusted accordingly. The system also must be adjusted to account for changes in the radio signals used by an sUAS that could otherwise render RF detection ineffective.

The effective range of a radio frequency signal defeat system is on the order of 1 to 2 miles, shorter than that of a detection system, because the system uses more power to defeat an sUAS than to detect one (see Figure 3-4). For sUASs that use traditional communications, radio signal defeat systems can be very effective, but there is a lag between when the system engages the sUAS and when the system defeats it. That lag may allow the sUAS to complete its mission (if, for example, the sUAS is conducting surveillance).

Handheld Counter-sUAS Devices

A handheld C-sUAS device is a portable version of an RF signal detection and defeat system. It looks like a traditional firearm and uses RF energy to interfere with the electronics of an sUAS. The effective range (about 550 yards) is significantly shorter than that of a full-size RF system. To use, a service member points the device at an sUAS and tracks the threat until the aircraft’s electronics are overwhelmed.

Because they are portable, handheld C-sUAS systems are not fixed in one location; they can be moved around the perimeter on the basis of the threat sUASs’ location or as a second line of defense within the facility to defeat sUASs that evade the other counter systems (see Figure 3-5).

Radar Systems

Of the detection systems considered, radars have the longest range (a little over 6 miles). After detecting an sUAS, radars must maintain contact with the target through successive radar returns in order to produce a track that allows a defeat system to engage the target. sUASs’ flight capabilities make maintaining the track difficult.

Radar systems are placed at the corners of a military installation to provide the widest field of view (see Figure 3-6). Because their operation is limited to line of sight, they may be placed on raised platforms or rooftops to avoid obstructions, such as buildings and trees, that would limit the detection range.

Kinetic Interceptors

The defeat system with the longest range is the kinetic interceptor system, which includes antiaircraft missiles and unmanned aircraft. Kinetic interceptors are designed to hit hostile sUASs. Currently, the range of missiles and C-sUAS aircraft is similar to that of radars used to detect sUASs. For that reason, kinetic interceptors may be placed with radar systems but do not need to be. They can be located anywhere along an installation’s perimeter (see Figure 3-7).

Options to Protect a Military Installation Under the Benchmark Scenario

CBO assessed five options for defending a military installation from sUASs. Each option includes one or more of the systems described above. The options were constructed to capture a range of possibilities available to decision-makers. (For details about how many systems are included in each option and the level of protection offered, see Table 3-1.)

Two options consist of one type of C-sUAS system each: Option 1 consists of 16 handheld defeat systems, and Option 2 consists of 12 RF signal detection and defeat systems. Those options would protect small areas of the installation (25 and 100 square miles, respectively).

The remaining options are composed of combinations of systems as well as a command-and-control system to coordinate between components. Option 3 consists of 4 radar systems and 12 RF signal detection and defeat systems, and Option 4 is made up of 4 radar systems and 4 kinetic interceptors. The layered defense in those options would allow them to protect a larger area (302 and 557 square miles, respectively). The command-and-control system links the C-sUAS systems and provides the installation’s commander with complete understanding of the status of the perimeter of the base. The system’s advanced algorithms can help the base commander optimize the allocation of the different systems, thus boosting their overall effectiveness.

Option 5 would provide the most comprehensive defense. It consists of a multilayered defense made up of all the C-sUAS systems from the other options: 4 radars, 12 RF signal detection and defeat systems, 4 kinetic interceptors, 16 handheld C-sUAS defeat systems to engage any sUASs not destroyed by the kinetic interceptor or radio signal defeat systems, and a command-and-control system. This option would protect the same area as Option 4 but would allow for more hostile s-UASs to be engaged at once.

Under Option 5, radars would be placed at the corners of the installation to provide maximum coverage. A kinetic interceptor system would be located with each radar; that way, the kinetic interceptor could use the information and the path detected by the radar to guide itself to the hostile sUAS. RF signal detection and defeat systems would be placed along the perimeter of the installation. (The installation in the benchmark scenario is square; on an irregularly shaped installation, site protection leadership would need to decide whether to expand the above-ground overlap of radar and RF signal systems’ coverage or to accept larger coverage gaps.) Finally, handheld C-sUAS systems, whose range is limited to within the base, are mobile and would be fielded throughout the installation (see Figure 3-8).

Option 5 also would allow for the interception of multiple sUASs, sometimes referred to as swarms, which are challenging for single systems to defend against. Radar and RF signal systems can detect and track multiple sUASs simultaneously, but RF signal systems, kinetic interceptors, and handheld defeat systems can be overwhelmed by sophisticated sUASs that use advanced communication or guidance systems. Under the options that include only one type of defeat system, if multiple sUASs approached from the same direction, a finite number of them could be dealt with at a time, potentially allowing some of them to evade the defense. If the attack was large enough, even the systems in Option 5 could be overwhelmed.

Costs of Protecting a Military Installation Under the Benchmark Scenario

CBO estimated procurement and installation costs for each option; for Option 5, the agency also estimated operating costs. CBO treated the different types of components as having separable costs, which allowed the agency to combine systems and add the costs of the various systems together to estimate the cost of each option.

Because the threat is continually changing, the Department of Defense will most likely conduct ongoing research, development, test, and evaluation (RDT&E). Currently, DoD allocates over $300 million per year for those purposes.1 That funding amount could change if the pace of the evolution of threats posed by sUASs changed. CBO did not include any RDT&E costs in its estimates because it expects that DoD will fund those activities regardless of the number of facilities that installed C-sUAS systems.

Acquisition Costs

Acquisition costs consist of procurement and installation costs. Procurement costs are the costs of purchasing a particular system; in the benchmark scenario, they range from $75,000 to $10 million (see Table 3-2).

Installation costs consist of the costs to build and provide the infrastructure needed to install and operate that system, including power, towers and enclosures to protect the system from weather and pests, and data connections. In CBO’s assessment, installation costs range from zero to $8 million (see Table 3-3). Options with fewer systems to install and integrate would cost less. Installations with site-specific requirements or with irregular shapes could cost more.

Annual Operating and Support Costs of Option 5

Operating and sustaining a multilayered counter-sUAS system would also incur annual costs. Those costs include maintaining spare parts and providing engineering support at each site. Additionally, C-sUAS systems would require maintenance and regular inspections as well as frequent software updates as both the threat and the software evolved. All told, those activities would cost about $5 million per year under Option 5, CBO estimates (see Table 3-4). Costs for other options were not estimated but would probably be lower because they consist of fewer systems to maintain and operate.

CBO’s estimates do not include personnel costs to operate the systems because CBO expects that the services would use existing military forces. If, however, the services added personnel to operate the systems, annual costs could be significantly higher. For example, if the Army assigned additional troops to operate the systems, a company of soldiers would be needed at each site at an annual cost of $6.6 million.2

Costs to Protect Multiple Facilities

Because military installations can be considered independent entities, CBO’s cost model for a single site can easily be scaled for multiple sites. For example, if the services decided to protect 10 sites, both the acquisition costs and operating and support costs would be 10 times the costs for a single site. Similarly, protecting 100 sites with only RF detect and defeat systems (as in Option 2) would cost $1.3 billion; protecting those 100 sites with a full three-layered defense would cost $7.4 billion (see Table 3-5). Annual operating and support costs would also scale: $5 million a year for a single site and $500 million a year for 100 sites. There are currently 824 military installations tracked in the Bureau of Transportation Statistics database.3 Over 90 percent of those military installations are small enough that the important areas could be protected by Option 4 or Option 5.

Effects of the Industrial Base on Costs

Currently, the existing industrial base can supply the systems needed to defend against sUASs. A recent request for information (RFI) issued by DoD’s Defense Innovation Unit garnered 135 responses concerning participation in a counter-sUAS demonstration.4 The many responses to the RFI, the many tests that DoD has run, and the wide array of systems being purchased by DoD demonstrate the depth of the current industrial base. That many vendors offer comparable systems also suggests that there is enough competition to keep prices from rising appreciably as DoD buys more systems. As a result of the broad industrial base, CBO’s estimates are based on current prices for currently available systems, and those prices are not expected to change significantly if the services expand the number of sites that are outfitted with C-sUAS systems.

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1. 1. Daniel M. Gettinger, Department of Defense Counter Unmanned Aircraft Systems: Background and Issues for Congress, Report R48477, version 3 (Congressional Research Service, March 31, 2025), www.congress.gov/crs-product/R48477.

2. 2. Estimated costs are based on a company of 66 soldiers and include the fully burdened cost of adding those personnel to the Army. The unit would consist of 1 O-3 soldier, 2 O-2 soldiers, 1 E-7 soldier, 2 E-6 soldiers, 20 E-3 soldiers, and 40 E-2 soldiers. That would allow three shifts of personnel to provide round-the-clock protection. CBO estimated the cost of such a company on the basis of DoD’s Manpower Model. See Department of Defense, “Full Cost of Manpower (FCOM) Cost Analysis Tool” (December 19, 2024), https://tinyurl.com/3z23mj64.

3. 3. Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Energy, Installations, and Environment, “Military Bases,” dataset (Department of Transportation, Bureau of Transportation Statistics, November 13, 2025), https://tinyurl.com/2bu5xp3r.

4. 4. Dan Schere, “FY-26 Army Experiment in Austin Will Test cUAS Solutions in Urban Environment,” Inside Defense (July 25, 2025), https://tinyurl.com/ysed4dw2.

About This Document

This report was prepared at the request of the Chairman and Ranking Member of the Subcommittee on Tactical Air and Land Forces of the House Armed Services Committee. In keeping with the Congressional Budget Office’s mandate to provide objective, impartial analysis, the report makes no recommendations.

Christopher Martin prepared the report with guidance from David Mosher and Edward G. Keating. David Arthur and Mia Keith-Schwartz contributed to the analysis. Alia Abdelkader, Ron Gecan, and Robert Sunshine (a consultant to CBO) offered comments. Edward G. Keating fact-checked the report.

Daniel Gettinger of the Congressional Research Service and Samuel Bendett of the Center for Naval Analysis commented on an earlier draft. The assistance of external reviewers implies no responsibility for the final product, that responsibility rests solely with CBO.

Jeffrey Kling reviewed the report. Caitlin Verboon edited it, and R. L. Rebach illustrated the cover, created the graphics, and prepared the text for publication. The report is available at www.cbo.gov/publication/62262.

CBO seeks feedback to make its work as useful as possible. Please send comments to communications@cbo.gov.

Phillip L. Swagel

Director

July 2026

Corrections

The Congressional Budget Office has corrected this report since its original publication. Both the PDF and online versions were corrected, but for ease of reference, the location of the correction in the PDF is indicated below.

The following change was made on July 14, 2026:

Page 5, Table 1-1, last row: “Less than 18,000” was changed to “Greater than 18,000.”