Increasing the Size and Missile Capability of the Navy's Fleet Within the Next Five Years
CBO examines three options to quickly increase the offensive lethality of the U.S. Navy's fleet of surface ships by 2030.
Summary
This report presents three options to quickly increase the offensive lethality (that is, the capacity to destroy, neutralize, or kill enemy ships, land-based installations and weapons, or personnel) of the U.S. Navy's fleet of surface ships. The growing power of China's navy and indications that that country's leaders want to have the capability to invade and occupy Taiwan by 2027 have created a sense of urgency in the U.S. Navy to increase the offensive capability of its surface force. To do that, the Navy needs to increase the fleet's ability to sink more enemy ships at long ranges and destroy more targets on land, either by adding ships that carry offensive weapons or by putting more offensive weapons on existing ships. In this report, the Congressional Budget Office explores several options that the Navy could pursue to bolster its offensive capability over the next five years. CBO does not make any recommendations about the options.
As of May 1, 2026, the Navy's fleet consisted of 291 battle force ships of various types: aircraft carriers, submarines, large surface combatants, small surface combatants, amphibious warfare ships, and some types of combat logistics and support ships. (That total does not include unmanned surface or undersea water vessels capable of carrying weapons, but the Navy has few of those systems in its inventory.) In addition to the strike capability of the fleet's 11 aircraft carriers, the Navy has an enormous missile capability. Its surface combatants and submarines carry about 9,100 vertical launching system (VLS) cells, which are essentially missile tubes for firing the offensive and defensive missiles the Navy uses.
As part of its 2025 shipbuilding plan, the Navy aims to increase its inventory of ships and the number of VLS cells they carry in accordance with its distributed maritime operations (DMO) concept. The DMO concept is a plan for using U.S. naval forces in combat operations against an adversary, particularly China, that has substantial capabilities for detecting and attacking U.S. Navy surface ships using antiship missiles and other weapons. A larger number of U.S. ships capable of carrying weapons would, in the event of a conflict, complicate China's ability to track, target, and attack all of the U.S. naval forces that may threaten its own.
This report examines three options to quickly increase the Navy's capability:
- Add missile launchers to existing and reactivated ships (Option 1),
- Buy used merchant ships and equip them with missile launchers (Option 2), or
- Buy used unmanned platforms and equip them with missile launchers (Option 3).
Other options, such as building more ships, even in foreign shipyards, would probably not bring additional capability to the fleet within five years. With respect to CBO's options, the Navy could pursue any or all of them. Each one would increase the number of cells capable of launching antiship, antiair, and land-attack missiles in the fleet as well as the number of ships capable of firing those missiles. Considered separately, Option 1 would add the most missile cells (640) and missile-carrying ships (69) to the Navy's fleet and cost $4.3 billion through 2030. Option 2 would add half as many missile cells (320) and fewer than one-third as many ships (20) and cost $2.3 billion. Option 3 would add the fewest missile cells (144) and missile-carrying ships (12) and cost $1.5 billion. All of CBO's options exclude the costs of buying new missiles.