CBO has discovered an error in the cost estimate released yesterday related to the longer-term budgetary effects of the managers amendment to the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act. Correcting that error has no impact on the estimated effects of the legislation during the 20102019 period. However, the correction reduces the degree to which the legislation would lower federal deficits in the decade after 2019.
The legislation would establish an Independent Payment Advisory Board, which would be required, under certain circumstances, to recommend changes to the Medicare program to limit the rate of growth in that programs spending. Those recommendations would go into effect automatically unless blocked by subsequent legislative action. In its original estimate, CBO wrote that: Such recommendations would be required if the Chief Actuary for the Medicare program projected that the programs spending per beneficiary would grow more rapidly than a measure of inflation (the average of the growth rates of the consumer price index for medical services and the overall index for all urban consumers). That statement is correct for fiscal years 2015 through 2019. After 2019, however, the threshold for Medicare spending growth that would trigger recommendations for spending reductions would be higherspecifically, the rate of increase in gross domestic product (GDP) per capita plus 1 percentage point.
With this corrected reading, savings from changes to the Medicare program (along with other changes to direct spending that are not associated directly with expanded insurance coverage) would increase at a rate that is between 10 percent and 15 percent per year during the 20202029 period, compared with a growth rate of nearly 15 percent reported in the initial estimate. The long-run budgetary effects of the other broad categories of the legislation are unchanged from the initial estimate. All told, CBO expects that the legislation, if enacted, would reduce federal budget deficits over the decade after 2019 relative to those projected under current lawwith a total effect during that decade that is in a broad range between one-quarter percent and one-half percent of GDP. In comparison, the extrapolations in the initial estimate implied a reduction in deficits in the 20202029 period that would be in a broad range around one-half percent of GDP. The imprecision of these calculations reflects the even greater degree of uncertainty that attends to them, compared with CBOs 10-year budget estimates. The expected reduction in deficits would represent a small share of the total deficits that would be likely to arise in that decade under current policies.
Based on this extrapolation, CBO expects that Medicare spending under the legislation would increase at an average annual rate of roughly 6 percent during the next two decadeswell below the roughly 8 percent annual growth rate of the past two decades (excluding the effect of establishing the Medicare prescription drug benefit). Adjusting for inflation, Medicare spending per beneficiary under the legislation would increase at an average annual rate of roughly 2 percent during the next two decadeswell below the roughly 4 percent annual growth rate of the past two decades. It is unclear whether such a reduction in the growth rate could be achieved, and if so, whether it would be accomplished through greater efficiencies in the delivery of health care or would reduce access to care or diminish the quality of care.
Addendum: The statements in CBO's December 19th letter about the federal budgetary commitment to health care remain correct. After 2019, the effects of the proposal that would tend to decrease that commitment would grow faster than those that would increase it. As a result, CBO expects that the proposal would generate a reduction in the federal budgetary commitment to health care during the decade following the 10-year budget window. By comparison, CBO expected that the legislation as originally proposed would have no significant effect on that commitment during the 2020-2029 period; most of the difference in CBOs assessment arises because the managers amendment would lower the threshold for Medicare spending growth that would trigger recommendations for spending reductions by the Independent Payment Advisory Board. The range of uncertainty surrounding these assessments is quite wide.