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report
April 2, 2013
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Weapon Systems
The Department of Defense (DoD) received $105 billion in 2012 to procure new weapon systems and other major equipment and to upgrade existing weapon systems; it received another $70 billion for research, development, testing, and evaluation of new weapon systems. CBO analyzes selected weapon programs. It also produces annual analyses of DoD's long-term defense plans, including projections of the cost of weapon systems.
related publications
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Technical Challenges of the U.S. Army’s Ground Combat Vehicle Program: Working Paper 2012-15
November 06, 2012 -
Approaches for Scaling Back the Defense Department’s Budget Plans
March 18, 2013 -
Long-Term Implications of the 2013 Future Years Defense Program
July 11, 2012 -
An Analysis of the Army's Transformation Programs and Possible Alternatives
June 02, 2009
The Army’s Ground Combat Vehicle Program and Alternatives
Apr 2013 - CBO compares the Army’s plan for the GCV with four options and finds that, although no option would meet all of the Army’s goals, all are likely to be less costly and pose a smaller risk of delay than CBO expects for the Army’s plan.
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Supplemental Material
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related publications
monthly archive
- May 2013 (2)
- April 2013 (14)
- March 2013 (22)
- February 2013 (10)
- January 2013 (11)
- December 2012 (4)
- November 2012 (10)
- October 2012 (4)
- September 2012 (6)
- August 2012 (5)
- July 2012 (11)
- June 2012 (8)
Supplemental Material
- blog post
Models Used by the Military Services to Develop Budgets for Activities Associated with Operational Readiness
Highlights
The Military Services Use Models to Inform About Two-Thirds of Their Budget Request for Operating Forces
The Congress directed CBO to review the modeling techniques that the military services use to generate their budget request for activities associated with operational readiness. CBO focused on identifying models used to inform the operating forces portion of the services' base budgets for operation and maintenance. CBO included only those models used at the services' headquarters.
CBO found that:
- Models were used to inform about 67 percent ($53 billion) of the services' $79 billion budget request for the active-duty component of operating forces in 2012,
- Operating forces (also known as budget activity 01) accounted for 14 percent of DoD's $554 billion budget request in 2012, and
- Models are one of many inputs to the budgeting process.
Using models does not guarantee good budgeting; not using them does not equate to bad budgeting.
View more presentations from Congressional Budget Office
The Amount of Modeling Varies Among the Services
- The Army uses models to inform the largest portion of its budget request for operating forces (82 percent of the request); the Air Force models the least (45 percent).
- Most services model large portions of their budget requests for training and for peacetime operations.
- The services vary widely in the degree to which they use models to generate their budget requests for day-to-day operations at their facilities and bases.
- All services model most of their budget requests for maintenance conducted at the depot level.
Operating forces is the largest budget activity within the services' budgets for operation and maintenance. Funding for operating forces pays for the training of combat and support units, as well as the maintenance and operation of most service installations. CBO did not review budget models outside of the operating forces activity.
Definitions and Scope
For the purposes of this study, CBO defined a model as:
a set of mathematical relationships or similar logical expressions that link a military service's activities, such as training and maintenance, to the cost of those activities.
Additionally, CBO:
- Relied on the services themselves to identify and characterize any models used in forming their budget requests for operating forces, and
- Did not compare, audit, or validate the services' models or attempt to identify any deficiencies in them.
monthly archive
- May 2013 (2)
- April 2013 (14)
- March 2013 (22)
- February 2013 (10)
- January 2013 (11)
- December 2012 (4)
- November 2012 (10)
- October 2012 (4)
- September 2012 (6)
- August 2012 (5)
- July 2012 (11)
- June 2012 (8)
An Analysis of the Navy's Amphibious Warfare Ships for Deploying Marines Overseas
Highlights
The Number of Amphibious Warfare Ships Falls Short of the Navy's Goal in 15 of the Next 30 Years
The Navy established a goal for a fleet of 33 amphibious ships in its 2012 30-year shipbuilding plan. Those ships are designed primarily to carry marines and their equipment into combat but also to perform other missions.
Under the current plan, between 2012 and 2041, the Navy will:
- Purchase 20 amphibious ships at a cost of about $50 billion,
- Retire 22 amphibious ships, and
- Meet or exceed the 33-ship goal between 2017 and 2031 but fall below the goal the rest of the time.
At any given time:
- About 30 percent of the total force of amphibious ships is deployed overseas conducting operations;
- About 74 percent is "deployable"—that is, in good material condition and with the crew sufficiently trained to perform a variety of missions;
- About 90 percent could be made available for an amphibious assault if the Navy had about three months to prepare.
Amphibious Force Meets Combatant Commanders' 2007 Request for Overseas Presence but Not Their 2010 "Unconstrained" Demand
In 2007, the combatant commanders requested nine ships for routine deployment. That request could be accommodated with the existing fleet.
By 2010, the combatant commanders asked for 18 ships. (The number increased because the combatant commanders were being asked about "unconstrained" demand—how many ships they wanted in the absence of any fiscal or force structure constraint.)
Meeting the request for 18 ships with the existing force would substantially increase deployment time and reduce time in ships' home ports.
Over a 27-month (117-week) operating cycle:
- Deployment time would more than double—from 26 weeks to 62 weeks.
- Time in home port would fall from 57 percent to 36 percent, well short of the Navy's goal of 50 percent.
monthly archive
- May 2013 (2)
- April 2013 (14)
- March 2013 (22)
- February 2013 (10)
- January 2013 (11)
- December 2012 (4)
- November 2012 (10)
- October 2012 (4)
- September 2012 (6)
- August 2012 (5)
- July 2012 (11)
- June 2012 (8)