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Military Personnel

CBO estimates that the Department of Defense spent $140 billion—or 27 percent of its base budget apart from the costs of operations in Iraq and Afghanistan—paying military personnel in 2012. CBO examines the budgetary implications of different approaches to compensating military personnel, including possible changes in the structure of cash pay, health benefits for military personnel and their family members, and health benefits for retirees. CBO also evaluates federal programs and issues related to veterans.

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CBO Testified on the Navy's Shipbuilding Plans

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March 10, 2011


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An Analysis of the Navy's Shipbuilding Plans

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March 10, 2011

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Military Retirement - January 2011 Baseline

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January 26, 2011

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Cost Implications of the Navy's Plans for Acquiring Littoral Combat Ships

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December 10, 2010

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Potential Costs of Veterans' Health Care

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October 7, 2010


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Potential Costs of Veterans' Health Care

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October 7, 2010

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Highlights

Potential Costs of Veterans’ Health Care

The Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) provides health care at little or no charge to more than 5 million veterans annually. Medical services are provided through the inpatient and outpatient facilities run by the Veterans Health Administration. Those services include routine health assessments, readjustment counseling, surgery, hospitalization, and nursing home care.

The Congressional Budget Office (CBO) projects that the future costs for VA to treat enrolled veterans will be substantially higher (in inflation-adjusted dollars) than recent appropriations for that purpose, partly because more veterans are likely to seek care in the VA system but mostly because health care costs per enrolled veteran are projected to increase faster than the overall price level. Under two scenarios that CBO examined, the total real resources (in 2010 dollars) necessary to provide health care services to all veterans who seek treatment at VA would range from $69 billion to $85 billion in 2020, representing cumulative increases of roughly 45 percent to 75 percent since 2010.

Although veterans from recent conflicts will represent a fast-growing share of enrollments in VA health care over the next decade, the share of VA’s resources devoted to the care of those veterans is projected to remain small through 2020, in part because they are younger and healthier than other veterans served by VA.

Background

To provide health care services, VA depends on discretionary funding that the Congress provides in annual appropriation acts. Although eligibility for VA health care is based primarily on veterans’ military service, VA may, and does, adjust enrollment according to the resources available to it.

The Veterans’ Health Care Eligibility Reform Act of 1996 (Public Law 104-262, 110 Stat. 3177) mandated that VA deliver services to veterans who have service-connected conditions, to veterans unable to pay for necessary medical care, and to specific groups of veterans, such as former prisoners of war. The legislation permitted VA to offer services to all other veterans to the extent that resources and facilities were available; it also required VA to develop and implement an enrollment system to facilitate the management and delivery of health care services.

VA’s enrollment system includes eight categories that determine veterans’ eligibility and priority for access to health care. The highest priority is given to veterans who have service-connected disabilities (priority groups 1 through 3, or P1 through P3); the lowest priority is given to higher-income veterans who have no compensable service-connected disabilities, that is, no conditions that are disabling to the degree that VA provides compensation (P8).

The number of veterans treated by VA climbed rapidly following the enactment of the 1996 law, increasing from 2.9 million in fiscal year 1995 to 4.5 million in 2003. By 2003, VA no longer had the capacity to adequately serve all current enrollees, prompting the Secretary of Veterans Affairs to suspend further enrollment of some higher-income veterans (those in P8); VA eased that restriction in 2009 to allow some of those veterans to enroll. (Enrolled veterans typically have more than one source of health care available to them and choose to use VA for only a small portion of their health care, relying on other sources such as Medicare, employer-sponsored insurance, or the Department of Defense’s TRICARE program.)

Current Resources

A total of $44 billion was appropriated to VA for 2009 to provide medical services to veterans and to conduct medical research. That amount was increased by 8 percent, to $48 billion, for 2010. VA has requested an appropriation of $52 billion, an additional 8 percent, for 2011. The average annual increase was more than 9 percent from 2004 through 2009.

One group of veterans—those who have deployed or will deploy to overseas contingency operations (OCO), which include Operation Iraqi Freedom, Operation New Dawn, and Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan and related activities—are of particular interest as policymakers and others attempt to determine the extent of the war-related medical conditions of those veterans and the resources required to treat them. Those veterans accounted for only about 6 percent of all patients in 2009 and 3 percent of the total dollars obligated for veterans’ health care in that year. Of the $43 billion obligated in 2009, VA estimates that it obligated $1.5 billion to care for OCO veterans. VA further estimates that those obligations will rise to $2.0 billion in 2010, $2.6 billion in 2011, and $3.3 billion in 2012.

Projecting Future Costs

This CBO report examines prospective demands on VA and projects the resources the agency would need to provide medical care to all enrolled veterans during the next 10 years, 2011–2020. (The report does not attempt to predict appropriations for VA.) Although the focus of this report is on the resources VA would need to treat all enrolled veterans, CBO has also separately projected the portion of those resources that would be needed to treat the veterans of the ongoing overseas contingency operations.

The recent increases in VA’s medical budget have reflected factors that will probably affect future resource requirements. First, as is true for all U.S. health care, VA’s medical expenditures per enrollee have grown more rapidly than has the overall price level. Second, the ongoing deployments to combat operations in Iraq and Afghanistan have increased the number of veterans seeking care from VA. Third, VA has been easing restrictions on enrolling higher-income veterans (those in P8), in part because of concerns expressed by policymakers and others who believe that restrictions on enrollment have caused some veterans to be denied benefits that they deserve.

To account for some possible policy changes and for uncertainty about the number of veterans who will be enrolled and the growth of medical expenditures per enrollee, CBO presents two scenarios to capture some of the range of possible outcomes. The scenarios differ in their assumptions about the number of enrollees in the VA health care system and the costs of providing medical services. CBO also assumes that there will be no major changes in VA’s policies (except for a possible change in eligibility criteria) and that the enrollment of non-OCO veterans (except for higher-income veterans) and the percentage of total health care that veterans receive from VA as opposed to other sources, referred to as their "reliance on VA," follow current trends.

Scenario 1. The first scenario was crafted using assumptions about enrollment and medical expenditures per enrollee that generate lower resource requirements than Scenario 2. The assumptions about factors affecting enrollment include the following:

  • VA’s eligibility, cost-sharing, and other policies are those in effect at the beginning of 2010. Those policies include the easing of enrollment restrictions that began in 2009 for veterans in priority group 8 who have no compensable service-connected disabilities and whose income is 10 percent or less above VA’s income thresholds.
  • The number of troops deployed to overseas contingency operations, which currently include the military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan and related activities, drops to 30,000 by 2013 and remains at that number throughout the decade.
  • VA’s medical expenditures per enrollee for each priority group grow in nominal terms at slightly more than 5 percent per year, about the same rate as that anticipated in the general population over the decade.

Scenario 2. CBO crafted the second scenario to illustrate potential policy changes and other outcomes that may result in higher resource needs for VA’s health care services. The assumptions for that scenario are as follows:

  • VA changes its eligibility rules to allow veterans who have no compensable service-connected disabilities and whose income is 30 percent or less above VA’s income thresholds to enroll. Other than that change, all policies relating to eligibility, cost sharing, and other factors are those in effect at the beginning of 2010.
  • The number of troops deployed to overseas contingency operations declines more slowly than in Scenario 1, dropping to 60,000 by 2015 and remaining at that number through the rest of the decade.
  • VA’s medical expenditures per enrollee for each priority group grow initially at the rate VA assumed in preparing the Administration’s 2011 budget request that was transmitted in February 2010 and, in subsequent years, at an annual rate that is about 30 percent higher than that anticipated in the general population—a rate that exceeds the average rate experienced by VA from 2003 through 2007, before significant numbers of veterans from the ongoing conflicts had enrolled.

Potential Costs to Treat All VA Enrollees

Under Scenario 1, CBO estimates that total enrollment would grow from 8.0 million in 2009 to more than 8.8 million by 2016—an increase of about 10 percent—but would edge down to 8.7 million in 2020. The resources required to treat all enrolled veterans would be about $69 billion in 2020, nearly 45 percent higher than the $48 billion that has been provided for 2010.

Under Scenario 2, enrollment would be 620,000 higher in 2020 than in Scenario 1, with 340,000 new enrollees resulting from VA’s further relaxation of the restrictions on enrollment and 280,000 from the higher troop deployments. The resources required to treat all enrolled veterans would reach nearly $85 billion in 2020, or 22 percent more than under Scenario 1 and about 75 percent more than the amount provided for 2010.

What factors explain the difference of roughly $15 billion in the potential costs of the two scenarios in 2020? The disparity between the growth rates of medical expenditures per enrollee in the two scenarios accounts for the lion’s share of the difference—$13 billion. Extending eligibility to additional higher-income veterans who have no compensable service-connected disabilities would add just $1 billion to the costs under Scenario 1; because those new enrollees are drawn from a group that historically has cost less to treat than most other veterans, the additional resources VA would require would be relatively small. The higher troop levels for contingency operations under Scenario 2 would also add $1 billion; the increase in the number of enrollees would be small—only about 3 percent—and they too would use fewer resources than the average enrollee.

The projections for both scenarios exceed the baseline projections that CBO constructs in accordance with the provisions set forth in the (now expired) Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985. The baseline projections reflect the assumption that appropriations increase at the same rate as the employment cost index for the wage and salary component of VA’s budget and at the same rate as the gross domestic product price index for all other components.

In making its projections, CBO did not explicitly account for recently enacted health care legislation—in particular, the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (P.L. 111-148) and the Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act of 2010 (P.L. 111-152). Although there is considerable uncertainty regarding how the new legislation will be implemented, CBO conducted a preliminary analysis of how it might affect VA’s resource requirements. That analysis indicates that the new laws may either increase or decrease the number of enrollees—and therefore VA’s resource requirements—but in either case probably by only a small amount. On the one hand, the costs of obtaining health insurance will be lower for some veterans in the latter part of the coming decade, leading some of them to seek less care from VA than they would have without the recent legislation. On the other hand, to avoid financial penalties that may be assessed on people who do not have a required level of health insurance, some veterans who would otherwise neither enroll in VA’s program nor obtain other insurance might choose to enroll with VA. Neither of those effects is likely to be large enough to significantly affect the projections in this report.

Potential Costs to Treat Veterans of Overseas Contingency Operations

As part of its projections for the resources needed to treat all enrolled veterans, CBO separately estimated the portion of resources that would be required to treat veterans of overseas contingency operations. CBO estimates that between the time hostilities began and the end of 2020, VA would enroll a total of 1.4 million or 1.7 million OCO veterans under Scenarios 1 and 2, respectively. The annual resources (in 2010 dollars) required to treat OCO veterans would increase from an estimated $2.0 billion in 2010 to $5.4 billion in 2020 under Scenario 1 and to $8.3 billion under Scenario 2. Because OCO veterans are typically younger and healthier than the average VA enrollee, they are less expensive to treat. Accordingly, the resources devoted to OCO veterans would be a small share of outlays, consuming 8 percent and 10 percent of VA’s resources for health care services in 2020 under Scenario 1 and Scenario 2, respectively. As the OCO veterans age, however, CBO expects that their costs will be similar to those of other older veterans who use VA’s health care services.



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An Analysis of the Army's Arsenal Support Program Initiative

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July 21, 2010


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An Analysis of the Army's Arsenal Support Program Initiative

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July 21, 2010

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Abstract

The Congress created the Arsenal Support Program Initiative (ASPI) to help maintain the functional capabilities of the Armys three manufacturing arsenals, which are located in Rock Island, Illinois, Watervliet, New York, and Pine Bluff, Arkansas. A primary goal of the program is to enable commercial firms to lease vacant space at the arsenals once that space has been renovated, thereby encouraging collaboration between the Army and commercial firms as well as reducing the costs the government incurs to operate and maintain the arsenal facilities. Since the ASPIs inception, a number of commercial tenants have leased unused property at the arsenals; however, the financial benefits that the program has generated for the government have proved to be small relative to the programs funding.

In response to a directive from the Congress, the Congressional Budget Office (CBO)conducted a business case analysis of the ASPI, examining the programs costs, return on investment, and economic impact. In keeping with CBOs mandate to provide objective, nonpartisan analysis, this report makes no recommendations.


Highlights

The Congress created the Arsenal Support Program Initiative (ASPI) in 2001 to help maintain the viability of the Armys three manufacturing arsenals. Owned and operated by the federal government, those arsenalswhich are located in Rock Island, Illinois, Watervliet, New York, and Pine Bluff, Arkansasprovide a variety of services, including the manufacture, renovation, and demilitarization of weapons and other equipment. The broad intent of the ASPI is to encourage collaboration between the Army and commercial firms to preserve the arsenals capabilities and to reduce the costs to the government of operating and maintaining those arsenals. Originally established as a two-year demonstration program, the ASPI has subsequently been extended through a series of National Defense Authorization Acts. The program is currently scheduled to expire at the end of 2011.

The principal outcome of the ASPI to date is that commercial tenants have begun to lease unused property at the arsenals, typically vacant buildings or portions of buildings that the Army has renovated specifically for that purpose. Tenants compensate the arsenals mostly in the form of negotiated rental payments or services in lieu of rent. As of 2009, a total of 46 tenants were leasing more than 200,000 square feet of space at the arsenals under the ASPI.

In recent years, however, policymakers have expressed concern that the ASPI is not fulfilling its objectives. In the conference report that accompanied the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008, legislators noted that receipts generated by the ASPI to that point were small relative to funding provided for the program; they also stated that the program was not clearly bolstering the arsenals core missions. As a result of those concerns, the Congress directed the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) to conduct a business case analysis of the ASPI. In response to that directive, CBO examined the costs, return on investment, and economic impact of the program; those findings are presented in this report. The Congress also directed the Government Accountability Office (GAO) to investigate how effectively the ASPI was fulfilling its objectives and to provide recommendations on restructuring the program to support the arsenals core missions. GAOs findings appear in a separate report that was released in November 2009.

Although the Department of Defense (DoD) has not requested any funding for the ASPI in its annual budget submissions, the ASPI has received more than $87 million in funding from its inception in 2001 through 2010. As of the end of 2009, a total of $69 million had been obligated for the program and, of that amount, $54 million had been disbursed. Over 90 percent of the obligations made for the program have been for the purpose of renovating and improving arsenal properties and infrastructure, CBO estimates. Funding for the ASPI is not used to pay employees who work for the office that manages the program; those costs are paid out of the Armys operation and maintenance account.

To determine the financial impact of the ASPI on the federal government, CBO first estimated the receipts and other financial benefits that the program has generated for the government so far and those that might be generated in the future. CBO then calculated the present value of those cash flows using a discount rate that attaches a market price to the risk associated with those flows. That present value can be compared to the present value of the governmental outlays needed to make space available to tenants.

Under the assumptions that the ASPI will receive no additional appropriations for renovations after 2010 and that the government will continue to pay for marketing and administering the program, CBO estimates that, measured in 2010 dollars, the present value of outlays for the program through 2075 is $99 million and the present value of the financial benefits that the program will generate for the government is $47 million. The resulting net present value is negative $52 million, meaning that the total stream of financial benefits that the ASPI has generated for the government so far and can be expected to generate in the future will fall short of the up-front investment required to ready the arsenal properties for tenants. That estimate translates into a government subsidy for the program of about 50 cents for every dollar spent.

Should the Congress provide further funding for renovations after 2010, each additional 100,000 square feet of space that the Army renovated under the ASPI would cost about $16 million in 2010 dollars, CBO estimates. At a subsidy of about 50 cents for every dollar spent, that spending would result in a net cost to the government of about $8 million.

In terms of the programs broader economic impact, the ASPI positively affects the local economies in the arsenal regions in two ways: Government spending for the program probably leads to additional jobs for civilians and income for area businesses; and commercial tenants who relocate to the arsenal regions because of the program buttress economic activity in the area. However, because of a number of uncertainties, CBO could not reliably quantify the positive economic impact of the ASPI within the arsenal regions.

On a national basis, the ASPI has had little if any net economic impact, in CBOs judgment, because the program primarily causes shifts in resources from one region of the country to another. It is possible that the governments spending for the ASPI has simply displaced appropriations that would have been made for other purposes within the federal budget, in which case any net impact on the economy would have been minimal. Alternatively, even if the spending added to federal deficits, the economy was operating at or near capacity during much of the programs existence. To keep inflation in check under those circumstances, the Federal Reserve generally takes into account information about the governments spending when it makes decisions about interest rates, with the intention of offsetting the impact on the economy of short-term fluctuations in such spending. As a result, additional government spending under those circumstances would not produce sustained increases in overall economic activity and employment. In addition, nearly all of the tenants currently leasing space at the arsenals were already located in the United States before they decided to participate in the program. Although the relocation of those tenants probably created an economic gain in the arsenal regions, it also probably resulted in an economic loss in the regions in which the tenants were previously located.



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Strategies for Maintaining the Navy's and Marine Corps' Inventories of Fighter Aircraft

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May 28, 2010


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Strategies for Maintaining the Navy's and Marine Corps' Inventories of Fighter Aircraft

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May 28, 2010

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