Congressional Budget Office

Supporting the congress since 1975

Congressional Budget Office

contact cbo

  • home
  • about
  • topics
  • cost estimates
  • my cbo

Employment and Labor Markets

The level of employment has a direct effect on people's well-being and the government's finances. When employment is higher, incomes and federal revenues are higher, while federal outlays for income support programs are lower. CBO analyzes the causes and consequences of unemployment, the effects of the unemployment insurance program, the impact of various policy proposals that might affect employment, and other issues concerning labor markets such as people's participation in the labor force.

Sub-Topics:

  • Federal Personnel
  • Labor Markets
  • Economic Stimulus
  • NAFTA

monthly archive

  • May 2013 (2)
  • April 2013 (14)
  • March 2013 (22)
  • February 2013 (10)
  • January 2013 (11)
  • December 2012 (4)
  • November 2012 (10)
  • October 2012 (4)
  • September 2012 (6)
  • August 2012 (5)
  • July 2012 (11)
  • June 2012 (8)
browse all
  • Sign Up For CBO Emails
  • Sign up for All CBO RSS Feeds

A Description of the Immigrant Population: An Update

blog post

June 3, 2011


  • blog post
  • Sign Up For CBO Emails
  • Sign up for All CBO RSS Feeds

A Description of the Immigrant Population: An Update

report

June 2, 2011

read complete document  (pdf, 0 kb)

Abstract

This document is the latest in CBO's series on immigration. It updates A Description of the Immigrant Population (November 2004), providing an overview of the nation's foreign-born population, with a particular focus on the years 2000 to 2009. It discusses changes in the numbers and countries of origin foreign-born people and their U.S. residency and citizenship status, and it compares demographic and labor market characteristics of foreign-born and native-born people in the United States.


Highlights

A Description of the Immigrant Population: An Update
View more presentations from Congressional Budget Office


  • Automatic Stabilizers
  • Tables to Accompany the 2011 Automatic Stabilizers Report
  • Sign Up For CBO Emails
  • Sign up for All CBO RSS Feeds

The Effects of Automatic Stabilizers on the Federal Budget

report

April 21, 2011


Abstract

This report focuses on the automatic responses of revenues and outlays to developments in the economy—the automatic stabilizers—that reflect cyclical movements in real (inflation-adjusted) output and unemployment. CBO estimates that automatic stabilizers are adding significantly to the budget deficit now but that their contribution will steadily fade over the next few years.


Highlights

In March 2011, the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) released its most recent baseline projections of federal revenues, outlays, and budget balances for the next 10 years. For those projections, CBO assumed the continuation of current laws and policies that affect taxes and mandatory spending programs and extrapolated the growth of discretionary spending by using projected rates of inflation. CBO estimated in March that the baseline budget deficit will rise from $1.3 trillion in fiscal year 2010 to $1.4 trillion in 2011 and then will average $692 billion over the next five years. At 9.3 percent of gross domestic product (GDP) in 2011, the deficit in those terms will be the second largest in more than half a century (behind only the 2009 deficit, which was 10.0 percent of GDP). By comparison, CBO projects that the deficit will average 4.1 percent of GDP during the five years from 2012 through 2016 if current laws remain in place.

CBO's projections of the budget deficit are affected by legislation that governs taxation and spending and by the automatic responses of revenues and outlays to developments in the economy and other factors. This report focuses on a component of the latter group—the automatic stabilizers—that reflect cyclical movements in real (inflation-adjusted) output and unemployment. During recessions, GDP falls relative to potential GDP (the quantity of output that corresponds to a high rate of use of labor and capital), and revenue declines automatically. In addition, some outlays—for example, to pay unemployment insurance claims or to provide federal nutrition benefits—automatically increase. Those automatic reductions in revenues and increases in outlays when GDP is falling relative to potential GDP and unemployment is correspondingly rising help bolster economic activity, but they also temporarily increase the budget deficit. As GDP moves up closer to potential GDP, revenues automatically begin to rise, outlays automatically begin to fall, and the automatic stabilizers offer a smaller boost to output. (For a discussion of the measurement of automatic stabilizers, see the appendix.)

CBO estimates that automatic stabilizers are adding significantly to the budget deficit now but that their contribution will steadily fade over the next few years. In 2010, CBO estimates, automatic stabilizers added the equivalent of 2.4 percent of potential GDP to the deficit, an amount somewhat greater than the 2.1 percent added in 2009. According to CBO's baseline projections, the contribution of automatic stabilizers to the budget deficit will decrease as a share of potential GDP—to 2.1 percent in 2011, 1.7 percent in 2012, and 1.5 percent in 2013 (see Table 1 and Table 2). That contribution will then continue to fall—to 1.0 percent in 2014, 0.5 percent in 2015, and 0.1 percent in 2016—consistent with CBO's projection for output to come back up near potential output by 2016.

The budget balance without automatic stabilizers is an estimate of what the surplus or deficit would be if GDP was at its potential, the unemployment rate was at a corresponding level, and all other factors were unchanged. That budget measure has several applications. For example, some analysts use it to discern underlying trends in government saving or dissaving (that is, trends in surpluses or deficits). Others use it to approximate whether the short-run influence of the budget on aggregate demand and on the growth of real output is positive or negative. More generally, the measure helps analysts estimate the extent to which changes in the budget balance are caused by cyclical developments in the economy and thus are likely to prove temporary rather than long lasting.

Under CBO's baseline assumptions, the budget deficit without automatic stabilizers would constitute 6.7 percent of potential GDP in 2011, up from 6.0 percent in 2010. That increase is primarily due to a rise in mandatory spending from sources other than the automatic stabilizers that amounts to 0.6 percent of potential GDP. Discretionary outlays, which have no automatic response to the business cycle, are projected to decline by 0.2 percent of potential GDP, and interest payments, which are assumed to have no automatic response, are projected to rise slightly. Revenues without automatic stabilizers are projected to decrease by 0.2 percent of potential GDP in 2011.

According to CBO's baseline projections, the budget deficit without automatic stabilizers falls significantly over the next three years, from 6.7 percent of potential GDP in fiscal year 2011 to 4.9 percent in 2012, 2.6 percent in 2013, and 1.9 percent in 2014 (see Figure 1). The drop in 2012 is due mostly to an increase in revenues without automatic stabilizers (from 15.8 percent of potential GDP to 17.1 percent)—largely attributable to the ending of the temporary reduction in payroll taxes for 2011, which was part of the Tax Relief, Unemployment Insurance Reauthorization, and Job Creation Act of 2010 (referred to in this report as the 2010 tax act, Public Law 111-312)—and to a lower amount of depreciation deductions for investment in business equipment resulting from provisions of the 2010 tax act and other recent acts. Outlays without automatic stabilizers fall by 0.5 percent of potential GDP in 2012, reflecting declines in both mandatory and discretionary outlays that are partly offset by an increase in interest payments. In 2013, the decline in the deficit without automatic stabilizers is almost entirely the result of a rise in revenues, which in turn is due to the delayed effects of the scheduled expiration at the end of 2011 of the temporary patch for the alternative minimum tax and, to a greater extent, to the expiration at the end of 2012 of other tax provisions extended or newly implemented in the 2010 tax act, including extensions of the individual income tax reductions enacted in 2001 and 2003. Moreover, some high-income taxpayers will be subject to additional taxes that are scheduled to take effect in calendar year 2013 under provisions of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010 (P.L. 111-148) and the Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act of 2010 (P.L. 111-152). Some of the impacts of those tax changes become larger in 2014, the first full fiscal year the provisions are in effect.

In 2015, the federal deficit without automatic stabilizers reverses course, rising to 2.5 percent of potential GDP in that year and to 3.3 percent in 2016. Those increases stem mainly from a rise in mandatory outlays (largely Social Security, Medicare, and Medicaid) that is not attributable to automatic stabilizers. Revenues without automatic stabilizers fall slightly in those years relative to potential GDP, mostly because of legislation that shifts the timing of corporate income tax payments out of 2016 and into prior years. An uptick in interest costs is roughly offset by a decline in discretionary spending.



  • blog post
  • Sign Up For CBO Emails
  • Sign up for All CBO RSS Feeds

Report on the Troubled Asset Relief Program

report

March 29, 2011

read complete document  (pdf, 623 kb)

Abstract

In October 2008, the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008 established the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) to enable the Department of the Treasury to purchase or insure troubled assets as a way to promote stability in financial markets. Section 202 of that legislation requires the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) to prepare a report on those transactions within 45 days of a report issued by the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) on the TARP's activities. This fifth statutory report from CBO on the TARP's transactions follows the report that OMB submitted to the Congress on February 14, 2011.


Highlights

In October 2008, the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008 (Division A of Public Law 110-343) established the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) to enable the Department of the Treasury to promote stability in financial markets through the purchase and guarantee of "troubled assets." Section 202 of that legislation requires the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) to submit semiannual reports on the costs of the Treasury's purchases and guarantees of troubled assets. The law also requires the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) to prepare an assessment of each OMB report within 45 days of its issuance. That assessment must discuss three elements:

  • The costs of purchases and guarantees of troubled assets,
  • The information and valuation methods used to calculate those costs, and
  • The impact on the federal budget deficit and debt.

To fulfill its statutory requirement, CBO has prepared this report on transactions completed, outstanding, and anticipated under the TARP as of March 3, 2011. CBO estimates that the cost to the federal government of the TARP's transactions (also referred to as the subsidy cost), including grants for mortgage programs that have not been made yet, will amount to $19 billion. That cost stems largely from assistance to American International Group (AIG), aid to the automotive industry, and grant programs aimed at avoiding foreclosures. Other transactions with financial institutions will, taken together, yield a net gain to the federal government, in CBO's estimation.

CBO's current estimate of the cost of the TARP's transactions is $6 billion less than the $25 billion estimate shown in the agency's previous report on the TARP (issued in November 2010). The reduction in the estimated cost results primarily from a lower assessment of losses from assistance provided to the automotive industry. CBO's current estimate is well below OMB's latest estimate of $64 billion, largely because of different assessments of the cost of the Treasury's housing programs under the TARP.

When the TARP was created, the U.S. financial system was in a precarious condition, and the transactions envisioned and ultimately undertaken engendered substantial financial risk for the federal government. The costs directly associated with the TARP, when taken in isolation, have come out toward the low end of the range of possible outcomes anticipated when the program was launched; however, funds invested, loaned, or granted to participating institutions through the Federal Reserve and other government entities helped limit those costs. As a result, only $432 billion will be disbursed through the TARP, CBO estimates, well below the $700 billion initially authorized. Overall, the outcomes of most transactions made through the TARP were favorable for the federal government.



monthly archive

  • May 2013 (2)
  • April 2013 (14)
  • March 2013 (22)
  • February 2013 (10)
  • January 2013 (11)
  • December 2012 (4)
  • November 2012 (10)
  • October 2012 (4)
  • September 2012 (6)
  • August 2012 (5)
  • July 2012 (11)
  • June 2012 (8)
browse all
  • Sign Up For CBO Emails
  • Sign up for All CBO RSS Feeds

CBO's Labor Force Projections Through 2021

blog post

March 22, 2011


  • blog post
  • Sign Up For CBO Emails
  • Sign up for All CBO RSS Feeds

CBO's Labor Force Projections Through 2021

report

March 22, 2011

read complete document  (pdf, 927 kb)

  • Sign Up For CBO Emails
  • Sign up for All CBO RSS Feeds

Civil Service Retirement - March 2011 Baseline

data or technical information

March 18, 2011

read complete document  (pdf, 18 kb)

monthly archive

  • May 2013 (2)
  • April 2013 (14)
  • March 2013 (22)
  • February 2013 (10)
  • January 2013 (11)
  • December 2012 (4)
  • November 2012 (10)
  • October 2012 (4)
  • September 2012 (6)
  • August 2012 (5)
  • July 2012 (11)
  • June 2012 (8)
browse all
  • Sign Up For CBO Emails
  • Sign up for All CBO RSS Feeds

Migrants' Remittances and Related Economic Flows

blog post

February 24, 2011


  • document
  • 2011_02_24_Remittances_chartbook.htm
  • blog post
  • Sign Up For CBO Emails
  • Sign up for All CBO RSS Feeds

Migrants' Remittances and Related Economic Flows

report

February 24, 2011

read complete document  (pdf, 1344 kb)

Abstract

Migrants' remittances—payments sent by foreign-born workers back to their home country—have become a significant source of monetary inflows for many countries. In 2009, such remittances from the United States to other countries totaled more than $48 billion, nearly 30 percent more in inflation-adjusted terms than they were in 2000. People in Mexico receive more of the remittances sent from the United States than do residents of any other country.

This document updates and expands upon the Congressional Budget Office's (CBO's) May 2005 publication Remittances: International Payments by Migrants. That paper included data through 2003; this document includes data through 2009. The existing data on global remittances are not of very high quality, however, and the comparisons and trends reported here should be viewed only as approximations.


Highlights

Migrants to the United States often send money to people in their home country or take it with them when they return home. Those transfers can involve sending money through banks or other institutions to family members or others in the home country, making financial investments in the home country, or returning to the home country while retaining bank accounts or claims on other financial assets in the United States. All three types of actions are similar in their economic effects, even though only transfers of money through banks and other financial institutions to foreign individuals are commonly thought of as migrants' remittances.

As one of the most important destinations of global migration, the United States is the largest national source of remittances. The opportunity to send or bring remittances home is one of the important motivations for migration, and policies that affect migration to the United States could affect outflows of remittances. In turn, the flow of remittances can affect economic growth, labor markets, poverty rates, and future migration rates in the United States as well as in recipient countries.

This document updates and expands upon the Congressional Budget Office's previous analysis of remittances—Remittances: International Payments by Migrants (May 2005)—and presents data through 2009. The new presentation provides a better view of people's total transfers of money between the United States and other countries but, because of changes in the way the data are collected and reported, does not provide as much information as was previously available on the portion of those transfers that is attributable to migrants. (See "Notes and Definitions" at the beginning of the full document for a summary of terminology and the appendix for a discussion of recent changes in the classification of remittances.) The existing data on global remittances and related economic flows are not of very high quality, and the comparisons and trends reported here should be viewed only as approximations.

Remittances from the United States (Exhibits 1 to 4)

The Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) estimates that migrants' remittances totaled about $48 billion in 2009—nearly 70 percent more than official development assistance provided by the U.S. government. Nearly $38 billion of that amount was personal transfers by foreign-born residents in the United States to households abroad. The rest, about $11 billion, reflected the compensation of employees who were in the United States for less than a year; some of that compensation, however, was spent in the United States. No breakdown of the regional destination of the money sent home is available for 2009, but in 2003, by BEA's estimate, about two-thirds of personal transfers went to countries in the Western Hemisphere, one-quarter went to countries in Asia and the Pacific, and the rest went to countries in Europe and Africa. BEA also reports that, in 2009, migrants' capital transfers (that is, individuals' transfers for themselves, as opposed to transfers to others) amounted to nearly $3 billion on net.

BEA estimates outflows of personal transfers on the basis of four characteristics: the size of the foreign-born population (differentiated by duration of stay in the United States, family type, country of origin, and sex), the percentage of the foreign-born population that remits, the income of the foreign-born population, and the percentage of income that the foreign-born population remits.

No information is publicly available on flows of migrants' remittances from the United States to specific regions or countries. Such details are available only for a category that BEA calls "net private remittances and other transfers," which measures outflows minus inflows (rather than outflows only) and includes institutional remittances by U.S. nonprofit organizations as well as a variety of other minor transactions. For 2009, BEA reports net private remittances and other transfers of $74 billion and net compensation of nonresident employees of nearly $8 billion, for a total of $82 billion in net outflows. That figure represented about 0.6 percent of total U.S. gross domestic product (GDP) in 2009. About 40 percent, or $33 billion, went to other countries in the Western Hemisphere. Another $17 billion was sent to countries in Asia and the Pacific, $9 billion flowed to countries in Europe, and $5 billion was transferred to countries in Africa.

Effects in Recipient Countries (Exhibits 5 and 6)

Remittances can have both positive and negative effects on the economies of recipient countries. The transfers provide a country's economy with foreign currency, help finance imports, improve the balance of payments in its international accounts, and increase national income. However, the migration that generates remittances also reduces the labor force of the country of origin, and remittances may reduce the remaining family members' incentive to work. The available evidence suggests that recipients with income below a threshold level tend to use remittances primarily for consumption, including, for instance, purchases of food, consumer goods, and health care. In surveys of people in the United States who remitted money to Mexico, for example, 70 percent reported that consumption was the only purpose, 3 percent reported that asset accumulation was the only purpose, and 26 percent said that both consumption and asset accumulation were reasons for remitting. Nevertheless, evidence from some developing countries suggests that households in those countries tend to save a larger portion of income from remittances than from other sources of income, providing a source of capital for investment.

Concurrent with the overall increase in global remittances has been a decline in the fees charged by financial institutions to make those transfers. Between 2001 and 2009, the fees charged to transfer $200 to six countries in Latin America declined by an average of at least 3 percent per year (for Haiti) to 10 percent per year (for Colombia), possibly because of lower transaction costs resulting from technological progress and more awareness among migrants about alternative ways to remit.

Remittances to Mexico (Exhibits 7 to 9)

Mexico is the destination of the largest amount of remittances from the United States. According to BEA's estimates, of the $33 billion (net) transferred from the United States to people in other countries in the Western Hemisphere in 2009 or earned as compensation by short-term migrants, about $20 billion was identified in the international economic accounts as going to Mexico; by BEA's estimates, such flows from the United States to Mexico (adjusted for inflation) rose by an average of 2 percent per year between 2000 and 2009. The Banco de Mxico estimates that all gross inflows of funds from abroad—not only from the United States—were about $22 billion in 2009. (The bank does not estimate outflows.) Estimates from the Banco de Mxico indicate that all gross inflows (adjusted for inflation) rose by an average of 11 percent per year during the past decade.

The difference between BEA's and the Banco de Mxico's estimates could stem not only from differences in definitions but also from differences in methodology and source data. Beginning in 2003, all Mexican banks and money transfer companies were required to register with the Banco de Mxico and to report monthly remittances by state. (Prior to that rule change, the Banco de Mxico inferred remittances from a 1990 census of different Mexican financial institutions.) In addition, around that time, the "matricula consular"—an identification card issued by the Mexican government to Mexican nationals living outside of the country—began to be accepted for opening bank accounts in the United States; that change may have helped facilitate money transfers to Mexico in a way that allowed the Banco de Mxico to better record them. Finally, the Banco de Mxico also conducts a border survey that asks returning migrants about cash and goods that they are bringing to relatives in Mexico. With the apparent increased use of more formal channels to transfer money between the United States and Mexico and those border surveys, the official Mexican statistics are recording cash transfers not captured in the past.

Global Flows of Remittances (Exhibits 10 to 13)

According to the International Monetary Fund, total inflows of remittances globallythe sum of personal transfers, compensation of employees, and migrants' capital transferswere about $407 billion in 2008 (in nominal dollars), up from about $150 billion in 2002, an average increase of 18 percent per year. About two-thirds of global inflows was sent as personal transfers, about 30 percent was recorded as compensation of employees, and about 5 percent stemmed from migrants' capital transfers. Although total inflows and outflows of global remittances should be equal, total recorded outflows—about $289 billion in 2008—are generally much lower than total recorded inflows. The discrepancy between total inflows and total outflows underscores the deficiencies of remittance data, which are collected or estimated in different ways in different countries. Even when remittance data are collected directly, discrepancies arise because of the use of informal channels for transfers of funds as well as the misclassification of remittances as tourism receipts, trade receivables, or deposits.

Total inflows of remittances constitute a small fraction of global economic activity, amounting to about 1 percent of total gross domestic product in 2008. For a number of countries, however, such funds constitute a substantial source of income: For at least six countries in Latin America and the Caribbean, total inflows amounted to more than 10 percent of GDP. Further, for a number of countries, total inflows were more than double total foreign direct investment in 2008.



  • blog post
  • Sign Up For CBO Emails
  • Sign up for All CBO RSS Feeds

Estimated Impact of the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act on Employment and Economic Output from October 2010 Through December 2010

report

February 23, 2011

read complete document  (pdf,  kb)

  • « first
  • ‹ previous
  • …
  • 4
  • 5
  • 6
  • 7
  • 8
  • 9
  • 10
  • 11
  • 12
  • …
  • next ›
  • last »
  • about
  • topics
  • cost estimates
  • my cbo
  • press
  • privacy, security, and copyright policies
  • our business opportunities
  • sitemap

work at cbo

learn more about working at cbo and check out the agency’s career opportunities

stay connected

get cbo’s email updates