Budget function 300 encompasses programs administered by the Department of the Interior, the Department of Agriculture, and the Army Corps of Engineers for land and water management, resource conservation, recreation, wildlife management, and mineral development. This function also covers funding for the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, which administers ocean and fisheries programs, and the Environmental Protection Agency, which administers the Superfund, makes grants to states, and issues and enforces environmental regulations.

On average, appropriations for discretionary programs rose by very little (just 2.5 percent annually) between 2002 and 2005. However, in 2006, discretionary funding jumped by 19 percent because of supplemental appropriations for post-hurricane rebuilding efforts along the Gulf Coast. Most of that additional funding ($7 billion) was provided to the Army Corps of Engineers. Discretionary funding for 2007 totals $30 billion, a decline of about 20 percent from the previous year, CBO estimates, and lower than the appropriations in 2004 and 2005.

Mandatory spending in this function is mostly for farm conservation programs authorized by the Farm Security and Rural Investment Act of 2002, which provides $3.8 billion in 2007 for cost-sharing assistance; annual rental payments; and long-term easements to help agricultural producers protect soil, water, and wildlife habitat. The spending in this function is partially offset by receipts from the sale of minerals, timber, and land; recreation fees; and other charges to users, which total about $6 billion in 2007, the Congressional Budget Office estimates.

The Army Corps of Engineers administers laws that pertain to the regulation of the nation's navigable waters. Section 10 of the Rivers and Harbors Act of 1890 requires the Corps to issue permits for work that would affect the navigable capacity of any waters of the United States. In addition, section 404 of the Clean Water Act of 1977 requires the Corps to issue permits for dredging or placing fill material in navigable waters. In 2005, the Corps received about 92,000 permit applications, some of which require more detailed review than others. Currently, companies that apply for commercial permits pay a fee of $100, and people who apply for private permits pay $10. (Government applicants are not charged a fee.) That fee structure, which has not changed since 1977, covers only about 5 percent of the costs of administering the program.

This option would raise the fee for commercial permits issued under sections 10 and 404 by an amount sufficient to recover the costs associated with awarding those permits. (The fee for private permits would not change.) That increase would reduce federal outlays by $13 million in 2008 and by $122 million over the 2008-2012 period.

Section 404 has become the core of the nation's effort to protect wetlands. It has been applied to waters that would not conventionally seem "navigable," such as wetlands adjacent to navigable waters and, under certain circumstances, wetlands adjacent to nonnavigable tributaries of waters traditionally considered navigable. Thus, the Corps has regulatory jurisdiction over a large number of wetlands. (Consistent with a 2006 Supreme Court decision, the extent of that jurisdiction ultimately will be determined by federal agencies' interpretations of certain terms and definitions—such as "relatively permanent" and "intermittent" flow and what constitutes a "significant nexus" to navigable waters—and whether those interpretations withstand the scrutiny of the courts.) Moreover, for the purposes of section 404, "dredging" and "placing fill material" encompass virtually any activity in which dirt is moved, which means that a wide variety of actions require permits.

Under section 404, the Corps must evaluate each application and grant or deny a permit on the basis of expert opinion and statutory guidelines. Most applications are quickly approved through existing general or regional permits, which grant authority for many low-impact activities. Evaluation of applications not covered by existing permits may require the Corps to undertake more-detailed, lengthier—and therefore more-costly—reviews.

The principal rationale for imposing cost-of-service fees on commercial applicants is that the party pursuing a permit, not the taxpaying public, should bear the cost of such permits. According to that argument, taxpayers should not have to pay for something that advances a commercial interest whose benefits accrue to a comparative few.

An argument against higher fees is that permit seekers should not have to pay more for a process that ultimately might deny them the right to use their land as they wish. The goal of the section 404 program, for example, is to advance a public interest by protecting wetlands. Arguably, since the public benefits from wetlands protection (sometimes at the expense of property owners), it should bear the costs. Critics maintain that the regulatory process that property owners must deal with is already onerous, so raising permit fees would further infringe on property owners' rights.

The Army Corps of Engineers conducts various operations designed to counter beach erosion, typically by dredging sand from offshore locations and pumping it onshore to rebuild eroded areas. The Corps funds a portion of such activities, and state and local governments pay the rest. Those operations have two primary goals: mitigating damage (replenishment helps beaches act as barriers to waves and protects coastal property from severe weather) and enhancing recreation.

This option would end federal funding for beach-replenishment activities. Doing so would reduce discretionary outlays by $28 million in 2008 and by $431 million through 2012.

Proponents of halting federal spending for beach replenishment argue that its benefits accrue largely to the states and localities in which the projects occur and that the cost should therefore be borne entirely at the state and local level. Furthermore, the ultimate effectiveness of replenishment efforts is questionable. Beach erosion is a natural process, and replenishment projects serve only to temporarily delay the inevitable natural shifting of beaches. One alternative to beach-replenishment projects is to remove the various retention structures that sometimes exacerbate erosion by inhibiting the natural flow of sand along a beach.

Opponents of eliminating federal funding argue that beach replenishment not only benefits specific states and localities but also serves the interests of nonresident beachgoers. Opponents also argue that, in some cases, federal projects (such as those intended to keep coastal inlets open) contribute to beach erosion, so federal taxpayers should bear some of the cost of replenishment in those areas. Moreover, ending federal funding could be considered unfair if municipalities and private owners invested in beachfront property with the expectation of continuing federal support.

Under the Federal Land Transaction Facilitation Act of 2000 (FLTFA), the Bureau of Land Management (BLM) is authorized to use proceeds from the sale of previously designated public lands to fund the acquisition of other, qualifying parcels of land and to cover expenses associated with those transactions. That act expires after 2010. According to the Administration, FLTFA was enacted to encourage the sale of lands that contribute little to BLM's mission and to purchase other parcels of land more in keeping with that mission, including those featuring "exceptional resources." Before FLTFA, proceeds from BLM land sales went directly to the Treasury, under the Federal Land Policy and Management Act.

This option, which is also included in the Administration's proposed budget for 2008, would amend FLTFA to expand the set of lands that the Department of the Interior would be authorized to sell, alter the distribution of proceeds from such sales, and extend the act beyond 2010. Instead of designating that all proceeds from such land sales be used to acquire other parcels of land and to cover sales expenses, the option would direct 70 percent of the first $60 million per year in proceeds, net of BLM's administrative costs, to the Treasury, along with all proceeds over $60 million each year. (The remainder of the proceeds would go to the Department of the Interior for land acquisition and restoration projects on BLM land.) The option also would allow lands to be sold according to updated resource management plans rather than limiting such sales only to parcels classified prior to July 25, 2000, when FLTFA was enacted. The option would reduce direct spending by $1 million in 2008 and by $173 million from 2008 to 2012.

Supporters of this option contend that it would minimize the amount of Federal spending that is not subject to regular oversight through the Congressional appropriation process. They argue that the change would reduce the federal budget deficit and would ensure that U.S. taxpayers benefited directly from land sales. Supporters also say that expanding the set of lands that the Department of the Interior would be authorized to sell would give BLM greater flexibility, enhancing its ability to consolidate its land holdings into larger areas that are less scattered and that can be more efficiently managed.

Opponents of this option say that it is not consistent with the policy of retaining lands in public ownership, as set forth in 1976 in the Federal Land Policy and Management Act. They say that FLTFA was intended to provide the Department of the Interior with a source of revenue to supplement the Land and Water Conservation Fund for acquiring high-priority private lands for inclusion in National Parks, National Forests, and BLM conservation areas. Opponents also maintain that the option would implicitly or explicitly place land managers under pressure to sell tracts of land to meet revenue expectations.

The Forest Service manages federal timber sales from national forests. According to annual reports by the agency's Forest Management Program, the service has spent more on the timber program in recent years than it has collected from companies that harvest the timber. In 2006, for example, when it sold roughly 2.8 billion board feet of public timber, funding reported for the program exceeded collections by about $75 million.

This option would eliminate discretionary funding for all future timber sales in four regions of the National Forest System—the Southwestern, Intermountain, Pacific Southwest, and Alaska regions—where expenditures in recent years were more than twice as high as offsetting receipts. Ending those sales would reduce the Forest Service's net outlays by $45 million in 2008 and by $280 million over the 2008-2012 period. (Those estimates are net of the income losses from eliminating sales in those regions.) The Forest Service does not maintain the necessary data to estimate the annual income and expenditures associated with individual timber sales. Thus, it is difficult to precisely estimate the budgetary savings that might arise from phasing out all timber sales in the National Forest System for which expenditures are likely to exceed offsetting receipts. This option focuses on the four regions listed to illustrate possible savings.

An argument in favor of ending timber sales in those regions is that federal taxpayers should not have to subsidize the profit-making activities of private companies. Other arguments are that such sales may lead to excessive depletion of federal timber resources and to the destruction of roadless forests that have recreational value.

An argument against ending the sales is that they might help bring stability to communities dependent on federal timber for logging and related jobs. Also, as a result of road construction, timber sales might foster access to forested land, enhancing firefighting efforts and expanding recreational uses.

The General Mining Law of 1872, originally intended to encourage settlement of the American West, governs access to hardrock minerals—such as copper, gold, silver, and uranium—on public lands. Unlike extractors of other minerals or fossil fuels from public lands, miners do not pay royalties to the government on the value of hardrock minerals that they remove. Instead, under the mining law, holders of more than 10 mining claims on public lands pay an annual maintenance fee of $125 per claim. Holders also pay a one-time $32 location fee when recording a claim. Authorization for the federal government to collect the maintenance and location fees expires in 2008.

The gross value of hardrock mineral production on public lands totals about $1 billion a year, according to current estimates. That value has risen in recent years largely because of increased demand, particularly in developing countries, for industrial commodities such as copper and molybdenum.

This option would reauthorize currently existing maintenance and location fees. It also would halt new patenting of public lands. In patenting, miners gain full title to public lands by paying a one-time fee of $2.50 per acre for placer claims (which allow the mining of alluvial deposits in modern or ancient stream beds) or $5 per acre for lode claims (which permit the extraction of mineral deposits from solid rock). Further, mirroring proposals that the Congress has considered in the past, it would impose an 8 percent royalty on all future production of hardrock minerals from those lands. The royalty would apply to net proceeds—defined as revenues from sales minus costs for mining, separation, transportation, and other activities. Together, those changes would increase federal collections by $170 million over five years: $135 million from reauthorization of maintenance and location fees and $35 million from royalty payments.(If the 8 percent royalty was applied to gross proceeds rather than to net proceeds, it would raise more money and be less costly to administer.)

The Congressional Budget Office's estimates assume that the states in which mining takes place would receive 10 percent of the royalty receipts. The estimates also assume that there would be no surge in patenting activity before royalties were imposed; such a surge could boost immediate patenting receipts and diminish future royalties.

Supporters of this option—including many environmental advocates—argue that low maintenance fees and the lack of royalties make mineral production less costly on federal lands than on private lands (where the payment of royalties is the rule). That difference, they contend, encourages overdevelopment of public lands, which may cause extensive environmental damage. Changing that situation could promote other uses for those lands, such as recreation or wilderness conservation.

An argument against ending patenting and imposing royalties is that, without free access to public resources, miners (especially small-scale miners) would limit their exploration for hardrock minerals in the United States. In addition, royalties could diminish the profitability of many mines, leading to scaled-back operations or closure and adverse economic consequences for mining communities in the West. Because the prices of many minerals are set in world markets, miners would be unable to pass their new royalty costs on to buyers.

The federal government owns and manages more than 650 million acres of public lands, which have many uses, including the provision of grazing for privately owned livestock. The Forest Service and the Bureau of Land Management administer grazing on some 155 million acres of public lands in the West. Ranchers are authorized to use that acreage for almost 20 million animal unit months (AUMs)—a standard measure that reflects the amount of forage needed by a cow and a calf for one month. As of March 1, 2007, cattle owners who have permits that allow their animals to graze on federal lands in the West will have to pay the government a fee of $1.35 per AUM. However, that fee may not give the public a fair return.

This option would set grazing fees for federal lands in each state in the same way that the state determines such fees on state-owned lands. If the federal government implemented this option over 10 years as existing grazing permits expired, the fee would rise almost 10-fold, on average. That increase would boost net federal collections by $13 million in 2008 and by a total of $125 million through 2012. (Under current law, the governments of those states and counties in which grazing takes place receive a portion of the federal fees. The estimates shown here are net of additional payments to states and counties, which would total roughly $41 million over the 2008-2012 period. The estimates do not reflect any additional appropriations for range improvements that could result from the added collections. However, they do incorporate an assumption about the extent to which an increase in fees might cause ranchers to reduce their use of AUMs.)

The current formula for federal grazing fees was established in the Public Rangelands Improvement Act of 1978. The formula uses a 1966 base value of $1.23 per AUM and adjusts it to account for changes in the market for beef cattle as well as in the markets for feed, fuel, and other production inputs. Over the years, the Congress has considered various proposals to increase grazing fees.

The principal justification for an increase is that the current formula appears to result in fees that are well below market rates and also below the federal costs of administering the grazing program. For example, in 1990, the appraised value of public rangelands in six Western states varied between $5 and $10 per AUM, far above the $1.81 fee charged that year. In addition, a 2005 study indicated that the Forest Service and the Bureau of Land Management would have had to charge $12.26 and $7.64, respectively, per AUM to cover their expenditures for managing their grazing programs in 2004, although the fee that year was $1.43 per AUM. Critics charge that such low fees subsidize ranching and contribute to overgrazing and deteriorating range conditions.

A rationale for using state formulas to set federal fees is that such an approach rejects the uniform nature of the current formula and instead follows decisions made at the state level. Grazing fees and methods for calculating them vary widely from state to state and sometimes even within a state. States' interest in the revenue received from both state and federal fees would lessen any incentive to manipulate state fees to lower federal fees.

An argument against this option is that state rangelands may be more valuable than federal lands for grazing purposes. Some formulas that states use to set fees might not reflect those differences in quality and conditions of use if applied to federal lands. In addition, using different procedures to set federal grazing fees in each state would result in higher administrative costs than those incurred under the current uniform federal formula. (The estimates for this option do not take into account possible increases in administrative costs.)

The Arctic National Wildlife Refuge (ANWR) consists of 19 million acres in northeastern Alaska; 1.5 million of that acreage consists of coastal plain, the least disturbed coastal region in the Arctic. ANWR was established to conserve fish and wildlife habitats, fulfill international treaty obligations related to wildlife and habitat protection, provide opportunities for indigenous people to continue their traditional lifestyles, and protect water quality. The Alaska National Interest Lands Conservation Act of 1980, which set up the reserve, prohibits industrial activity on ANWR's coastal plain unless specifically authorized by the Congress. According to the U.S. Geological Survey, that plain appears to have the most promising potential for oil production of any unexplored onshore area in the United States.

This option would open ANWR's coastal plain to the production of oil and natural gas. The Congressional Budget Office, following recent legislative proposals, assumes that leases would be offered in two phases, with the first sale likely to occur in 2010 and the second in 2012. With the federal government receiving proceeds from auctioning leases for oil and gas development rights, this option would raise about $6 billion over the 2008-2012 period. (Although the federal government would later receive income from royalties on production, the bulk of those payments would occur after 2017.) Under recent legislative proposals, half of those funds would go to the state of Alaska, leaving $3 billion in net offsetting receipts (which are credited against direct spending) to the federal government over the 2008-2012 period. CBO's estimate is based on the U.S. Geological Survey's projections of the mean value of economically recoverable oil that could be produced from federal land in ANWR. It also relies on information from other federal agencies, the state of Alaska, and industry experts about oil and gas companies' perceptions of key factors that affect the expected profitability of ANWR leases—in particular, companies' probable assumptions about long-term oil prices, volumes of recoverable reserves, and required rates of return on such investments.

Proponents of this option highlight the national security advantages of reducing U.S. dependence on imported oil. They argue that most of ANWR would remain closed to development and that the section of the coastal plain that would be directly affected by oil drilling and production represents less than 1 percent of the entire refuge area. Moreover, they maintain, technological changes have improved the ability of the oil and gas industries to safeguard the environment.

Opponents of this option argue that whatever the still-uncertain gain from oil production in ANWR, extracting a nonrenewable resource for a relatively short time will not provide lasting energy security. In addition, they say, ANWR's coastal plain is a crucial area for the biological productivity of the refuge, and industrial activity there would pose a threat to wildlife and the environment, despite efforts to mitigate its impact. Moreover, such activity could affect international treaty obligations.

For more than a century, the federal government, through the Bureau of Reclamation, has helped finance and build infrastructure to support municipal and industrial water supplies, hydroelectric power generation, irrigation, flood control, and recreational usage. Under current law, users of water for agricultural, municipal, and industrial purposes, as well as users of hydropower generated by federal water projects, must make payments intended to recover some of the government's construction costs. For those who use water for hydropower and municipal and industrial purposes, reimbursement includes making interest payments. That requirement does not extend to irrigators. Moreover, a determination by the Secretary of the Interior that irrigators' repayment obligations exceed their ability to pay shifts the associated reimbursement responsibilities to users of hydropower.

As originally authorized in 1944, a portion of the Pick-Sloan Missouri Basin Program's power facilities and reservoirs was intended to support regional irrigation facilities. Agricultural users were to reimburse the federal government for that portion, without interest, upon completion of the irrigation facilities. Although the program's power facilities and reservoirs have been largely completed, only some of the planned irrigation facilities have been constructed. The Bureau of Reclamation maintains that the benefits of constructing the remaining irrigation facilities do not justify the costs. As those facilities are unlikely to be built, the federal government cannot charge the intended users for their share of the federal government's original investment in the power facilities and reservoirs that have been completed.

This option would make power customers who use the existing facilities responsible for that portion of the reimbursement originally assigned to irrigators on the basis of plans for facilities that were not realized. Reassigning those reimbursement responsibilities would increase offsetting receipts (which are credited against direct spending) by $108 million through 2012.

Proponents of this option argue that power customers receive subsidized service because they benefit from, but do not pay for, the extra capacity that was built into the facilities to support irrigation. Another argument for the change is that if the federal government's overall investment in other aspects of the completed hydropower facilities increased (because of renovation and replacements) the amount of the investment that is unrecoverable also might increase.

Opponents of this option argue that power customers are already responsible for repaying the majority of the project's irrigation-related investment because of ability-to-pay determinations. They also maintain that the irrigation facilities that have not been constructed are still Congressionally authorized projects that could be funded in the future.

Two major laws administered by the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)—the Clean Water Act (CWA) and the Safe Drinking Water Act (SDWA)—seek to protect the quality of the nation's waters and the safety of its drinking water supply by requiring municipal wastewater and drinking water systems to meet certain performance standards. Both laws provide for grants to capitalize revolving funds at the state level. States use the revolving funds to offer various forms of assistance (such as market-rate and subsidized loans, loan or bond guarantees, and bond purchases) to communities to help them build or replace systems to meet the federal standards. For 2006, EPA received total appropriations of about $2 billion for water-infrastructure grants, including $900 million for clean water funds, $850 million for drinking water funds, and roughly $300 million for targeted grants to specific communities.

This option would phase out all of EPA's grant funding for wastewater and drinking water facilities over a transitional period of three years. Such action would reduce federal outlays by $32 million in 2008 and by $2.6 billion through 2012.

Amendments to the CWA in 1987 phased out a previous program that provided direct grants for the construction of wastewater treatment facilities and replaced it with the program to support wastewater systems through new state revolving funds (known as SRFs). Under that program, states contribute matching funds of 20 cents per federal dollar and operate their SRFs within broad limits, defining eligible projects (which may focus not only on treatment facilities but also on the installation, rehabilitation, or replacement of sewer pipes, control of urban and agricultural runoff, and other water-quality efforts), choosing the terms of the assistance, and setting priorities. In 2005, 67 percent of the loans made by SRFs—representing 22 percent of the total funding—went to communities with populations under 10,000. Authorization for the SRF program under the Clean Water Act has expired, but the Congress continues to provide annual appropriations for grants, distributing them to the states according to the shares specified in the 1987 amendments.

Amendments to the SDWA in 1996 authorized EPA to make grants to capitalize state revolving-loan funds for drinking water systems. Although generally modeled on the CWA's wastewater program, the drinking water program allocates federal funding according to a formula based on needs identified in a quadrennial EPA survey. In turn, states are required to establish a priority-setting system that focuses on the most serious health risks associated with drinking water, compliance with SDWA quality standards, and the financial needs of local water systems.

One justification for eliminating federal grants to water-related SRFs is that such grants could encourage inefficient decisions about water infrastructure by allowing states to lend money at below-market interest rates, which in turn could reduce incentives for local governments to find less-costly ways to control water pollution and provide safe drinking water. Another rationale is that federal contributions to wastewater SRFs originally were viewed as a temporary step on the way to full state and local financing. Moreover, those contributions might not increase total investment in water systems if they merely replace funding that state and local sources would have provided otherwise.

Opponents of such cuts argue that the need for investments to replace aging infrastructure, reduce health threats in drinking water (such as from cryptosporidium), and protect the nation's waters (from sewer overflows, for example) is so large that federal aid should be increased, not reduced. Without external assistance, they say, water systems in many small or economically disadvantaged communities would be unable to maintain the quality of their service and comply with the CWA's and SDWA's new and forthcoming requirements. States, they contend, cannot supply all of the necessary funding. Opponents of the option also argue that eliminating the federal grants would force even many large systems—which tend to have lower costs because of economies of scale—to charge rates that would pose significant hardships for low- and moderate-income households. Moreover, they note that the most recent assessments of the grant programs by the Office of Management and Budget concluded that both are performing adequately and appear to be making progress toward their long-term goals.

Energy Star is a product-labeling and certification program run by the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). Its goal is to help consumers and organizations save energy and reduce greenhouse-gas emissions by choosing products or management practices that are energy efficient or that rely on clean forms of energy.EPA allows businesses, institutions, and local governments that meet certain criteria for energy efficiency in their products or management practices to use the Energy Star label in their marketing. The types of products that EPA has certified include lighting fixtures, home appliances, office equipment, home-construction materials, and new houses. EPA also disseminates information on sellers of labeled products and offers program participants some technical assistance in implementing changes that increase energy efficiency. Energy Star is one of several climate-protection partnerships in which EPA works to disseminate information on energy-efficient technologies and clean forms of energy.

This option would end appropriations for the Energy Star program. Doing so would save $45 million in outlays in 2008 and $268 million over the 2008-2012 period.

An argument for eliminating the program is that Energy Star labels may provide insufficient information to enlighten consumers' choices. In particular, the labels do not clarify the potential savings of a product relative to competing products. In addition, reducing energy use does not always imply reducing emissions of greenhouse gases: Coal-fired electricity-generating plants produce a large amount of carbon dioxide (a greenhouse gas), so encouraging consumers to buy an electric appliance with an Energy Star label rather than a less-efficient natural gas appliance could actually increase emissions.

An argument for maintaining the Energy Star program is that it addresses existing failures in the marketplace and that the labels and EPA's public education efforts provide consumers with some, albeit imperfect, information about energy-saving products. Insufficient consumer interest in energy efficiency may compound industry's reluctance to invest in uncertain new technologies.

Through its Science to Achieve Results (STAR) program, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) funds scientific and engineering research that is relevant to EPA's mission but which the agency lacks the resources to perform internally. Created in 1995, STAR is a competitive, peer-reviewed grant program that accounts for 15 percent to 20 percent of the research budget for EPA's Office of Research and Development, which manages the program. In 2006 the program received $69 million in appropriations, down from $100 million in 2005. (The Administration's budget request for 2008 included $61.9 million for the STAR program.)

This option would eliminate the STAR program, saving $61 million in outlays in 2008 and $362 million over five years.

STAR provides grants—typically of about $500,000 annually for several years—to leading scientists in the academic and nonprofit research communities. It also funds fellowships for graduate work in environmental sciences, with the aim of strengthening the nation's foundation in that field and attracting a continuing supply of new researchers. (Approximately 1,200 STAR fellowships have been awarded since the program's inception.) Requests for STAR grant applications are written with the help of EPA staff members who expect to be the primary users of the research. According to an independent report by the National Research Council (NRC), those requests are subjected to an "extensive" internal review before they are issued to ensure they are directed toward "issues most important to EPA" and are consistent with the agency's strategic plans. Applications submitted in response to the requests undergo a "rigorous" peer-review process, according to the NRC, that is designed to prevent conflicts of interest between proposal review and project oversight. Historically, about 10 percent of fellowship applications and slightly less than 15 percent of grant applications—about half of those that pass EPA's peer-review process—have been funded.

Critics of the STAR program cite several concerns raised by the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) in a program assessment conducted for the President's 2005 budget. The OMB concluded that STAR's research in water quality, land use, and wildlife is similar to that conducted by other federal agencies; that the program's coordination with other EPA offices and other agencies is inadequate to ensure that the agencies have access to research findings; that the program has not shown "adequate progress toward achieving long-term goals"; and that the NRC's evaluation of STAR, which was intended to improve program management, was "insufficient in scope" and failed to address the effectiveness and policy relevance of the funded research. In addition, although the NRC's evaluation was generally laudatory, it concluded that EPA makes insufficient use of outside experts in planning STAR's research agenda and that substantial delays often occur between the completion of STAR-funded research and the use of that research in related EPA rulemaking.

Supporters of STAR note the NRC's positive evaluation of the research funded by the program and the Government Accountability Office's critique of OMB's assessment methodology as a "work in progress" that needs "considerable revisions" if it is to become an "objective, evidence-based assessment tool." The NRC's evaluation stated that STAR's size relative to EPA's Office of Research and Development's total research budget is a "reasonable recognition of the value of independent, peer-reviewed research to the agency"; that the program has "established and maintains a high degree of scientific excellence"; and that it helps satisfy EPA's requirement for a "strong and balanced" research program. Moreover, the NRC concluded that the STAR program supports research that is not conducted or funded by other government agencies—particularly research related to ecology, airborne particulates, and pollution prevention—and thus expands the nation's scientific foundations in the areas of human health and the environment.

The Conservation Security Program (CSP), first authorized in the Farm Security and Rural Investment Act of 2002, gives agricultural producers financial and technical help to promote the conservation and improvement of soil, water, air, energy, and plant and animal life on lands used for agricultural purposes. (By contrast, the Conservation Reserve Program, which is the subject of option 300-13, encourages conservation by taking land out of agricultural production.) Under the CSP, producers enroll in 5- to 15-year contracts in which they agree to undertake various conservation measures in exchange for annual payments. For each acre enrolled in the program, producers receive a base payment equal to a percentage of their county's prevailing rental rate for similar land. In addition, they may receive an enhancement (or bonus) payment for undertaking further conservation measures. Together, those payments could exceed the cost of implementing the required conservation measures.

Because of various annual and multiyear spending constraints, the Department of Agriculture limits CSP enrollment to producers in selected watersheds. A different set of watersheds is chosen each year to focus program spending on priority areas around the country. Various laws in the past few years have limited program spending as follows: to $41.4 million in 2004, $202 million in 2005, $259 million in both 2006 and 2007, $1,954 million over the 2006-2010 period, and $5,560 million over the 2006-2015 period.

This option would curtail the Conservation Security Program in one of two ways: by prohibiting new enrollments or by allowing additional enrollments but eliminating enhancement payments, starting in 2008. The first change would reduce spending by the department's Commodity Credit Corporation (CCC) by $190 million in 2008 and by $1.6 billion over five years. The second change would reduce CCC spending by $166 million in 2008 and by $1.3 billion through 2012. (Both approaches assume that the $2.0 billion cap over 5 years and the $5.6 billion cap over 10 years would be reduced by the total amount of the savings and that no further contract modifications would be allowed.) Neither change would affect the terms of existing contracts. Even with no additional enrollments, existing contracts signed since implementation began in 2004 will cost a total of nearly $2.5 billion over the next 10 years, the Congressional Budget Office estimates.

An argument for scaling back the CSP is that certain provisions of the program cast doubt on its effectiveness. First, making payments to producers who have already adopted conservation practices does not add to the nation's conservation efforts. Less than 0.1 percent of the $177 million spent on CSP through 2005 (the last year for which data are available) was spent on new practices. Second, enhancement payments were supposed to reward participants who undertook exceptional conservation measures; however, the criteria used to determine enhancement payments are not readily apparent, and such payments have represented over 80 percent of total CSP financial assistance costs so far. Third, making payments that exceed producers' costs to adopt and maintain conservation measures could be viewed as a wasteful use of federal funds.

Supporters of the Conservation Security Program see it as a better way to support agriculture—through a form of "green payment"—than the traditional crop-based subsidies. When fully implemented, the CSP could foster the adoption of more conservation practices to protect the nation's natural and productive resources. Such practices often require significant up-front costs to undertake and could reduce the economic output of land; CSP payments might offset those costs. Further, because CSP base payments are restricted by legislation, the enhancement payments, which are not subject to such restrictions, are useful in encouraging participation in the program. Finally, the high percentage of recipients receiving enhancement payments could be justified by the fact that the department has chosen to focus the program's limited funds on enrolling participants who have already demonstrated greater levels of commitment to conservation activities.

The Conservation Reserve Program (CRP) is intended to promote soil conservation, improve water quality, and protect wildlife habitat by removing land from active agricultural production. Landowners offer to sign contracts with the Department of Agriculture to keep land out of production, usually for 10 to 15 years, in exchange for providing annual rental payments and cost-sharing assistance for establishing appropriate conservation practices on the enrolled land. Acreage may be enrolled in one of two ways: through general enrollments, which are held periodically for larger tracts of land, or through continuous enrollments, which allow producers to offer at any time smaller tracts of land that are devoted to those conservation practices considered the most effective (such as the use of filter strips, grass waterways, and riparian buffers). Not all contract offers are accepted, however; approval is based on an evaluation of the costs and potential environmental benefits of a landowner's plan. The CRP is funded by the Department of Agriculture's Commodity Credit Corporation at about $2.1 billion to $2.6 billion per year.

Currently, some 36.7 million acres are enrolled in the CRP. Total enrollment is capped at 39.2 million acres under the 2002 Farm Security and Rural Investment Act—up from 36.4 million acres under the 1996 Federal Agriculture Improvement and Reform Act. The Congressional Budget Office estimates that enrollment in the program will reach 39.023 million acres by 2017.

This option would limit the scope of the Conservation Reserve Program in one of three ways: by restricting future enrollment to 36.4 million acres, as under the 1996 farm law, reducing outlays by $301 million over the 2008-2012 period; by prohibiting new general enrollments, beginning in 2008, but allowing current participants to reenroll when their contracts expired, reducing spending by $689 million through 2012; or by prohibiting any new general enrollments (including reenrollments), beginning in 2008, lowering spending by $1.9 billion through 2012. The savings from reducing CRP payments would be net of offsetting costs from additional spending for commodity programs, especially marketing-assistance loan benefits, because some land formerly in CRP contracts would return to production.

Under the second and third approaches, the amount of land enrolled in the CRP would drop significantly. Current contracts covering about 16 million acres were set to expire in 2007, as were contracts for another 6 million acres in 2008. However, the department offered contract holders an opportunity to extend some contracts up to the maximum of 15 years, thus delaying their expiration. Without new enrollments, by 2017, acreage in the CRP would total 26.0 million if reenrollment was permitted and 5.3 million if it was not.

Although there is widespread agreement about the need to take at least some environmentally sensitive land out of production, some supporters of scaling back the CRP see the program as expensive and poorly focused. They argue that the CRP's funding could be put to other uses that would provide greater environmental benefits. Other supporters of limiting the program worry that retiring large amounts of cropland in a given area could dampen economic activity (for example, by reducing the demand for seed, fertilizer, and other farm supplies), thus hurting rural communities. Also, reducing CRP enrollment could free more land for corn and biomass production for ethanol.

Opponents of scaling back the CRP note that the program helps landowners because its payments are often larger and more certain than profits from continued agricultural production; it particularly helps those participants for whom putting the land back into production is an unattractive option. Conservationists and environmentalists particularly support the Department of Agriculture's plan to accept the most environmentally sensitive land in future enrollments. Studies have indicated that the CRP yields high returns—in enhanced wildlife habitat, improved water quality, and reduced soil erosion—for every dollar spent.

The National Park Service runs two programs—National Heritage Area (NHA) grants and Statutory Aid—that assist local efforts to establish, preserve, or operate areas of natural, historical, cultural, or recreational importance. Locations that have been designated National Heritage Areas by the Congress are eligible for grants under the first program. Under the second, each individual allocation of statutory aid must be given a specific authorization. Sites that receive support from either program are not operated or managed by the National Park Service but rather by state or local agencies, nonprofit groups, or private partnerships. As of 2006, 27 sites had been designated National Heritage Areas and had received grants. Twelve sites received statutory aid in 2006 (there were 20 such sites in 2005, including 8 that received statutory aid in both years). The Administration has proposed eliminating both programs in the past (while still supporting existing Heritage Areas and three current recipients of statutory aid through the Department of the Interior's Historic Preservation Fund and the National Park Service's operations budget, respectively). The Congress trimmed the NHA grant program budget by 9 percent in 2006, to $13.3 million, and cut Statutory Aid by 37 percent, to $7 million, compared with 2005 appropriations.

This option would eliminate funding for both NHA grants and Statutory Aid. Ending those programs would reduce discretionary outlays by $20 million in 2008 and by $106 million between 2008 and 2012.

NHA grants are intended to serve as "seed money" to help the organizations that receive them become self-sustaining by setting up partnerships with state and local governments, nonprofit groups, and businesses to fund ongoing operations. Those grants are limited to no more than $1 million annually for up to 15 years (with a total cap of $10 million) for areas designated since 1996. Heritage areas may receive other federal funding as well (primarily from the Department of Transportation for road and infrastructure improvements). By statute, half of their funding must come from nonfederal sources. The Statutory Aid program provides financial assistance on an as-needed basis to local efforts to establish, preserve, and operate such sites. Both programs are intended to allow the National Park Service to extend its mission of preserving nationally significant natural and historical resources without acquiring and managing those resources itself.

The Government Accountability Office (GAO) has criticized the National Park Service's administration of the NHA grant program. According to GAO, the Park Service lacks systematic processes for identifying potentially qualified NHA sites and recommending them to the Congress for approval; it has not established "results-oriented performance goals and measures" in its oversight of heritage areas; and it has failed to track federal funding or determine the appropriateness of expenditures for the program. (However, the Park Service maintains that it has not been funded to carry out those latter tasks.) GAO also contends that the "sunset" provisions (dates for grant aid to end) included in the NHA program have been ineffective. Since the first area was designated in 1984, six areas have reached their original sunset dates. However, at least five have had those dates extended by the Congress and have continued to receive funding under the originally enacted authorization levels. Nine heritage areas designated in 1996 sought similar extensions in 2006.

One argument for eliminating the NHA grant program is that the local groups receiving grants have failed to become self-sufficient, as evidenced by the continued funding of heritage areas past their sunset dates. Moreover, the efforts funded by that program and the Statutory Aid program are—in the words of the Park Service itself—"secondary to the primary mission of the National Park Service."

An argument against eliminating the programs is that public interest in creating new heritage areas is growing. GAO notes that the number of bills introduced in the Congress to study or designate new heritage areas has risen considerably in recent years. Thirty such bills were submitted in the 109th Congress. In addition, both programs are said to protect important resources.