30 percent. For the Soviets, the percentage, which is close to 100 percent today, would decline only to about 85 percent.

Post-Attack Measures of Balance

Results also shift sharply for the United States under measures that assume a counterforce attack--that is, an attack in which the Soviets try to destroy U.S. strategic forces. As Figure 5 shows, by 1996, in the most likely scenario of an attack that occurred with strategic warning, the United States would have about 9,900 surviving warheads available for retaliation, more than three-quarters of which would be capable of attacking hardened targets. The subset of these weapons available for an immediate retaliatory attack would total about 3,000. This contrasts sharply with the situation today, when the United States

Figure 5.
U.S. Warheads Surviving a Soviet Attack in 1996
(With strategic warning and with tactical warning)



SOURCE: Congressional Budget Office estimates.
NOTE: Adjusted for weapons available for retaliation.

would likely have very little prompt HTK capability if it absorbed a Soviet attack before retaliation. After a surprise attack (tactical warning only), the subset of hard-target warheads available for prompt retaliation would be considerably smaller, about 800 warheads. Two factors primarily contribute to this result. First, virtually no rail-mobile MX missiles are assumed to survive such an attack. Second, in peacetime only about one-third of the strategic submarines at sea are on a prompt alert status, ready to receive a launch order and execute it promptly. Another one-third are on modified alert--that is, required to be able to react within a specified period of time; others may be conducting training exercises or be in transit, for instance.

What do these numbers of surviving hard-target capable weapons mean for U.S. retaliatory capability, particularly for the Administration's goal of increasing U.S. capability to hold at risk a significant portion of hardened Soviet strategic forces and leadership facilities? The Soviets have 1,318 ICBM silos. According to the DoD's *Soviet Military Power*, 818 of these silos are considered very hard. In addition, the Soviets may have between several hundred to several thousand hardened command and control centers and leadership bunkers, plus several hundred other strategic force targets. Only a fraction of these targets are likely to require prompt retaliation on the part of the United States.

Figure 6 shows the change in performance of U.S. retaliatory forces against a set of 2,000 very hard targets. This number probably represents a major portion of the set of Soviet hard targets.11/ In all cases, representing a range of scenarios for the U.S. force posture and retaliation, there is a major increase in U.S. capability against this set

11. Former Secretary of Defense Harold Brown has the following observation in his book, *Thinking About National Security: Defense and Foreign Policy in a Dangerous World* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1983). "The United States must maintain hard-target capability. . . to ensure perception of a U.S.-Soviet strategic balance by being able to put at risk many hard targets of value to the Soviet leaders. . . . To this end, 1,000 to 2,000 warheads with prompt hard-target capability would be sufficient. The purely military advantages of prompt capability over delayed capability are modest, but they include a rapid response in kind to a Soviet attack on U.S. missile silos and a more effective ability to attack a Soviet political leadership that is being shuttled among hardened command posts." Note that this would represent a target set of at most 2,000 facilities, since some if not many targets could require more than one warhead.

Figure 6.
Performance of U.S. Retaliatory Forces Against An Illustrative Set of Soviet Hard Targets, in 1987 and 1996



SOURCE: Congressional Budget Office estimates.

NOTE: All figures represent the performance of on-line U.S. hard-target capable warheads against an illustrative target set consisting of 2,000 targets hardened to 5,000 psi. The calculations are based on the assumption that no more than two warheads are allocated against any one target. Calculations include adjustments for weapon reliability and, in the case of bomber weapons, ability to penetrate.

CASE 1: Prompt ballistic missiles only. U.S. absorbs a Soviet attack before retaliating. In the case of strategic warning, all ballistic missiles are considered to be on prompt alert status. In the case of tactical warning, only about one-third of SLBMs at sea are on prompt alert status—that is, ready to receive and execute a launch message within minutes.

CASE 2: Prompt ballistic missiles only. U.S. launches its silo-based ICBMs before absorbing a Soviet attack, but after indication an attack was under way.

CASE 3: All ballistic missiles and bomber weapons. U.S. absorbs a Soviet attack before retaliating.

CASE 4: All ballistic missiles and bomber weapons. U.S. launches its silo-based ICBMs before absorbing a Soviet attack, but after indication an attack was under way.

of targets. (This trend would continue beyond 1996 as the SICBM and Trident II were fully deployed). The overall capability of the force is also presumably increased since less capable weapons, which were targeted against very hard targets, could be reallocated to targets against which they have a much higher probability of destruction.

Although some analysts would argue that this situation implies that the United States has an excess of hard-target warheads, the limitations of the aggregate analysis here preclude this conclusion. Because the nature of nuclear war is uncertain, planners and policymakers have generally moved in the direction of having forces available to support a wide range of options, although not all would necessarily be used. Some groups, such as the Administration and many military planners, argue that if deterrence is to be credible, the United States must have the capability to hold at risk a major portion of military, leadership, and command and control facilities. Furthermore, the Soviet Union has an extensive military and civil defense network and, with dispersal, the number of potential hardened targets may increase significantly. As discussed in Chapter II, other groups argue that the drawbacks involved in deploying large amounts of hard-target capability to attack an opponent's forces outweigh the advantages. They further argue that other types of targeting--against the "softer" economic and industrial infrastructure, for instance--would exact a heavy enough price on the Soviets that it would act as a strong deterrent.

Effects of a Robust Soviet Modernization Effort

The preceding analysis assumes continuation of the recent trends in the Soviet pace of modernization. Testimony of the CIA, cited earlier, points out that with a greater commitment of resources, but not a maximum effort, the Soviets could have about 21,000 deployed warheads by the mid-1990s.

How might U.S. goals be affected if the Soviets pursue a robust expansion of their forces? In this case, the Soviets might have about 18,000 ballistic missile warheads, and about 5,400 prompt hard-target capable warheads. The United States would clearly be worse off than if the Soviets do not expand their forces, but basic trends toward meeting U.S. goals would not be altered.

The survivability of one of the three main segments of U.S. strategic forces--submarines, which are a major contributor of both survivable and hard-target capable warheads in the mid-1990s--is unlikely to be significantly affected by an increased number of warheads. Unless the Soviet Union were to achieve a technological breakthrough--which could occur independent of an expansion--U.S. submarines at sea should remain essentially invulnerable.

Nor are the extra Soviet warheads apt to threaten significantly U.S. bombers that are on alert and so are ready to take off within minutes of receipt of warning; the key to destroying alerted bombers is warheads that arrive very quickly. Large numbers of quickly arriving submarine-launched warheads might allow the Soviet Union to barrage the airspace around U.S. bases more effectively in an attempt to destroy bombers, but this does not seem to be likely for several reasons. First, bombers at inland bases have additional time to react before SLBMs arrive, and over time a higher percentage of the bomber force will be at these bases. Also, measures such as additional dispersal could be taken to protect the bomber force; however, such measures, if permanent, could be costly. Second, Soviet operational practice has been to keep their newer, longer-range submarines closer to their own territory, indicating a different mission for these forces and decreasing the threat of a barrage attack. Finally, barraging airspace is a challenge even with a very large number of warheads.

The survivability of fixed missile silos may further decrease, although since they are currently a very high-priority target, the difference is likely to be marginal. The Soviets, if they chose to, could more effectively barrage the mobile land-based forces--SICBM and Rail MX in a garrisoned basing mode. The effectiveness of such an attack would be most noticeable in the case of a surprise attack, one with tactical warning only. In such a case, the Rail MX would probably have very low survivability even without an expanded Soviet force, since destroying the very lucrative 10-warhead targets would not require a very large expenditure of Soviet resources. SICBM survivability may be considerably degraded compared with the preceding analysis, although it would come at a considerable price to the Soviets in terms of warheads expended for the barrage attack. The United States could take steps to restore the survivability of SICBM by in-

creasing its peacetime dispersal area at bases in the Southwest, although it would be more costly to do so.12/

There would be a large imbalance in overall forces between the United States and the Soviet Union. By 1996, without any additional procurement by the United States beyond current plans, the Soviets could have about 8,000 more warheads, although the United States could have about 3,000 more hard-target capable warheads. With additional Soviet forces, however, the United States may have additional targeting requirements as well. Although by an important measure in terms of U.S. deterrent posture, the United States would continue to have large numbers of warheads able to survive a Soviet attack and retaliate, some analysts would argue that preserving a balance of forces is also a critical component of deterring war and preventing aggression by denying even the perception of superiority.

In summary, the survivability of U.S. forces would not be greatly affected by a Soviet expansion, and in most cases measures could be taken to preserve survivability in affected forces, though at a significant price. If U.S. policymakers decided that preserving a balance of forces in overall numbers was also necessary for deterrence, matching such an expansion could be very costly to the United States, although it would also presumably have been costly for the Soviet Union.

COST OF CONTINUING MODERNIZATION

While new systems could have a significant effect on the survivability and retaliatory capability of U.S. forces, they also command a high price. The Department of Defense estimates that, in its 1988 budget request, total obligational authority for strategic forces would amount to $39.2 billion, rising to $42.1 billion in 1989. This amount includes obligational authority for procurement of new weapons, modification and operation of existing weapons, and research on future weapons. By this definition, strategic forces would account for 12.9 percent of the total DoD budget request in 1988 and 13.4 percent in 1989.

12. See Congressional Budget Office, "Forgoing SALT: Potential Costs and Effects on Strategic Capabilities" (Staff Working Paper, August 1986), for analysis of a barrage attack on the SICBM, and costs of expanded SICBM basing.

Strategic costs could continue to grow in the years beyond 1989. The Department of Defense does not provide public estimates of costs attributable to strategic forces beyond the budget years of 1988 and 1989. Nor can numbers be projected accurately using DoD's definition of the strategic force budget, since projections for certain types of costs are not available beyond 1989--for example, those for research and procurement of minor systems, modifications of existing systems, and operating costs. Nonetheless, as Table 5 shows, research and procurement costs for selected major systems would continue to grow and, depending on what happens to other costs, could drive up total strategic costs. For major systems with publicly available cost estimates, research and procurement costs would grow modestly from $19.2 billion in 1988 to a peak of $22.9 billion in 1990 and then fall to $21.4 billion in 1992. But these costs exclude those for one of the largest programs--the Advanced Technology Bomber--whose costs are classified but likely to be growing sharply. Beyond 1992, costs could decrease as systems now planned for research and procurement are completed. That decrease might not occur, however, if, for example, the United States decided to deploy some version of a strategic defense. According to the Director of the Strategic Defense Initiative Organization, Lt. General James Abrahamson, estimates of the total costs related to an initial deployment of even a limited system range from $70 billion to $100 billion.

EFFECTS OF RECENT ARMS CONTROL PROPOSALS

Verifiable agreements limiting strategic weapons could offer important advantages to the United States; the benefits and risks of such agreements are not the focus of this analysis. It seems unlikely, however, that arms agreements currently being discussed will greatly reduce the costs of strategic forces. During arms negotiations, the Administration has consistently proposed deep reductions in the size of U.S. and Soviet nuclear arsenals. This section briefly examines the possible cost effects of some of the Administration's proposals made at the summit in Reykjavik, Iceland, in October 1986.

TABLE 5. MAJOR STRATEGIC INVESTMENT: 1987-1992
(In billions of current dollars of budget authority)

	1987	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992	Five-Year Costs 1988-1992
Major Procurement							
MX Missile							
Quantity	12	21	21	21	21	21	105
Cost	1.1	1.3	1.4	1.2	1.1	1.0	6.0
MX Rail Basing							
Quantity	0	0	0	5	25	20	50
Cost	0	0	0	1.2	2.2	1.5	4.9
SICBM							
Quantity	0	0	0	18	36	60	114
Cost	0	0	0.1	3.1	2.9	3.6	9.7
Trident SSBN							
Quantity	1	1	1	1	1	1	5
Cost	1.4	1.4	1.4	1.5	1.6	1.6	7.5
Trident II (D-5)							
Quantity	21	66	66	66	72	72	342
Cost	1.3	2.3	2.2	2.2	2.1	2.0	10.8
SRAM II							
Quantity	0	0	0	0	25	75	100
Cost	0	0	0	a/	0.2	0.2	0.4
KC-135R							
Quantity	50	36	36	36	36	36	180
Cost	0.8	0.6	0.6	0.7	0.7	0.7	3.3
E-6A							
Quantity	3	3	7	0	0	0	10
Cost	0.4	0.4	0.4	0	0	0	0.8
Other Major Programs							
Cost	2.1	1.8	2.3	2.3	1.5	1.3	9.2
B-52/B-1B							
Cost	0.5	0.3	0.3	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	0.6
ATB							
Cost	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
Subtotal for Major Procurement							
In current year dollars	7.7	8.1	8.7	12.2	12.3	11.9	53.2
In 1988 dollars	7.9	8.1	8.4	11.5	11.4	10.7	50.2

(Continued)

TABLE 5. (Continued)

	1987	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992	Five-Year Costs 1988-1992
Major RDT&E							
SDI							
Cost	3.2	5.2	6.3	7.4	8.4	9.8	37.1
Rail MX							
Cost	a/	0.6	1.2	0.8	0.6	a/	3.2
SICBM							
Cost	1.1	2.2	2.2	2.1	1.4	0.8	8.7
Trident II (D-5)							
Cost	1.6	1.1	0.5	0.3	0.2	0.1	2.2
SRAM II							
Cost	a/	0.2	0.2	0.3	0.1	a/	0.8
Other Major Programs b/							
Cost	1.1	1.4	1.2	1.2	1.2	1.2	6.2
B-52/B-1B							
Cost	0.1	0.4	0.4	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	0.8
ATB							
Cost	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
Subtotal for Major RDT&E							
In current year dollars	7.2	11.1	12.0	12.1	11.9	11.9	59.0
In 1988 dollars	7.4	11.1	11.6	11.4	10.9	10.7	55.6
Total Investment (In 1988 dollars)	15.4	19.2	20.1	22.9	22.2	21.4	105.8
Real Growth (In percents)	---	25	5	14	-3	-4	---

SOURCE: Congressional Budget Office based on Department of Defense data.

NOTES: Details may not add to totals because of rounding.
n.a. = not available.

a. Less than $100 million.
b. Detail available through 1989. Estimates assume 1989 costs will continue beyond 1989.

Possible Agreement

According to Administration testimony, the Reykjavik summit produced one area of agreement (in principle) regarding offensive forces, an agreement calling for reductions of 50 percent in strategic force levels.13/ More specifically, the agreement called for reductions over a five-year period to a ceiling of:

- 1,600 strategic nuclear delivery vehicles (SNDVs), consisting of sea-based and land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles and heavy bombers; and

- 6,000 warheads carried by those SNDVs.

Negotiators also agreed to a special, important counting rule for warheads carried by strategic bombers. For bombers carrying cruise missiles, each cruise missile would count individually as one warhead. But for bombers carrying short-range weapons, each bomber load would count as only one warhead, regardless of the actual number of bombs or short-range attack missiles carried.14/ Furthermore, both sides agreed to the right to pursue more restrictive sublimits, such as those on heavy ICBMs, and to address separately the issue of limits on sea-launched cruise missiles.

While the United States and the Soviet Union agreed in principle on general limits on strategic offensive forces, there are still many areas--such as sublimits to configure forces--requiring resolution. Also, the Soviets insisted that offensive limits be accompanied by limits on the U.S. Strategic Defense Initiative. Such limits were not acceptable to the United States. Thus, the Reykjavik summit produced

13. Testimony of Richard Perle, Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Policy, and others, before the Defense Policy Panel of the Committee on Armed Services, House of Representatives, November/December 1986 (Committee print number 99-48).

14. According to Mr. Perle's testimony, the United States insisted on the counting rule for penetrating bombers--those carrying short-range weapons--since they would have to penetrate heavily concentrated Soviet air defenses to accomplish their mission. Because many of these bombers might be lost, the United States felt all these weapons should not count. The Soviets are reportedly more concerned about U.S. cruise missiles and so may have considered the two rules a good compromise.

no formal agreement limiting either offensive or defensive weapons. Nonetheless, this section analyzes the above proposed framework for offensive limits, since the framework will probably form the basis for any future accord.

Effect on the Administration's Plan

Most of the Administration's modernization program could be accommodated within the general offensive force limits considered at Reykjavik, but the accommodation would require earlier and more extensive retirement of existing forces than is currently planned. There are two exceptions, however. One pertains to the plans to have bombers carry cruise missiles, which would probably have to be severely curtailed to avoid drastic reductions in other modernization programs. Most of these cruise missiles have already been procured but need not be deployed. The second exception pertains to the number of warheads tested on the new Trident II missile. The Navy reportedly plans to carry a mix of smaller Mark 4 and larger Mark 5 warheads on the missile. The missile can reportedly carry twelve Mark 4 warheads, or eight Mark 5 warheads.15/ To accomplish the modernization program as planned, the maximum number of warheads the Trident II can be counted as having is eight.16/

With these constraints, the United States could accommodate its modernization program within the Reykjavik limits with the retirement of systems listed in Table 6. This "fully modernized" approach does not significantly alter new procurements.17/ However,

15. See Michael Gordon, "U.S. Plans to Test Submarine Missile with Twelve Warheads," *New York Times*, October 7, 1987, p. 1.

16. For reasons of verification, under the precedent of SALT-type counting rules, a missile is always counted as having the maximum number of warheads with which it has been tested. The missile has been tested with more than eight warheads. While other counting rules may be agreed upon, if, in the final arms control agreement, the D-5 is credited with more than eight warheads, it will probably significantly reduce the number of Trident submarines (or other ballistic missile weapons) allowed to be deployed, since each Trident submarine carries 24 missiles.

17. The sublimits proposed by the United States would have a somewhat greater effect on procurement plans. These proposed sublimits are reportedly the following:

(Continued)

TABLE 6. CHANGES IN U.S. PLANS UNDER ILLUSTRATIVE, "FULLY MODERNIZED" APPROACH

Systems Retired Early
All Minuteman III missiles
294 Minuteman II missiles
242 B-52 bombers a/
All Poseidon submarines
Changes in Procurement
Fewer Advanced Cruise Missiles (Details classified)
Resulting Forces in Year 2000 b/
156 Minuteman II missiles
50 silo-based MX missiles
50 rail-based MX missiles
500 SICBMs
20 Trident SSBNs with Trident II missiles
21 B-52H bombers with ALCMs carried externally c/
100 B-1B bombers
132 ATB bombers

SOURCE: Congressional Budget Office estimates.

a. If the United States were allowed to retain 69 B-52Gs dedicated to the conventional mission, then only 194 B-52Gs would retire early.

b. The year 2000 was chosen for illustration to capture the full effects of the modernization program. Early retirements, however, assume the agreement is actually implemented in 1988 and that the five-year timetable for reductions pertains.

c. B-52s can carry 12 ALCMs externally. B-52Hs are currently planned to be further modified to carry eight ALCMs internally, beginning in the late-1980s. This illustration assumes that internal modifications are not done on the remaining B-52s.

17. (Continued)

- o 1,650 total warheads on heavy ICBMs, medium ICBMs carrying more than six warheads apiece, and mobile ICBMs (if permitted at all);
- o 3,300 total ICBM warheads; and
- o 4,800 total ballistic missile warheads.

Compared with the force structure in Table 6, these sublimits would require retiring the remaining Minuteman II ICBMs; deploying a total of 17 Trident submarines; and retaining 77 B-52Hs with externally carried cruise missiles; or 47 B-52Hs with both internally and externally carried cruise missiles.

the United States would have to retire all of its Minuteman III and most of its Minuteman II missiles, as well as most of its B-52 bombers and all of its Poseidon submarines. Furthermore, under this approach, one squadron of B-52s would carry cruise missiles, but no B-1B bombers would do so. Under current plans, all B-52s assigned to the strategic mission and all B-1Bs would eventually carry cruise missiles. Most of these missiles have already been bought but would not be deployed. Under Reykjavik counting rules, this fully modernized approach would reduce total U.S. warheads by 44 percent below what they would have been under the Administration's plan (see Figure 7). Under the Reykjavik rules, reductions would be heaviest in bomber weapons and smaller in ICBMs and SLBMs.

Figure 7.
Illustrative U.S. Force Under Reykjavik Proposal (With modernization)



SOURCE: Congressional Budget Office estimates.

Compared with reductions under the Reykjavik counting rules, reductions in actual inventories would be smaller--only 32 percent--coming down to a level of about 8,700 warheads rather than a 44 percent reduction to 6,000 warheads. Actual inventory reductions are smaller because, under the fully modernized approach, the United States could keep a number of bombers armed with short-range attack missiles and bombs. These bombers would count as one warhead under the Reykjavik rules but would actually carry many weapons. For example, the B-1B could carry 8 bombs and 16 SRAM IIs in a penetrating role.

Assuming these U.S. reductions began in 1988 and followed the fully modernized approach described above, the cost savings would come mostly from retiring weapons sytems and resulting reductions in operating and support costs. Eventually, these savings could average $2 billion a year. Cost savings in early years, however, could be offset by one-time costs of retiring U.S. forces. Another potentially costly item could be future upgrades to the B-1B force to maintain its capabilities for penetration to the year 2000. (The B-1B is planned to retain a shoot-penetrate role in the Administration baseline; however, a pure penetration role may be more demanding.) Savings could be substantially larger if the United States responded to the Reykjavik limits by curtailing modernization rather than by accelerating retirements of existing systems. Regardless of the U.S. approach, however, very long-run savings could be substantial since there would be fewer systems to replace.

The Reykjavik proposal would probably have a greater effect on Soviet modernization plans than on U.S. plans (see Figure 8). In addition to modernizing their land-based missiles, which dominate their triad, the Soviets currently plan to replace most of their submarine-based missiles, many of which now have single warheads, with missiles that have multiple warheads. They also plan to add cruise missiles to their bomber force. These moves will sharply increase their total number of warheads. Under the Reykjavik agreements, the Soviets would have to modify their modernization plans or sharply reduce their land-based missiles.

Figure 8 shows the effects on Soviet forces if the Soviet Union were to continue with their submarine modernization plans and offset with reductions in land-based missiles. Figure 8 also assumes that the

Soviets would modernize, but not greatly expand, their bomber force. Under these assumptions, percentage reductions in total Soviet warheads are less than U.S. reductions, but Soviet reductions fall much more heavily on their land- based missiles.

Both the United States and the Soviet Union would have strong incentives under the Reykjavik proposal to increase the numbers of bombers that do not carry cruise missiles. As noted above, such bombers count as only one warhead but actually carry many weapons.

Figure 8.
Illustrative Soviet Force Under Reykjavik Proposal (With modernization)



SOURCE: Congressional Budget Office estimates.

This incentive could be the greatest for the Soviet Union, since it traditionally has had a much smaller bomber force than the United States. It could have a costly effect on the United States, however, since the United States has not invested as heavily in air defenses against bomber attacks as has the Soviet Union. An emphasis on bombers, however, is considered by many analysts to be more stabilizing than one on ballistic missiles. Since bombers take many hours to reach their targets--barring fundamental changes in technology--the potential for their use in an effective surprise or "bolt-out-of-the-blue" attack is greatly minimized.

Effects of More Far-Reaching Limits

The final U.S. proposal at Reykjavik also contained more far-reaching reductions. It proposed that both sides eliminate all offensive ballistic missiles (ICBMs and SLBMs) over a second five-year period following the achievement of the limits discussed above. During the 10-year period of offensive force reductions, both sides would also agree to abide by the terms of the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) treaty. At the conclusion of the 10 years, however, each side would be free to deploy strategic defenses unless otherwise agreed. The analogous Soviet proposal reportedly called for eliminating all strategic weapons, not just ballistic missiles, and for placing restrictions on strategic defense research beyond that in the ABM treaty.

Clearly, either proposal in its entirety would have significant effects on current plans to modernize. Under the U.S. version, all ballistic missiles--including MX, SICBM, and Trident II--would be banned by the end of the 10-year period of reductions. Since most of the new U.S. systems would not even begin to be deployed for five or more years, it would make little sense to pursue them. This study does not analyze these far-reaching proposals more fully, however, since they seem much less likely to be included in future arms agreements than the more modest limits discussed above.

Without agreement on these far-reaching arms limits, Administration plans for rising strategic costs would most likely not be altered significantly by arms control. Coupled with the limits the Congress seems likely to impose on total defense spending, rising strategic costs raise a question. Can the United States still achieve

effective deterrence of nuclear war if it buys and operates fewer strategic systems than under Administration plans? Unfortunately, there can be no clear answer to that question, since deterrence depends on perceptions and judgments that cannot be quantified. Nonetheless, the trends in strategic forces discussed earlier--coupled with specifics of forces planned for deployments--suggest alternative approaches.