APPENDIX A

EXPANDING NATO BEYOND THE VISEGRAD STATES

Legislation before the Congress in 1995--the National Security Revitalization Act--stated that Romania, Bulgaria, Albania, the Baltic nations of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, and certain countries in the former Soviet Union and Yugoslavia should be invited to join the North Atlantic Treaty Organization if they could further the principles of the alliance and contribute to the security of the North Atlantic area.

Despite the lengthy list of countries in the legislation, Slovenia, Romania, Ukraine, and the Baltic nations are among the most often mentioned in the public debate as candidates for entry after the Visegrad states. Yet, with the exception of Slovenia, most of those nations would be difficult or costly to defend. The problems that each country would present will be addressed separately.

SLOVENIA

Slovenia is a small mountainous state in the former Yugoslavia that has a contiguous border with one nation now in NATO (Italy). It also borders Austria, Hungary, and Croatia. (See Summary Figure 1.) Because of its economic and political reforms, Slovenia has begun to be mentioned as a possible early entrant.

If Slovenia was attacked, Italian ground and air forces and two squadrons of U.S. aircraft based in Italy could reinforce the country. In any conflict, the Italian air force could fly from Italian air bases, eliminating the need to create colocated operating bases in Slovenia. Because the country is small and mountainous, the Slovenian military might be able to hold an attacker at bay until NATO forces arrived. Because all of Slovenia's neighbors are small (except Italy) and it has reasonably good relations with them, no NATO forces would probably need to be stationed there permanently. In short, NATO could defend Slovenia fairly inexpensively. Yet admitting Slovenia to NATO would carry some risk because of its location in the volatile Balkan region. It was involved in conflict after the former Yugoslavia dissolved.

ROMANIA AND THE UKRAINE

In contrast, Romania and the Ukraine could be very difficult to defend. They have large territories and are not close to NATO forces based in Germany. For example,

unlike moving ground forces east to the Visegrad states, NATO would have difficulty moving forces east to Romania and Ukraine if a threat to those nations occurred. Also, supplying those ground forces over such long distances (800 to 1,000 miles) would be difficult. Thus, the forward stationing of substantial quantities of troops and equipment in those countries might be needed. As noted in Chapter IV, stationing such large forces is expensive and not very flexible, especially if different threats arise than were expected. Although some analysts have cited a fully independent Ukraine as important to Western security, stationing large numbers of NATO troops on a nation bordering Russia and in the territory of the former Soviet Union would certainly be seen by the Russians as threatening. Regardless of whether NATO forces were permanently stationed there, even admitting Ukraine--a neighboring power with large armed forces--could make Russians feel uneasy.

Supplying NATO forces operating in the Ukraine or Romania could be more difficult than supplying such forces stationed in the Visegrad nations. In any war against Russia, the Russians would probably try to interdict supplies--with mines and attacks by submarines and aircraft--moving through the Turkish Bosporous Strait bound for the Romanian or Ukrainian ports on the Black Sea. In addition, the Russian Black Sea fleet might contest control of that body of water.

Of course, rather than reinforcing and resupplying those nations, NATO could provide them with equipment to defend themselves. But as new members of NATO with an Article V guarantee, those nations might expect more from the alliance.

THE BALTIC STATES

Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania are geostrategically important for Russia. They border Russia and sit astride the Baltic Sea and the Gulf of Finland--the only water route to St. Petersburg, Russia's second largest city. Admitting them to NATO might be seen by Russia as provocative. In addition, defending those states would be difficult for NATO. They are small nations with no strategic depth. A Russian attack would overwhelm them quickly, probably forcing NATO to launch an amphibious assault backed by air strikes from carrier battle groups in the Baltic Sea to retake them. The U.S. Navy, however, might have reservations about sending amphibious ships and carrier battle groups into the confined waters of the Baltic Sea where a preponderance of land-based Russian air power is nearby. Resupplying forces in the Baltic Sea or the Baltic states might be difficult if the Danish Straits were closed by mines and attacks by submarines and aircraft.

Even permanently stationing NATO ground forces in the Baltic states might not ensure an effective defense. The small size of those nations limits the number of

NATO forces that could be stationed there. Much larger Russian forces nearby could easily overwhelm forces that would have few routes of retreat. Stationing NATO forces in the Baltics could deter the Russians from attacking in the first place but could be seen by them as threatening.

Admitting the Baltic states might entail much risk for NATO and little reward. Although those states are undertaking political and economic reform, their gross domestic products are small and their precarious security situation could draw the alliance into a conflict with Russia.

APPENDIX B

ANALYZING THE SECURITY SITUATION IN THE VISEGRAD STATES: TERRAIN, GEOGRAPHY, AND ARMED FORCES

Each of the Visegrad states faces a unique security situation that results from its geography, its terrain, and the current state of its military forces and defense budget (for a summary of each nation's security situation, see Tables B-1 through B-4). A comparison of their security situations is in order.

TERRAIN AND GEOGRAPHY

Although the overall threat to the Visegrad region is currently low, Hungary probably has the most security concerns, and the Czech Republic has the fewest. The situations of Poland and Slovakia rest somewhere in between.

Hungary

Hungary's security situation is problematic. It is a mostly flat country surrounded by the nations of Ukraine, Slovakia, Austria, and Slovenia. Hungary also borders Croatia, Serbia, and Romania. Bordering the unstable former Yugoslavian republics of Croatia and Serbia creates the most immediate risk for Hungarian security. The war in the former Yugoslavia spilled over into Hungary when the Serbs bombed a Hungarian border town. In addition, Serbia has a Hungarian minority and the rights of that group might become an issue in the future. Slovakia and Romania also have large Hungarian minorities. As noted earlier, Slovakia and Hungary have recently signed an agreement on the issue of minority rights. Although the Hungarian and Romanian militaries cooperate, the civilian leaderships of the two nations have not been able to settle the minority question.

Finally, any defense of Hungary might be difficult if Slovakia was not also admitted into the alliance. Without Slovakia, Hungary would not be contiguous with any other nation in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Because Hungary has no sea coast, NATO forces and supplies would have to come by air unless Slovakia or neutral Austria would consent to let them pass through their territories. (For NATO's peacekeeping mission in Bosnia, such military assets were allowed to pass overland. Whether that arrangement would be allowed during a regional war, however, might be more uncertain.)

Poland

Although no major threat now exists to Poland's security, the nation's terrain and geography make it particularly vulnerable should one develop. Poland is the most strategically located Visegrad state. Germany--Poland's western neighbor--is concerned about security and stability there. That concern will become even more important as Germany's seat of government is moved from Bonn to Berlin, which is near the Polish-German border. Because Poland is flat, it has historically been an invasion route through Europe between Central and Western European states and Russia. Because of its open terrain, large area, and long exposed borders (over 500 miles), Poland could be hard to defend against an assault of heavy armored forces. But as noted earlier, if Russia chose to launch an offensive against Poland, it would have to do so through Lithuania, Ukraine, or Belarus.

Slovakia

Slovakia is strategically located in East Central Europe, but its security is enhanced by mountainous terrain. If the Visegrad states became members of NATO, Slovakia would border three NATO neighbors (Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary), neutral Austria, and the Ukraine. Slovakia's eastern border with the Ukraine is only about 50 miles long. In short, because of the rugged terrain and the channeling of any attacker onto a narrow front, Slovakia could be defended fairly easily from an attack either by or through the Ukraine. Slovakia recently enhanced its security by signing a treaty that ended a long-standing dispute with Hungary on the rights of the Hungarian minority living in Slovakia.

Czech Republic

Of the Visegrad states, the Czech Republic probably has the fewest security concerns. It is mostly highlands, with some mountains. If all four Visegrad states were absorbed into NATO, the Czech Republic would be bordered by three NATO states (Slovakia, Poland, and Germany) as well as neutral Austria. Thus, unless tensions increase with Slovakia, the outlook for Czech security seems promising.

ARMED FORCES

A nation's security depends on the state of its armed forces, as well as its terrain and its neighbors. The armed forces of all Visegrad states are shrinking. They have obsolescent equipment and low states of readiness. Of the Visegrad states, Poland will

have by far the largest and most capable armed forces (see Table B-5 for a comparison of the future force goals of those states).

Because the Warsaw Pact alliance oriented its forces westward toward NATO during the Cold War, after that ended, most of the forces in the Visegrad nations were in the western parts of those nations. Most of the Visegrad states want to spread their forces more evenly throughout their territories in a "360-degree defense." The Czech Republic and Hungary have been more successful than Poland. To date, Poland has redeployed only a small number of its forces eastward. Building new military facilities in eastern Poland would be expensive. Likewise, after the split of the Czechoslovakian military, Slovakia--in the eastern part of the old territory--has few hardened military facilities. Such facilities would have to be built.

In addition, the Czech Republic and Hungary have their forces arrayed in more mobile independent brigades. Poland and Slovakia have not yet completed such a reorganization. Poland is converting and Slovakia plans to convert its forces, now organized in Soviet-style divisions, into such brigades. All of the Visegrad militaries are creating forces capable of peacekeeping, as well as rapid-reaction forces to allow quicker responses to crises.

DEFENSE SPENDING

In addition to reducing the size of their armed forces since the end of the Cold War, all of the Visegrad states have dramatically shrunk their spending on defense. For example, Hungary's spending has dropped almost 60 percent since 1988, and Poland's spending has decreased 44 percent since 1987. Spending on defense in the Visegrad region is low, ranging from Slovakia's $400 million per year to Poland's $2.4 billion per year, more than twice any other nation in the region (see Table B-5 for a comparison of defense spending in the Visegrad nations).

DEFENSE INDUSTRIES

Like the militaries of the Visegrad states, their defense industries are obsolescent and face an uncertain future. Both military exports and domestic budgets for defense procurement have declined. A well-known defense publication argues that the defense sectors of the Visegrad nations--geared to produce heavy offensive weaponry

for the Warsaw Pact--will not be able to manufacture defensive weapons incorporating the high technology needed for the post-Cold War environment.[1]

CONCLUSION

The security situation in each Visegrad nation, the state of its armed forces, and the size of its defense budget will affect the amount of help it can provide to NATO in any defense concept chosen for an expanded alliance. In developing options for the defense of those nations, CBO recognized that despite their likely contribution of small contingents of forces for peacekeeping operations, the Visegrad nations will be net consumers of NATO security. In fact, spending for peacekeeping cuts into what few resources they have to spend on their defense. Their shrinking forces are obsolescent and not ready to fight. After the Cold War, one of the most heavily armed regions of the world has reduced its armaments and military forces dramatically.

1. Brigitte Sauerwein, "Focus on East Central Europe," *International Defense Review* (September 1994), p. 14.

TABLE B-1. SECURITY SITUATION OF POLAND

Borders	Germany, Czech Republic, Slovakia, Ukraine, Belarus, Lithuania, and Russia	
Terrain and Geography	Large area with long borders and mostly flat terrain	
Composition of the Military	Ground forces:	11 divisions, four independent brigades
	Air forces:	Seven regiments of tactical aircraft for air defense, four regiments for ground attack
	Naval forces:	One destroyer, one frigate, four corvettes, 24 mine-clearing ships, seven missile craft, 22 patrol boats, three coastal boats, and three submarines
Trends in the Military	295,000 personnel in 1990 being reduced to 145,000 in 2000	
CFE Limits	Tanks:	1,730
	Armored combat vehicles:	2,150
	Artillery pieces:	1,610
	Aircraft:	460
	Helicopters:	130
Defense Spending	Currently:	$2.4 billion in 1995 or 2.4 percent of GDP
	Future goal:	3 percent of GDP
Defense Industry	Produces tanks, armored vehicles, rocket artillery, small arms, radars, aircraft trainers, cargo aircraft, helicopters, frigates, landing craft, and mine-clearing vessels	

SOURCE: Congressional Budget Office based on data provided by the Department of Defense, *The Military Balance* (1995/1996), and other sources.

NOTE: CFE = Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe; GDP = gross domestic product.

TABLE B-2. SECURITY SITUATION OF THE CZECH REPUBLIC

Borders	Germany, Austria, Slovakia, and Poland	
Terrain and Geography	Mostly highlands with some mountains	
Composition of the Military	Ground forces:	Eight brigades
	Air forces:	One regiment of tactical aircraft for air defense, three regiments for ground attack
Trends in the Military	140,000 personnel in 1993 being reduced to 55,000 in 2000	
CFE Limits	Tanks:	957
	Armored combat vehicles:	1,367
	Artillery pieces:	767
	Aircraft:	230
	Helicopters:	50
Defense Spending	Currently:	$1.1 billion in 1995 or 2.5 percent of GDP
	Future goal:	Same percentage of GDP
Defense Industry	Produces world-class electronic warfare equipment and aircraft for training; also produces small arms	

SOURCE: Congressional Budget Office based on data provided by the Department of Defense, *The Military Balance* (1995/1996), and other sources.

NOTE: CFE = Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe; GDP = gross domestic product.

TABLE B-3. SECURITY SITUATION OF SLOVAKIA

Borders	Poland, the Czech Republic, Austria, Hungary, and Ukraine	
Terrain and Geography	Small area with short borders and mountainous terrain	
Composition of the Military	Ground forces:	One division
	Air forces:	One regiment of tactical aircraft for air defense, one regiment for ground attack
Trends in the Military	70,000 personnel in 1993 being reduced to 35,000 in 2000	
CFE Limits	Tanks:	478
	Armored combat vehicles:	683
	Artillery pieces:	383
	Aircraft:	115
	Helicopters:	25
Defense Spending	$400 million or 3.1 percent of GDP	
Defense Industry	Specializes in producing tanks, armored vehicles, and artillery	

SOURCE: Congressional Budget Office based on data provided by the Department of Defense, *The Military Balance* (1995/1996), and other sources.

NOTE: CFE = Treaty on Conventioinal Forces in Europe; GDP = gross domestic product.

TABLE B-4. SECURITY SITUATION OF HUNGARY

Borders	Austria, Slovenia, Croatia, Serbia, Romania, Ukraine, and Slovakia	
Terrain and Geography	Small, mostly flat nation	
Composition of the Military	Ground forces:	12 brigades
	Air forces:	Three regiments of tactical aircraft for air defense
Trends in the Military	95,000 personnel in 1990 being reduced to 50,000 in 2000	
CFE Limits	Tanks:	835
	Armored combat vehicles:	1,700
	Artillery pieces:	840
	Aircraft:	180
	Helicopters:	108
Defense Spending	Currently:	$600 million in 1995 or 1.5 percent of GDP
	Future goal:	Little possibility of increasing in the near future
Defense Industry	Specializes in producing communication and electronic systems; produces no major weapon systems	

SOURCE: Congressional Budget Office based on data provided by the Department of Defense, *The Military Balance* (1995/1996), and other sources.

NOTE: CFE = Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe; GDP = gross domestic product.

TABLE B-5. COMPARING THE SIZE OF VISEGRAD ARMED FORCES AND DEFENSE BUDGETS

Country	Force Goal (Number of Troops)	1995 Defense Budget (Billions of dollars)	Defense Budget as a Percentage of GDP
Poland	145,000	2.4	2.4
Czech Republic	55,000	1.1	2.5
Hungary	50,000	0.6	1.5
Slovakia	35,000	0.4	3.1

SOURCE: Congressional Budget Office based on data from the Department of Defense and the Visegrad governments.

NOTE: GDP = gross domestic product.