

CHAPTER IV

OPTIONS TO FURTHER ENHANCE THE SECURITY OF THE VISEGRAD STATES

This chapter looks at ways to improve the capability of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization to mount an effective, integrated defense of the territory of the Visegrad states. Each of the options is envisioned as an incremental increase in military capability, political capability, and cost to the options that precede it in the discussion. All improvements contained in the options in this chapter are added to the enhancements made to Visegrad forces and infrastructure in Chapter III. Unlike improving local forces--which would provide a defense for a border skirmish or limited war with a regional power--the options in this chapter would attempt to provide an Article V defense against an aggressive and militarily potent Russia.

Options in this chapter also represent different perspectives on providing an adequate defense for the Visegrad nations. Should a crisis occur, the first of these more ambitious options (Option II) would relocate NATO aircraft from Germany and other bases in Europe to prepared operating bases in the Visegrad nations. From there, according to advocates of airpower as the dominant force in warfare, they could be used to attack decisively and halt an invading enemy force. Even more ambitious is Option III. That option would, in the event of a crisis, also prepare facilities in the Visegrad states where NATO ground forces from Germany would be deployed to deter attack or to defend those nations if deterrence failed. Advocates of this more traditional view believe that substantial friendly ground forces are needed to stop an attacker with heavy forces. Option IV would preposition stockpiles of military equipment in the Visegrad states so that forces could be flown in to operate them in a time of crisis. That option would allow heavy NATO ground forces to arrive at the front faster during the most dangerous early stages of a crisis when local forces are in the most danger of being overrun. Option V--the most ambitious of all--would station a limited number of non-German NATO ground and air forces (equipment and personnel) on the territory of the Visegrad states (the forces would be drawn from those now based in Germany). Those forces would provide an early defense and also act as an even stronger political symbol of NATO's commitment to defend those states than would prepositioned equipment. The forces would also organize training exercises and maintain facilities that would receive larger forces in time of war.

If the parliaments of the 16 member nations actually voted to expand NATO, the current low-threat environment would probably allow those legislative bodies to spend as much or as little as they chose to carry out the expansion. Should the threat

increase--that is, if Russia dramatically improved the readiness of its existing forces--the more ambitious and costly options cited above would need to be considered.

OPTION II: PROJECT NATO AIR POWER EAST TO DEFEND THE VISEGRAD STATES

This option adopts an alternative developed by some analysts to use the improved Visegrad forces (see Chapter III) as a holding or delaying force so that NATO air power, operating from bases on the territory of new member states, could destroy enemy forces. In Option I, the presumption was that the air forces of current NATO members, if needed to reinforce Visegrad forces, would operate from their existing bases in neighboring nations (Germany, Italy, and the United Kingdom). In this option, NATO air power would be deployed to and operate from prepared bases in the Visegrad nation when that country was under threat. This option is similar to a situation in which some of the U.S. aircraft helping a ground force of primarily local units initially defend South Korea would fly from Japan to prepared bases on the Korean peninsula.

This option has its pros and cons. Flying from prepared bases--called co-located operating bases, or COBs--is a much more efficient way of conducting air operations than flying aircraft from bases in Western Europe. As a result of decreasing the distance to targets, efficiency would be enhanced by increasing the number of sorties aircraft could fly, increasing the number of weapons they could carry, and reducing fuel consumption. According to some Air Force officials, preparing a Visegrad nation's air bases to receive NATO aircraft in time of crisis also sends a signal of NATO's commitment to defend that country. Building COBs in the Visegrad states would eliminate the need to buy tankers for Western European air forces cited in Option I.

Alternatively, operating aircraft from COBs in the Visegrad states has its disadvantages. Being closer to the enemy means that the enemy is closer to you. Using COBs would require that an effective air defense system ensured air supremacy over the Visegrad nations so that allied bases and aircraft were not subject to damage from enemy action. Although Russia's air power after the Cold War has greatly declined in both numbers of aircraft and readiness, it still possesses large numbers of aircraft and a substantial military capability.

Operating aircraft from Germany rather than creating COBs is less costly, probably less threatening to Russia, and less likely to lead to the suppressing or destroying of aircraft because Germany is politically and militarily harder to attack than the Visegrad nations. Air Force officials also note that conducting air operations

from Germany might be more effective because of its better support structure, including better communications and access to national intelligence sources.

Although ignoring whether NATO aircraft would be based in Germany or Poland, a RAND wargaming model--with assumptions similar to those of the Congressional Budget Office on the Russian threat and the number of defending NATO aircraft--showed that NATO aircraft, in combination with a holding force of unimproved Polish ground forces, could successfully halt the advance of a potential Russian attacker.¹ CBO's option might be even more effective against this threat because it would improve Poland's forces significantly.

CBO estimated that preparing to project air power east to defend the Visegrad states would add \$18.6 billion to the cost of expansion (see Table 4).² Of that amount, the cost to the United States was estimated at \$4.6 billion, the cost to NATO allies at \$10.3 billion, and the cost to new members at about \$3.6 billion.

Create Colocated Operating Bases

Several actions would need to be taken to create COBs in the Visegrad states and support them. This option assumes that sufficient numbers of COBs would be created in the Visegrad states to house 11½ wings of NATO aircraft (eight of 10 air wings of the German air force, one British air wing based in Germany, and the two and one-half U.S. air wings now based in Europe). In other words, if a Visegrad nation was attacked, the alliance would be expected to deploy most existing NATO aircraft based in Germany plus all U.S. aircraft based in Europe. (Two German air wings would remain in Germany for air defense.) Because Western defense budgets are declining, creating COBs for any more than 11½ air wings is probably not an effective alternative. If additional aircraft from NATO allies or the continental United States needed to be used in any conflict, however, they could be deployed to Germany and fly from the bases left empty by aircraft being deployed forward to COBs in the Visegrad states. As a result, no added facilities would be needed for those supplemental aircraft.

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1. Charles Kelley Jr., Daniel Fox, and Barry Wilson, "A First Look at Options for Poland," in Paul Davis, ed., *New Challenges for Defense Planning: Rethinking How Much Is Enough* (Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND, 1994), pp. 451-476.
 2. Because creating COBs in the Visegrad states would eliminate the need to buy tankers for European air forces, the costs of the tankers have been subtracted to arrive at this figure.

To create a COB for NATO aircraft to be deployed to and operate from in time of crisis would involve modifying an existing air base in a Visegrad state. In general, the Visegrad nations have sufficient airfield space today to support the deployment of NATO aircraft because they have reduced the size of their own air forces. Extensive modifications to Visegrad air bases, however, would probably be needed because most are in poor condition. Runways would need repair and reinforcement. New command, control, and communications equipment and modern air traffic control facilities would probably be needed. Additional hangar space (hardened shelters) and upgraded barracks, mess halls, and maintenance and repair shops would be required. After the COBs were created, costs would also be incurred to operate and support them.

The Congressional Budget Office estimates that creating, operating, and supporting COBs in the Visegrad states for 11½ wings of NATO aircraft would cost \$8 billion (this figure includes short-range air defense systems that would be

TABLE 4. SUMMARY OF THE COSTS FOR THE 1996-2010 PERIOD TO CARRY OUT OPTION II: PROJECT NATO AIR POWER EAST (In billions of 1997 dollars)

Activity	Cost to the United States	Cost to U.S. Allies	Cost to Members	Total Cost
Create and Operate and Maintain COBs (Including air defenses)	1.8	5.9	0.3	8.0
Stockpile Ammunition and Fuel Near Bases	1.8	5.7	0.3	7.7
Extend NATO Pipeline to COBs	0.1	0.3	0	0.4
Make Improvements So Allied Aircraft Can Project Power	0	0.8	0	0.8
Conduct Exercises	1.0	2.6	3.0	6.6
Eliminate the Need for Tankers in Option I	0	-5.0	0	-5.0
Total	4.6	10.3	3.6	18.6

SOURCE: Congressional Budget Office.

NOTE: NATO = North Atlantic Treaty Organization; COBs = colocated operating bases.

needed to protect the bases because they were close to the front). Because those expenses would be eligible for funding by the Security Investment Program, CBO estimates the cost to the United States to be \$1.8 billion.

Stockpile Extra Ammunition and Fuel

Enough fuel and ammunition would be stockpiled at the COBs to last the aircraft being deployed there for 30 days. The United States and NATO nations would need to purchase fuel and ammunition, so those expenses would be their responsibility. Tanks and environmentally controlled bunkers would have to be built, operated, and supported. CBO assumed that NATO would pay for building those facilities and operating and maintaining them.

CBO estimates that the total cost of stockpiling fuel and ammunition would be \$7.7 billion. U.S. costs are estimated at \$1.8 billion.

Extend the NATO Pipeline to Colocated Operating Bases

The NATO pipeline system, complete with pumping stations, would be extended to distribute fuel to all COBs in the Visegrad states. The SIP would finance the cost of constructing the extension, and NATO's military budget would pay the cost of operating and maintaining it. CBO estimates that extending the NATO pipeline to all COBs would cost about \$400 million. Estimated cost to the United States would be about \$100 million.

Allow NATO Aircraft to Project Power

To be deployed to COBs in the Visegrad states during a contingency, non-U.S., allied aircraft would need mobile engineers, maintenance units, medical units, and other support assets that are already contained in U.S. air wings. CBO estimates that those items would cost \$800 million. Because those enhancements are the responsibility of allied governments, however, the United States would not incur any costs.

Hold More Frequent Exercises

More frequent exercises (once every two years) would be held using U.S. and West European aircraft, operating from COBs, to supplement Visegrad air and ground forces during a crisis. Member nations are usually responsible for financing the cost of fuel and other operations and support to participate in NATO exercises. However,

because the Visegrad nations are unlikely to be able to pay the entire cost of sending their forces, CBO assumed that Germany and the United States would each pay 10 percent of their costs. In addition, NATO's military budget usually finances some of the costs of setting up the exercise. CBO assumed that this expense would be 10 percent of the total cost.

CBO estimates that more frequent NATO exercises in the Visegrad states would cost an added \$6.6 billion during the 1996-2010 period. The cost for U.S. forces both to participate and to finance 10 percent of Visegrad expenses is estimated at \$1 billion.

OPTION III: PROJECT POWER EASTWARD WITH GROUND FORCES BASED IN GERMANY

When a Visegrad nation was under threat, this option would add ground forces to the air power flowing east. Almost all of the 11 NATO divisions based in Germany--six of seven German divisions, one French division, one British division, one-third of a Belgian division (one brigade), one-third of a Dutch division (one brigade), and one and one-third U.S. division equivalents (four brigades)--would move east to facilities in the Visegrad nations. (One German division would remain in Germany for defensive purposes; it could be augmented by other allied forces from their home countries if needed.)

This option also relies on five prepositioned stockpiles of weapons (equivalent to five brigades) located in Luxembourg, Italy, and the Netherlands. In time of crisis, the personnel to operate that military equipment would be flown in from the United States. After the equipment was manned with airlifted personnel, the equipment would be driven overland to a Visegrad state under threat. Therefore, a total of 11 $\frac{2}{3}$ divisions would be available to defend the Visegrad states. Because those forces seem formidable enough to counter the worst-case threat of a resurgent, aggressive, and militarily potent Russia and because NATO countries seem unwilling to increase the size of forces stationed forward, CBO assumed a defense composed of existing forces. Furthermore, if other reinforcements from NATO nations or the United States were needed, they could join the battle later, but they would not need to have reception facilities built for them in the Visegrad nations.

Planning to send Western ground forces to assist a Visegrad state under threat of attack offers several advantages. First, planning to send ground forces in this situation is often considered a greater symbol of commitment to defend an ally than is planning to send only air power. Second, a stronger defense can be mounted when both air and ground power are sent before an attack. More combat power can be amassed, and the enemy must fight simultaneously against the synergistic effects of

both ground and air power. Third, although NATO and Visegrad aircraft and Visegrad ground forces might be able to stop an attack, a rapid counteroffensive to regain any lost territory might be difficult without NATO ground forces.

Committing ground forces also has several disadvantages. First, it puts large numbers of NATO military personnel at risk. Second, it raises the stakes of the conflict and could turn a lesser dispute into a wider conflict. Third, German forces--the core of those sent to assist the Visegrad states--would need the ability to project power. That ability might cause concern among other Western European allies or Russia.

Improvements needed to move ground forces eastward in time of crisis would raise the cost of expansion. CBO estimates that the total cost to add ground forces to the air power flowing east would be \$30.1 billion. Of that amount, the cost to the United States is estimated at \$3.6 billion; to NATO allies, \$20.3 billion; and to new members, \$6.2 billion (see Table 5).

Enhance Allied Ground Forces to Allow Them to Project Power

Several steps would need to be taken so that ground forces could flow east if a Visegrad state was threatened. The forces of the Western European allies have only a limited ability to move from their bases in Germany. Hence, because the Germans are providing over half of the divisions that would flow eastward in this scheme of defense, it is particularly crucial that they develop the capabilities to project power. Once again, to project power, those forces need more combat support, such as a reinforcing artillery brigade, more air defenses, and additional helicopters for lifting troops. They also need more support to make them more agile, such as additional combat engineers, military police, maintenance and mobile repair units, self-contained logistics (for example, ammunition handling and storage) and transportation (trucks and heavy equipment transporters), better communications, and medical units (including a combat support hospital).

In many NATO nations, the military now contracts with civilian organizations to provide some of the support capabilities. That procedure might be adequate for allied forces defending-in-place in Germany, but it might not be adequate if those forces flowed east to defend a Visegrad state. Using military assets to project power, however, is usually more expensive than using civilian assets. If all eight and two-thirds non-U.S. allied divisions in Germany were so outfitted, it would cost about \$12.9 billion. Because NATO requires national forces assigned to it to provide their own weapons and support and because U.S. forces already possess most of those assets, no cost to the United States would accrue. Existing NATO allies would be required to pay the entire cost.

Make U.S. Forces in Germany More Mobile

Although U.S. forces have a much greater ability to project power on the ground than allied armies, they experienced some deficiencies in mobility during the Persian Gulf War. The United States suffered a shortage of heavy equipment transporters and heavy vehicles. During the Cold War, high-quality Western European railroads lessened the need for such vehicles. Because the railroads in the Visegrad nations are much less adequate and modern precision-guided weapons make them vulnerable, such vehicles might become more important if NATO forces had to defend those nations in a crisis.

CBO estimates that the added number of vehicles needed to completely fill out the four U.S. brigades stationed in Germany and to haul the five sets of pre-positioned equipment (five brigades) would cost \$1.2 billion. Because nations are usually required to pay most expenses for equipping and supplying their forces, the United States would be required to finance all of those costs.

TABLE 5. SUMMARY OF THE COSTS FOR THE 1996-2010 PERIOD TO CARRY OUT OPTION III: PROJECT POWER EASTWARD WITH GROUND FORCES IN GERMANY (In billions of 1997 dollars)

Activity	Cost to the United States	Cost to NATO Allies	Cost to New Members	Total Cost
Enhance Allied Ground Forces for Power Projection Missions	0	12.9	0	12.9
Make U.S. Forces in Germany More Mobile	1.2	0	0	1.2
Create Reception Facilities for Ground Forces (Including air defenses)	0.7	2.3	0.1	3.1
Extend the NATO Pipeline	0	0.1	0	0.2
Stockpile Fuel and Munitions	0.2	0.8	0	1.1
Conduct Regular Large-Scale Exercises in the Visegrad States	1.5	4.2	6.0	11.8
Total	3.6	20.3	6.2	30.1

SOURCE: Congressional Budget Office.

NOTE: NATO = North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

Create Reception Facilities for Ground Forces

NATO ground forces flowing east to reinforce the Visegrad nations would need facilities in those nations to receive them. Reception facilities for ground forces could be located at abandoned bases in the Visegrad states to take advantage of some of the existing infrastructure. Reception facilities include upgraded barracks, mess halls, and facilities for maintaining equipment. They also include hangars for helicopters, rail sidings and facilities for unloading train cars, and parking lots to rearrange equipment from its configuration for transportation to its configuration as fighting units. Reception facilities at existing air bases include extra hangars for aircraft and warehouses to store incoming material. Since reception facilities would be fairly close to the front, short-range air defenses would also be needed to protect them from attack.

The cost of creating reception facilities would be \$3.1 billion. Because such costs are eligible for the Security Investment Program, the costs to the United States are estimated at \$700 million.

Extend the NATO Pipeline

NATO would extend its fuel pipeline to all such staging and marshaling areas. CBO estimates that such an extension would cost about \$200 million. Because such costs are eligible for the SIP, CBO estimates that costs to the United States would be less than \$100 million.

Stockpile Fuel and Munitions

Thirty days' worth of fuel and ammunition for incoming NATO forces would be purchased and stockpiled in tanks and hardened environmentally controlled bunkers, respectively. Purchasing the fuel and ammunition is a national responsibility. But NATO would finance building the facilities and operating and maintaining them. CBO estimates that the total cost would be \$1.1 billion and the cost to the United States would be about \$200 million.

Exercises in the Visegrad States

Conducting more regular (once a year) large-scale exercises would be necessary, with NATO forces flowing east to reception facilities and COBs in the Visegrad states and U.S. forces flying in to join their five brigades of prepositioned equipment in Western Europe.

Normally, each nation must pay its own costs for participating in NATO exercises. Because the Visegrad nations are unlikely to be able to pay the entire cost of participating, however, CBO assumed that Germany and the United States would each pay 10 percent of their costs. In addition, NATO's military budget usually finances some of the costs of setting up the exercise. CBO assumed that expense to be 10 percent of the total cost.

CBO estimates that more frequent NATO exercises in the Visegrad states would cost an added \$11.8 billion during the 1996-2010 period. The cost for U.S. forces to both participate and finance 10 percent of Visegrad expenses is estimated at \$1.5 billion.

OPTION IV: MOVE STOCKS OF PREPOSITIONED EQUIPMENT EAST

Instead of transporting forces generated from five sets of prepositioned military equipment overland from Western Europe (their current location) in time of crisis, those stocks could be permanently stationed near air bases in the Visegrad states. During a crisis, troops from the continental United States would fly into the air bases to join their equipment that was located in concealed areas.

Stationing the prepositioned equipment in the Visegrad states would allow the five U.S. brigades to respond to a threat in those nations much more quickly. The move would save the time needed to transport the equipment overland through Western Europe. Alternatively, with the end of the Cold War, the United States has already paid to restation equipment from Germany to locations nearer to Dutch and Belgian ports (in the Netherlands and Luxembourg) so that it could be shipped quickly to points of crisis outside the area of the North Atlantic Treaty.

Stationing the equipment instead in the Visegrad states might make getting the equipment to certain "out-of-area" operations slower and more difficult. That dilemma may illustrate a larger conflict between the goal of admitting new members and tailoring forces to defend them and the goal of responding to out-of-area crises quickly. Yet if these forces needed to be deployed to the Balkan countries, they might be closer to their destinations. Although Russia might view prepositioned equipment in the Visegrad states as a threatening gesture, it might also see it as less provocative than permanently stationing NATO forces in those nations.

Although the equipment already exists for those stocks, moving it across Europe and building facilities to hold it would incur costs. Some maintenance facilities might also need to be built. CBO estimates that such actions would cost an added \$1.2 billion (see Table 6). The costs to the United States are estimated at \$300 million. The European allies would finance most of the remaining \$900 million; the

cost to new members would be less than \$100 million. The costs of moving the equipment would accrue to the United States, whereas SIP would cover the costs of building storage and maintenance facilities and operating and maintaining them.

OPTION V: STATION A LIMITED NUMBER OF FORCES FORWARD

Under this option, limited numbers of NATO forces would be permanently stationed on the territories of new member states. Two and two-thirds division equivalents of ground forces (one U.S. division equivalent, two French brigades, two British brigades, and one Dutch brigade) and one British and one American air wing--all now based in Germany--would be permanently stationed in the Visegrad states. If a Visegrad state was threatened, however, most air and ground forces would continue to move east from their bases in Germany and other parts of Europe--that is, six of seven German divisions, one and one-third division equivalents of allied ground forces (one brigade from Belgium, France, the United Kingdom, and the United States still stationed in Germany), eight German air wings, and the one and one-half U.S. wings based in Italy and the United Kingdom.

Considering the political sensitivities in Europe of German forces being stationed outside Germany, CBO assumed that none of the forces stationed in the Visegrad states would be German. It was also assumed that a small number of forces

TABLE 6. SUMMARY OF THE COSTS FOR THE 1996-2010 PERIOD TO CARRY OUT OPTION IV: MOVE STOCKS OF PREPOSITIONED EQUIPMENT EAST (In billions of 1997 dollars)

Activity	Cost to the United States	Cost to NATO Allies	Cost to New Members	Total Cost
Move Prepositioned Equipment from Western Europe to the Visegrad States	0.02	0	0	0.02
Build Storage Sites and Maintenance Facilities for the Equipment	0.27	0.89	0.05	1.21
Total	0.29	0.89	0.05	1.23

SOURCE: Congressional Budget Office.

NOTE: NATO = North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

from each of four allied nations would remain based in Germany as an additional means to reassure European nations. The rest of the allied troops in Germany would be restationed forward in the Visegrad states.

CBO did not analyze an option to station large numbers of forces in the Visegrad states for a number of reasons. Although stationing large numbers of forces there would allow a more rapid defense, it might have disadvantages militarily. In an environment in which both the threat and the threatened nation were uncertain, stationing such large forces forward might lead to an inflexible defense. The lack of north-south roads in the Visegrad states and vulnerable mountain passes in Slovakia might preclude the shifting of forces from their permanent stations to the allied country being attacked.

Russia would probably react strongly to a large permanent presence by NATO forces in the Visegrad states. Also, permanently deploying large numbers of forces would require either stationing German forces on foreign soil or using more troops from other allies, including the United States. The first alternative could cause fears of renewed German expansionism and the second is probably politically infeasible given the trend in NATO of withdrawing forces from foreign soil. Finally, the cost of facilities to support the permanent stationing of large numbers of forces is probably prohibitive, especially given the decline in the defense budgets of most NATO nations. CBO estimates that it would cost an added \$56 billion to station 10 ground divisions and 11½ air wings permanently in the Visegrad states.

In a time of little and uncertain threat, stationing a smaller number of forces forward and holding the bulk of forces in Germany as a mobile reserve to reinforce any Visegrad nation under threat of attack would provide a more flexible defense. That is, there may be a positive trade-off between improving road and rail transportation to improve the speed of reinforcement (see Option I) and the costly stationing of large numbers of forces. Russia might still have an adverse reaction to that smaller forward contingent, but it would probably be less severe than if large numbers of forces were stationed forward. Also, stationing only a small number of non-German forces in the new member states would send a political signal of NATO's commitment to defend them. At the same time, it would limit costs, the number of allied troops stationed on Visegrad soil, and fears of renewed German expansionism.

CBO's military options were designed with the current security situation in East Central Europe in mind. In the unlikely event that Russia abrogated its commitments under the Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe, began to increase the size of its armed forces substantially, and undertook a more aggressive foreign policy toward the East Central European region, the NATO countries would probably have

to incur the high costs of permanently stationing large numbers of forces there to guarantee a credible defense of the Visegrad states.

If a decision was made to base small numbers of forces permanently in the Visegrad nations, they would probably be stationed at local bases made available by the post-Cold War reduction in Visegrad military forces. Based on unclassified information from U.S. intelligence agencies, the poor condition of those bases would require extensive rehabilitation of existing facilities and many new ones to bring them up to Western standards.

CBO estimated that the added cost to station a limited number of NATO ground forces in the Visegrad nations would be \$14.2 billion. The SIP would pay the costs to construct or rehabilitate operational facilities, such as runways or hangars for aircraft. Countries stationing forces are required to pay for their own support facilities, such as facilities for dependents and morale, welfare, and recreation. Most of the operational facilities, however, were financed under Option II and III; thus, the incremental cost of Option V would be mainly for support facilities. The added cost to the United States was estimated at \$5.5 billion and the cost to the NATO allies at \$8.7 billion; the cost to new members was negligible.

To base forces permanently in the Visegrad nations, the following items will need to be financed (see Table 7).

Bases for Ground Forces

The bases will need modern barracks, mess halls, storage facilities, commissaries, schools, hospitals, family housing, and facilities for morale, welfare, and recreation (so-called MWR), which include gymnasiums and child development centers. Because those are not operational facilities, they would have to be financed by the countries stationing the forces. CBO estimates that the facilities for two and two-thirds divisions of NATO forces stationed forward would cost \$12.5 billion. Stationing the equivalent of one division of U.S. ground forces forward is estimated to cost \$4.7 billion.

Main Operating Bases for Air Wings

Unlike COBs, which are bases in a host nation used by NATO aircraft only during a crisis, main operating bases (MOBs) are used for permanently stationing NATO aircraft. MOBs have more permanent facilities than COBs. In addition, all of the facilities for dependents of military personnel and morale, welfare, and recreation needed for ground force bases would also be required for MOBs. Because those are

not operational facilities, they would have to be financed by the countries stationing the forces. Creating MOB's for two air wings (one British and one American) was estimated to cost \$1.1 billion. The cost for the U.S. air wing's MOB was estimated at about \$600 million. (See Box 1 for a discussion of the implications if NATO decided to station nuclear weapons on the territories of Visegrad states.)

Expenses for Moving the Forces East

NATO members would incur costs to move air and ground forces from bases in Germany to new bases in the Visegrad states. Each nation is required to pay the costs of moving its own forces forward. CBO estimates that those expenses would be \$70 million. The cost to move one wing of U.S. air forces and one division equivalent of U.S. ground forces was estimated at \$30 million.

TABLE 7. SUMMARY OF THE COSTS FOR THE 1996-2010 PERIOD TO CARRY OUT OPTION V: STATION A LIMITED NUMBER OF FORCES FORWARD
(In billions of 1997 dollars)

Activity	Cost to the United States	Cost to NATO Allies	Cost to New Members	Total Cost
Upgrade Bases for Ground Forces (Modern barracks, mess halls, commissaries, schools, hospitals, family housing, and facilities for morale, welfare, and recreation)	4.7	7.8	0	12.5
Upgrade Main Operating Bases for Aircraft (Many facilities are the same as for bases supporting ground forces)	0.6	0.6	0	1.1
Move the Forces East	0	0	0	0.1
Operate and Support the Bases	0	0	0	0
Close Existing Bases in Germany	0.2	0.3	0	0.5
Total	5.5	8.7	0	14.2

SOURCE: Congressional Budget Office.

NOTE: NATO = North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

Operating and Supporting the Bases

CBO assumed that over time the costs to operate and support bases for air and ground forces in the Visegrad states would be about the same as those in Germany. The cost of living in those nations would probably be below that of Germany, at least for some years until their economies completed the current transitional phase. A lower cost of living makes products purchased from the local economy less expensive. For example, military fuel and utilities for the bases might cost less than in Germany. Alternatively, the dilapidated condition of local Visegrad military bases might increase operation and support costs. CBO assumed that those factors offset each other. Thus, it did not include any additional costs for operations and support for forces that were moved from Germany to the Visegrad states.

Closing Existing Bases in Germany

The bases in Germany housing the two and two-thirds ground divisions and two air wings that would be restationed to the Visegrad nations would have to be closed. Costs would include shutting down the facilities and cleaning up the bases so that they met environmental standards. Each NATO nation would have to pay for the cost of closing down its own bases. CBO estimates the total cost of closing the bases to be \$500 million. The costs to close U.S. bases are estimated at \$200 million.

BOX 1.
NUCLEAR GUARANTEES TO NEW MEMBERS

Article V of the North Atlantic Treaty states that if an alliance member is attacked, each ally will assist that nation by such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force. In effect, this assistance includes the use of the nuclear forces of the alliance to shield any member against an attack. During the Cold War, American nuclear weapons were seen as offsetting the quantitatively superior forces of the Warsaw Pact.

According to the September 1995 NATO study on enlarging the alliance, "The coverage provided by Article 5, including its nuclear component, will apply to new members." The study, however, states the following:

There is no a priori requirement for the stationing of nuclear weapons on the territory of new members. In light of both the current international environment and the potential threats facing the Alliance, NATO's current nuclear posture will, for the foreseeable future, continue to meet the requirements of an enlarged Alliance. There is, therefore, no need now to change or modify any aspect of NATO's nuclear posture or policy, but the longer-term implications of enlargement for both will continue to be evaluated. NATO should retain its existing nuclear capabilities along with its right to modify its nuclear posture as the circumstances warrant. . . .¹

Retaining NATO's current nuclear policy seems designed to mitigate Russian sensitivities but at the same time to keep the option to station nuclear weapons in new member states if the threat to them becomes more severe.

Some analysts question, however, whether the United States, to defend the Visegrad states in a post-Cold War world, would be willing to use nuclear weapons--perhaps inviting a nuclear counterattack on the U.S. mainland. In other words, they believe that extending the U.S. nuclear guarantee to cover these states is not credible. They argue that the credibility would be especially lacking if NATO did not station short-range or intermediate-range nuclear weapons on the soil of the Visegrad states and instead relied on U.S. strategic weapons--intercontinental ballistic missiles and submarine-launched ballistic missiles--for a nuclear guarantee to these new members. Other analysts argue that the location of the weapons is less important than the guarantee itself. They maintain that nonstrategic nuclear weapons could be flown in quickly during a crisis. In fact, basing those weapons forward might present a security problem in the event of a conflict or the threat of one.

Yet if NATO's current nuclear policy was changed to deploy nuclear weapons in the Visegrad states, reconstituting the forces to do so might be difficult and expensive. The Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty of 1987 led to the removal and destruction of all intermediate-range nuclear missiles based in Europe.

1. North Atlantic Treaty Organization, *Study on NATO Enlargement* (Brussels: NATO, September 1995).

**BOX 1.
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Furthermore, in 1991, unilateral actions by the United States and the Soviet Union, under Presidents George Bush and Mikhail Gorbachev, removed and set for destruction all short-range battlefield nuclear weapons (nuclear shells fired from field artillery and short-range nuclear missiles) from Europe.

Because it takes a long time to dismantle nuclear artillery shells, many in the U.S. inventory have not yet been destroyed. If the alliance policy that avoids stationing nuclear forces in new member nations continues for even a few years (new members may not even be formally admitted until the end of the decade or beyond), those short-range weapons will probably have been destroyed. Thus, the United States would have to start manufacturing short-range nuclear weapons again. It would, moreover, incur the costs of reconstituting the production lines to manufacture them and the military units needed to employ them. Any testing of them might be constrained by a comprehensive test ban (CTB), which is currently being negotiated. Manufacturing intermediate-range nuclear missiles and stationing them in Europe would violate the INF treaty.

If the alliance wanted to station nuclear weapons in the Visegrad nations, a more likely alternative would be to use "dual capable" aircraft--that is, aircraft that can deliver both conventional and nuclear weapons. Many tactical fighters can drop air-delivered nuclear bombs, which are still stockpiled in Europe. Thus, CBO assumed that the British and U.S. fighter wings to be stationed in the Visegrad states under Option V could conduct such missions. The existing stockpiles of nuclear bombs would have to be moved from elsewhere in Europe to hardened and secure storage facilities built for them in the Visegrad states; added manpower would be necessary, including that needed for security. CBO estimates that those changes would cost \$2 billion. The costs to the United States are estimated at \$900 million. CBO assumed that NATO would finance the costs of building storage facilities and operating and maintaining them. The costs for adding personnel and moving the weapons would probably be funded by the United States and the United Kingdom.

However, if the stationing of nuclear weapons in the Visegrad states so alarmed Russia that a new nuclear arms race in Europe ensued, the costs to the United States could be much higher. Many new nuclear bombs and nuclear-capable aircraft might have to be manufactured and the units established to employ them, all resulting in increased costs for research and development, procurement, and operations and support. Those developments might undercut existing arms control treaties, those under negotiation (the CTB), and the unilateral actions on short-range weapons undertaken by Presidents Bush and Gorbachev.

Even if the stockpiles of nuclear bombs were not moved into the Visegrad states, the prospect of having nuclear-capable dual-use aircraft stationed in those nations could make Russia uneasy. The Russians might reason that the bombs could be moved quickly into those states during a crisis.

